Bluetooth: use inclusive language in SMP

This patch replaces some non-inclusive terms based on the appropriate
language mapping table compiled by the Bluetooth SIG:
https://specificationrefs.bluetooth.com/language-mapping/Appropriate_Language_Mapping_Table.pdf

Specifically, these terms are replaced:
master -> initiator
slave -> responder

Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[e-mail]>

include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h

···
 struct mgmt_ltk_info {
 	struct mgmt_addr_info addr;
 	__u8	type;
-	__u8	master;
+	__u8	initiator;
 	__u8	enc_size;
 	__le16	ediv;
 	__le64	rand;

net/bluetooth/mgmt.c

···
 
 static bool ltk_is_valid(struct mgmt_ltk_info *key)
 {
-	if (key->master != 0x00 && key->master != 0x01)
+	if (key->initiator != 0x00 && key->initiator != 0x01)
 		return false;
 
 	switch (key->addr.type) {
···
 		switch (key->type) {
 		case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED:
 			authenticated = 0x00;
-			type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
+			type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
 			break;
 		case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED:
 			authenticated = 0x01;
-			type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE;
+			type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
 			break;
 		case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH:
 			authenticated = 0x00;
···
 {
 	switch (ltk->type) {
 	case SMP_LTK:
-	case SMP_LTK_SLAVE:
+	case SMP_LTK_RESPONDER:
 		if (ltk->authenticated)
 			return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED;
 		return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED;
···
 	ev.key.rand = key->rand;
 
 	if (key->type == SMP_LTK)
-		ev.key.master = 1;
+		ev.key.initiator = 1;
 
 	/* Make sure we copy only the significant bytes based on the
 	 * encryption key size, and set the rest of the value to zeroes.

net/bluetooth/smp.c

···
 	u8		id_addr_type;
 	u8		irk[16];
 	struct smp_csrk	*csrk;
-	struct smp_csrk	*slave_csrk;
+	struct smp_csrk	*responder_csrk;
 	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
-	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
+	struct smp_ltk	*responder_ltk;
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
 	u8		*link_key;
 	unsigned long	flags;
···
 	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 
 	kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
-	kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
 	kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
 
 	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
···
 			kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
 		}
 
-		if (smp->slave_ltk) {
-			list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
-			kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
+		if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
 		}
 
 		if (smp->remote_irk) {
···
 	int ret;
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
-		   conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+		   conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
 
 	ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
···
 		else
 			auth = 0;
 
-		/* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
-		 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
+		/* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
+		 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
 		 * STK never needs to be stored).
 		 */
 		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
···
 		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
 	}
 
-	if (smp->slave_csrk) {
-		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+	if (smp->responder_csrk) {
+		smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
 	}
 
 	if (smp->ltk) {
···
 		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
 	}
 
-	if (smp->slave_ltk) {
-		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+	if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+		smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
 	}
 
 	if (smp->link_key) {
···
 
 	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
 		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
-		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+		struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
 		struct smp_ltk *ltk;
 		u8 authenticated;
 		__le16 ediv;
···
 
 		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+				  SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
 				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
-		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+		smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
 
 		ident.ediv = ediv;
 		ident.rand = rand;
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
+			     &ident);
 
 		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
 	}
···
 				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
 			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
 		}
-		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+		smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
 
···
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
 	u8 auth;
 
-	/* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
+	/* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
 	if (hcon->out)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
···
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 
-	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+		   hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
···
 	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
 	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
 
-	/* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
+	/* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
 
 	return true;
···
 		/* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
 		 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
 		smp->ltk = NULL;
-		smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
+		smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
 		smp->remote_irk = NULL;
 
 		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
···
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 	}
 
-	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
···
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+		/* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
 		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 	}
 
···
 		reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
-	case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
-		reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+	case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
+		reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:

net/bluetooth/smp.h

···
 	__u8	ltk[16];
 } __packed;
 
-#define SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT	0x07
-struct smp_cmd_master_ident {
+#define SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT	0x07
+struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident {
 	__le16	ediv;
 	__le64	rand;
 } __packed;
···
 enum {
 	SMP_STK,
 	SMP_LTK,
-	SMP_LTK_SLAVE,
+	SMP_LTK_RESPONDER,
 	SMP_LTK_P256,
 	SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG,
 };