ecryptfs: Fix ecryptfs_printk() size_t warnings

Commit cb55d21f6fa19d8c6c2680d90317ce88c1f57269 revealed a number of
missing 'z' length modifiers in calls to ecryptfs_printk() when
printing variables of type size_t. This patch fixes those compiler
warnings.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[e-mail]>

fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c

···
 	BUG_ON(!crypt_stat || !crypt_stat->tfm
 	       || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED));
 	if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
-		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key size [%d]; key:\n",
+		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key size [%zd]; key:\n",
 				crypt_stat->key_size);
 		ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
 				  crypt_stat->key_size);
···
 	}
 	ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
 			"Initializing cipher [%s]; strlen = [%d]; "
-			"key_size_bits = [%d]\n",
+			"key_size_bits = [%zd]\n",
 			crypt_stat->cipher, (int)strlen(crypt_stat->cipher),
 			crypt_stat->key_size << 3);
 	if (crypt_stat->tfm) {

fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c

···
 	} else {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING,
-				"Unsupported packet size: [%d]\n", size);
+				"Unsupported packet size: [%zd]\n", size);
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
···
 	       auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
 	crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
 	if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
-		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n",
+		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%zd]:\n",
 				crypt_stat->key_size);
 		ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
 				  crypt_stat->key_size);
···
 			if (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE != tag_11_contents_size) {
 				ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Expected "
 						"signature of size [%d]; "
-						"read size [%d]\n",
+						"read size [%zd]\n",
 						ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE,
 						tag_11_contents_size);
 				rc = -EIO;
···
 			goto out_wipe_list;
 			break;
 		default:
-			ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "No packet at offset "
-					"[%d] of the file header; hex value of "
+			ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "No packet at offset [%zd] "
+					"of the file header; hex value of "
 					"character is [0x%.2x]\n", i, src[i]);
 			next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 0;
 		}
···
 	if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; "
 				"using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, "
-				"where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
+				"where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%zd]\n",
 				key_rec->enc_key_size);
 		memcpy(key_rec->enc_key,
 		       auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
···
 	if (rc < 1 || rc > 2) {
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
 				"for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; "
-				"got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
+				"got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%zd]\n",
 				rc, key_rec->enc_key_size);
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
···
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
 				"for crypt_stat encrypted session key; "
 				"expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. "
-				"key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc,
+				"key_rec->enc_key_size = [%zd]\n", rc,
 				key_rec->enc_key_size);
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
···
 		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
-	ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n",
+	ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%zd] bytes of the key\n",
 			crypt_stat->key_size);
 	rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg,
 				      (*key_rec).enc_key_size);
···
 	}
 	ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n");
 	if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
-		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n",
+		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%zd]:\n",
 				key_rec->enc_key_size);
 		ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key,
 				  key_rec->enc_key_size);