Linux kernel ============ This file was moved to Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst Please notice that there are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or ``make pdfdocs``. There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory, several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation. See Documentation/00-INDEX for a list of what is contained in each file. Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.
The lack of newlines in preceding format strings is a clear indication
that these were meant to be continuations of one another, and indeed
output ends up quite a bit more compact (and readable) that way.
Switch other plain printk()-s in the function instances to pr_info(),
as requested.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59A7D72B0200007800175E4E@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
sme_encrypt_execute() stashes the stack pointer on entry into %rbp
because it allocates a one-page stack in the non-encrypted area for the
encryption routine to use. When the latter is done, it restores it from
%rbp again, before returning.
However, it uses the FRAME_* macros partially but restores %rsp from
%rbp explicitly with a MOV. And this is fine as long as the macros
*actually* do something.
Unless, you do a !CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER build where those macros
are empty. Then, we still restore %rsp from %rbp but %rbp contains
*something* and this leads to a stack corruption. The manifestation
being a triple-fault during early boot when testing SME. Good luck to me
debugging this with the clumsy endless-loop-in-asm method and narrowing
it down gradually. :-(
So, long story short, open-code the frame macros so that there's no
monkey business and we avoid subtly breaking SME depending on the
.config.
Fixes: 6ebcb060713f ("x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170827163924.25552-1-bp@alien8.de
The following commit:
d0ec49d4de90 ("kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM")
uses __sme_clr() to remove the C-bit in rsvd_bits(). rsvd_bits() is
just a simple function to return some 1 bits. Applying a mask based
on properties of the host MMU is incorrect. Additionally, the masks
computed by __reset_rsvds_bits_mask also apply to guest page tables,
where the C bit is reserved since we don't emulate SME.
The fix is to clear the C-bit from rsvd_bits_mask array after it has been
populated from __reset_rsvds_bits_mask()
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paolo.bonzini@gmail.com
Fixes: d0ec49d ("kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170825205540.123531-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Align them vertically for better readability and use BIT_ULL() macro.
No functionality change.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170821080651.4527-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull more rdma fixes from Doug Ledford:
"Well, I thought we were going to be done for this -rc cycle. I should
have known better than to say so though.
We have four additional items that trickled in.
One was a simple mistake on my part. I took a patch into my for-next
thinking that the issue was less severe than it was. I was then
notified that it needed to be in my -rc area instead.
The other three were just found late in testing.
Summary:
- One core fix accidentally applied first to for-next and then cherry
picked back because it needed to be in the -rc cycles instead
- Another core fix
- Two mlx5 fixes"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dledford/rdma:
IB/mlx5: Always return success for RoCE modify port
IB/mlx5: Fix Raw Packet QP event handler assignment
IB/core: Avoid accessing non-allocated memory when inferring port type
RDMA/uverbs: Initialize cq_context appropriately
Speculative processor accesses may reference any memory that has a
valid page table entry. While a speculative access won't generate
a machine check, it will log the error in a machine check bank. That
could cause escalation of a subsequent error since the overflow bit
will be then set in the machine check bank status register.
Code has to be double-plus-tricky to avoid mentioning the 1:1 virtual
address of the page we want to map out otherwise we may trigger the
very problem we are trying to avoid. We use a non-canonical address
that passes through the usual Linux table walking code to get to the
same "pte".
Thanks to Dave Hansen for reviewing several iterations of this.
Also see:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=149860136413338&w=2
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816171803.28342-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull ACPI fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix two recent regressions (in ACPICA and in the ACPI EC driver)
and one bug in code introduced during the 4.12 cycle (ACPI device
properties library routine).
Specifics:
- Fix a regression in the ACPI EC driver causing a kernel to crash
during initialization on some systems due to a code ordering issue
exposed by a recent change (Lv Zheng).
- Fix a recent regression in ACPICA due to a change of the behavior
of a library function in a way that is not backwards compatible
with some existing callers of it (Rafael Wysocki).
- Fix a coding mistake in a library function related to the handling
of ACPI device properties introduced during the 4.12 cycle (Sakari
Ailus)"
* tag 'acpi-4.13-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: device property: Fix node lookup in acpi_graph_get_child_prop_value()
ACPICA: Fix acpi_evaluate_object_typed()
ACPI: EC: Fix regression related to wrong ECDT initialization order
CM layer calls ib_modify_port() regardless of the link layer.
For the Ethernet ports, qkey violation and Port capabilities
are meaningless. Therefore, always return success for ib_modify_port
calls on the Ethernet ports.
Cc: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
The arch_apei_get_mem_attributes() function is used to set the page
protection type for ACPI physical addresses. When SME is active, the
associated protection type cannot have the encryption mask set since the
ACPI tables live in un-encrypted memory - the kernel will see corrupted
data.
To fix this, create a new protection type, PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC, that is a
'no encryption' version of PAGE_KERNEL, and return that from
arch_apei_get_mem_attributes().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e1cb9395b2f061cd96f1e59c3cbbe5ff5d4ec26e.1501186516.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:
- fix linker script regression caused by dead code elimination support
- fix typos and outdated comments
- specify kselftest-clean as a PHONY target
- fix "make dtbs_install" when $(srctree) includes shell special
characters like '~'
- Move -fshort-wchar to the global option list because defining it
partially emits warnings
* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v4.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
kbuild: update comments of Makefile.asm-generic
kbuild: Do not use hyphen in exported variable name
Makefile: add kselftest-clean to PHONY target list
Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally
fixdep: trivial: typo fix and correction
kbuild: trivial cleanups on the comments
kbuild: linker script do not match C names unless LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION is configured
* acpica-fix:
ACPICA: Fix acpi_evaluate_object_typed()
* acpi-ec-fix:
ACPI: EC: Fix regression related to wrong ECDT initialization order
* acpi-properties-fix:
ACPI: device property: Fix node lookup in acpi_graph_get_child_prop_value()
In case we have SQ and RQ for Raw Packet QP, the SQ's event handler
wasn't assigned.
Fixing this by assigning event handler for each WQ after creation.
[ 1877.145243] Call Trace:
[ 1877.148644] <IRQ>
[ 1877.150580] [<ffffffffa07987c5>] ? mlx5_rsc_event+0x105/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1877.159581] [<ffffffffa0795bd7>] ? mlx5_cq_event+0x57/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1877.167137] [<ffffffffa079208e>] mlx5_eq_int+0x53e/0x6c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1877.174526] [<ffffffff8101a679>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[ 1877.180753] [<ffffffff810f717e>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3e/0x1e0
[ 1877.188014] [<ffffffff810f735d>] handle_irq_event+0x3d/0x60
[ 1877.194567] [<ffffffff810f9fe7>] handle_edge_irq+0x77/0x130
[ 1877.201129] [<ffffffff81014c3f>] handle_irq+0xbf/0x150
[ 1877.207244] [<ffffffff815ed78a>] ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x20
[ 1877.214829] [<ffffffff815f434f>] do_IRQ+0x4f/0xf0
[ 1877.220498] [<ffffffff815e94ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d
[ 1877.227025] <EOI>
[ 1877.228967] [<ffffffff814834e2>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x52/0xc0
[ 1877.236990] [<ffffffff81483615>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xc5/0x200
[ 1877.243676] [<ffffffff8101bc7e>] arch_cpu_idle+0xe/0x30
[ 1877.249831] [<ffffffff810b4725>] cpu_startup_entry+0xf5/0x290
[ 1877.256513] [<ffffffff815cfee1>] start_secondary+0x265/0x27b
[ 1877.263111] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 1877.267296] RIP [< (null)>] (null)
[ 1877.273264] RSP <ffff88046fd63df8>
[ 1877.277531] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: 19098df2da78 ("IB/mlx5: Refactor mlx5_ib_qp to accommodate other QP types")
Signed-off-by: Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
After issuing successive kexecs it was found that the SHA hash failed
verification when booting the kexec'd kernel. When SME is enabled, the
change from using pages that were marked encrypted to now being marked as
not encrypted (through new identify mapped page tables) results in memory
corruption if there are any cache entries for the previously encrypted
pages. This is because separate cache entries can exist for the same
physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit.
To prevent this, issue a wbinvd if SME is active before copying the pages
from the source location to the destination location to clear any possible
cache entry conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e7fb8610af3a93e8f8ae6f214cd9249adc0df2b4.1501186516.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>