Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

- Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on
digitalSignature attribute in the certificate

- PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring

- PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring
(keys blessed by the vendor)

- tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode

- tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers

- Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g.
.machine keyring)

Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1]

* tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings
tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code
tpm: remove redundant variable len
tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors
tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors
tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine
tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling
KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings
KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction
tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

···
 			This will guarantee that all the other pcrs
 			are saved.
 
+	tpm_tis.interrupts= [HW,TPM]
+			Enable interrupts for the MMIO based physical layer
+			for the FIFO interface. By default it is set to false
+			(0). For more information about TPM hardware interfaces
+			defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) see
+			https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-platform-tpm-profile-ptp-specification/
+
 	tp_printk	[FTRACE]
 			Have the tracepoints sent to printk as well as the
 			tracing ring buffer. This is useful for early boot up

certs/system_keyring.c

···
 					  builtin_trusted_keys);
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin - Restrict digitalSignature key additions by the built-in keyring
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @restriction_key: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring. The new key
+ * must have the digitalSignature usage field set.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				    const struct key_type *type,
+				    const union key_payload *payload,
+				    struct key *restriction_key)
+{
+	return restrict_link_by_digsig(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+				       builtin_trusted_keys);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 /**
  * restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring
···
 					  secondary_trusted_keys);
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary - Restrict by digitalSignature.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @restrict_key: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system
+ * keyrings. The new key must have the digitalSignature usage field set.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *dest_keyring,
+						  const struct key_type *type,
+						  const union key_payload *payload,
+						  struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+	/* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
+	 * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
+	 */
+	if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
+	    dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+	    payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
+		/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
+		return 0;
+
+	return restrict_link_by_digsig(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+				       secondary_trusted_keys);
+}
+
 /*
  * Allocate a struct key_restriction for the "builtin and secondary trust"
  * keyring. Only for use in system_trusted_keyring_init().
···
 		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted;
 
 	return restriction;
+}
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
 }
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
···
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
+	ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
+	if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
+		pr_devel("PKCS#7 key is on revocation list\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
 	if (!trusted_keys) {
 		trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
 	} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) {
···
 		if (!trusted_keys) {
 			ret = -ENOKEY;
 			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
-			goto error;
-		}
-
-		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
-		if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
-			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
 			goto error;
 		}
 	}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c

···
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_digsig - Restrict additions to a ring of digsig keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate has digitalSignature usage set. If it is,
+ * then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. Afterwards verify
+ * the new certificate against the ones in the trust_keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a digsig. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			    const struct key_type *type,
+			    const union key_payload *payload,
+			    struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+
+	if (!pkey)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+					  trust_keyring);
+}
+
 static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
 			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
 {

drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm1.c

···
 
 static int tpm1_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
-	int len = 0;
 	char *eventname;
 	struct tcpa_event *event = v;
 	unsigned char *event_entry =
···
 	/* 3rd: event type identifier */
 	seq_printf(m, " %02x", do_endian_conversion(event->event_type));
 
-	len += get_event_name(eventname, event, event_entry);
+	get_event_name(eventname, event, event_entry);
 
 	/* 4th: eventname <= max + \'0' delimiter */
 	seq_printf(m, " %s\n", eventname);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c

···
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include "tpm.h"
 #include "tpm_tis_core.h"
 
···
 	tpm_tis_flush(iobase);
 }
 
-static int interrupts;
-module_param(interrupts, int, 0444);
+static bool interrupts;
+module_param(interrupts, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(interrupts, "Enable interrupts");
 
 static bool itpm;
···
 module_param(force, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force device probe rather than using ACPI entry");
 #endif
-
-static int tpm_tis_disable_irq(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
-{
-	if (interrupts == -1) {
-		pr_notice("tpm_tis: %s detected: disabling interrupts.\n", d->ident);
-		interrupts = 0;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static const struct dmi_system_id tpm_tis_dmi_table[] = {
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "Framework Laptop (12th Gen Intel Core)",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Framework"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Laptop (12th Gen Intel Core)"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "Framework Laptop (13th Gen Intel Core)",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Framework"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Laptop (13th Gen Intel Core)"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "ThinkPad T490s",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad T490s"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "ThinkStation P360 Tiny",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkStation P360 Tiny"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "ThinkPad L490",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad L490"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "ThinkPad L590",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad L590"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "ThinkStation P620",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkStation P620"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "TUXEDO InfinityBook S 15/17 Gen7",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TUXEDO InfinityBook S 15/17 Gen7"),
-		},
-	},
-	{
-		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
-		.ident = "UPX-TGL",
-		.matches = {
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "AAEON"),
-			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "UPX-TGL01"),
-		},
-	},
-	{}
-};
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_PNP) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
 static int has_hid(struct acpi_device *dev, const char *hid)
···
 	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy;
 	int irq = -1;
 	int rc;
-
-	dmi_check_system(tpm_tis_dmi_table);
 
 	rc = check_acpi_tpm2(dev);
 	if (rc)

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c

···
 	return size;
 }
 
-static int tpm_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+static int tpm_tis_try_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 	int size = 0;
 	int status;
 	u32 expected;
 	int rc;
-
-	if (count < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
-		size = -EIO;
-		goto out;
-	}
 
 	size = recv_data(chip, buf, TPM_HEADER_SIZE);
 	/* read first 10 bytes, including tag, paramsize, and result */
···
 		goto out;
 	}
 	status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
-	if (status & TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL) {	/* retry? */
+	if (status & TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL) {
 		dev_err(&chip->dev, "Error left over data\n");
 		size = -EIO;
 		goto out;
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
 	return size;
+}
+
+static int tpm_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
+	unsigned int try;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (count < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
+		rc = tpm_tis_try_recv(chip, buf, count);
+
+		if (rc == -EIO)
+			/* Data transfer errors, indicated by EIO, can be
+			 * recovered by rereading the response.
+			 */
+			tpm_tis_write8(priv, TPM_STS(priv->locality),
+				       TPM_STS_RESPONSE_RETRY);
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+
+	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
···
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
+	rc = tpm_tis_verify_crc(priv, len, buf);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "CRC mismatch for command.\n");
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
 out_err:
···
 	int rc;
 	u32 ordinal;
 	unsigned long dur;
+	unsigned int try;
 
-	rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, buf, len);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return rc;
-
-	rc = tpm_tis_verify_crc(priv, len, buf);
-	if (rc < 0) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "CRC mismatch for command.\n");
-		return rc;
+	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
+		rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, buf, len);
+		if (rc >= 0)
+			/* Data transfer done successfully */
+			break;
+		else if (rc != -EIO)
+			/* Data transfer failed, not recoverable */
+			return rc;
 	}
 
 	/* go and do it */

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h

···
 	TPM_STS_GO = 0x20,
 	TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL = 0x10,
 	TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT = 0x08,
+	TPM_STS_RESPONSE_RETRY = 0x02,
 	TPM_STS_READ_ZERO = 0x23, /* bits that must be zero on read */
 };
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c

···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
-			 u8 *in, const u8 *out)
+/*
+ * Half duplex controller with support for TPM wait state detection like
+ * Tegra QSPI need CMD, ADDR & DATA sent in single message to manage HW flow
+ * control. Each phase sent in different transfer for controller to idenity
+ * phase.
+ */
+static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer_half(struct tpm_tis_data *data,	u32 addr,
+				     u16 len, u8 *in, const u8 *out)
+{
+	struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(data);
+	struct spi_transfer spi_xfer[3];
+	struct spi_message m;
+	u8 transfer_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	while (len) {
+		transfer_len = min_t(u16, len, MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE);
+
+		spi_message_init(&m);
+		phy->iobuf[0] = (in ? 0x80 : 0) | (transfer_len - 1);
+		phy->iobuf[1] = 0xd4;
+		phy->iobuf[2] = addr >> 8;
+		phy->iobuf[3] = addr;
+
+		memset(&spi_xfer, 0, sizeof(spi_xfer));
+
+		spi_xfer[0].tx_buf = phy->iobuf;
+		spi_xfer[0].len = 1;
+		spi_message_add_tail(&spi_xfer[0], &m);
+
+		spi_xfer[1].tx_buf = phy->iobuf + 1;
+		spi_xfer[1].len = 3;
+		spi_message_add_tail(&spi_xfer[1], &m);
+
+		if (out) {
+			spi_xfer[2].tx_buf = &phy->iobuf[4];
+			spi_xfer[2].rx_buf = NULL;
+			memcpy(&phy->iobuf[4], out, transfer_len);
+			out += transfer_len;
+		}
+
+		if (in) {
+			spi_xfer[2].tx_buf = NULL;
+			spi_xfer[2].rx_buf = &phy->iobuf[4];
+		}
+
+		spi_xfer[2].len = transfer_len;
+		spi_message_add_tail(&spi_xfer[2], &m);
+
+		reinit_completion(&phy->ready);
+
+		ret = spi_sync(phy->spi_device, &m);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		if (in) {
+			memcpy(in, &phy->iobuf[4], transfer_len);
+			in += transfer_len;
+		}
+
+		len -= transfer_len;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer_full(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
+				     u16 len, u8 *in, const u8 *out)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(data);
 	int ret = 0;
···
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
+			 u8 *in, const u8 *out)
+{
+	struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(data);
+	struct spi_controller *ctlr = phy->spi_device->controller;
+
+	/*
+	 * TPM flow control over SPI requires full duplex support.
+	 * Send entire message to a half duplex controller to handle
+	 * wait polling in controller.
+	 * Set TPM HW flow control flag..
+	 */
+	if (ctlr->flags & SPI_CONTROLLER_HALF_DUPLEX)
+		return tpm_tis_spi_transfer_half(data, addr, len, in, out);
+	else
+		return tpm_tis_spi_transfer_full(data, addr, len, in, out);
+}
+
 static int tpm_tis_spi_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				  u16 len, u8 *result, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
···
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	phy->flow_control = tpm_tis_spi_flow_control;
+
+	if (dev->controller->flags & SPI_CONTROLLER_HALF_DUPLEX)
+		dev->mode |= SPI_TPM_HW_FLOW;
 
 	/* If the SPI device has an IRQ then use that */
 	if (dev->irq > 0)

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c

···
 	},
 };
 
-static int __init tpm_tis_synquacer_module_init(void)
-{
-	int rc;
+module_platform_driver(tis_synquacer_drv);
 
-	rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_synquacer_drv);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void __exit tpm_tis_synquacer_module_exit(void)
-{
-	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_synquacer_drv);
-}
-
-module_init(tpm_tis_synquacer_module_init);
-module_exit(tpm_tis_synquacer_module_exit);
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM MMIO Driver for Socionext SynQuacer platform");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

include/crypto/public_key.h

···
 			       const struct key_type *type,
 			       const union key_payload *payload,
 			       struct key *trust_keyring);
+int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			    const struct key_type *type,
+			    const union key_payload *payload,
+			    struct key *trust_keyring);
 #else
 static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
 				      const struct key_type *type,
 				      const union key_payload *payload,
 				      struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+					  const struct key_type *type,
+					  const union key_payload *payload,
+					  struct key *trust_keyring)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

include/keys/system_keyring.h

···
 					    const struct key_type *type,
 					    const union key_payload *payload,
 					    struct key *restriction_key);
+int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				    const struct key_type *type,
+				    const union key_payload *payload,
+				    struct key *restriction_key);
 extern __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring);
 
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_reject
+#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin restrict_link_reject
 
 static inline __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring)
 {
···
 	const struct key_type *type,
 	const union key_payload *payload,
 	struct key *restriction_key);
+int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
+						  const struct key_type *type,
+						  const union key_payload *payload,
+						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
+#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING

security/integrity/Kconfig

···
 	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
 	help
 	 If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
 	 be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys

security/integrity/digsig.c

···
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
-#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary
 #else
-#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
 #endif
 
 static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
···
 	} else {
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
 			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
-		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
 			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
 			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);

security/integrity/evm/Kconfig

···
 
 	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
 	   onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.  A public key can be used to
-	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process.
+	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. The
+	   key must have digitalSignature usage set.
 
 config EVM_X509_PATH
 	string "EVM X509 certificate path"

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

···
 	help
 	  Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
 	  key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
-	  secondary trusted keyrings.
+	  secondary trusted keyrings. The key must also have the
+	  digitalSignature usage set.
 
 	  Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
 	  IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,

security/integrity/integrity.h

···
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
-bool __init trust_moklist(void);
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
 						  const void *data, size_t len)
 {
 }
-static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+
+static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
 {
 	return false;
 }

security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c

···
 __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 {
 	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) &&
+		    imputed_trust_enabled())
 			return add_to_machine_keyring;
 		else
 			return add_to_platform_keyring;
 	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 

security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h

···
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
 /*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);

security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c

···
 static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
···
 					      get_handler_for_dbx);
 		if (rc)
 			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 

security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c

···
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
-static bool trust_mok;
-
 static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
 {
 	int rc;
···
 	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
 	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
 	 */
-	if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
 		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
 					 data, len, perm);
 
···
 	return false;
 }
 
-bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 {
 	static bool initialized;
+	static bool trust_mok;
 
 	if (!initialized) {
 		initialized = true;
+		trust_mok = false;
 
 		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
 			trust_mok = true;
 	}
 
 	return trust_mok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading
+ * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable,
+ * and for other platforms, it is always enabled.
+ */
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return trust_moklist();
+
+	return true;
 }

security/keys/request_key_auth.c

···
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
-	strlcpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
+	strscpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
 
 	/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
 	 * another process */