apparmor: move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}

AppArmor split out task oriented controls to their own logical file
a while ago. Ptrace mediation is better grouped with task than
ipc, so move it.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[e-mail]>

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

···
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
 
 /*
  * The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection

security/apparmor/include/ipc.h

···
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-struct aa_profile;
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE		MAY_WRITE
-#define AA_PTRACE_READ		MAY_READ
-#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED	AA_MAY_APPEND
-#define AA_MAY_BE_READ		AA_MAY_CREATE
-#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT	2
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
-			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
-#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
-
-#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
-	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
-	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request);
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
 
 #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */

security/apparmor/include/task.h

···
 	ctx->token = 0;
 }
 
+#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE		MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_PTRACE_READ		MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED	AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_BE_READ		AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT	2
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
+#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+
+#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
+	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
+	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request);
+
+
 #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */

security/apparmor/ipc.c

···
  */
 
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
···
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/sig_names.h"
-
-/**
- * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
- * @mask: permission mask to convert
- *
- * Returns: pointer to static string
- */
-static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
-{
-	switch (mask) {
-	case MAY_READ:
-		return "read";
-	case MAY_WRITE:
-		return "trace";
-	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
-		return "readby";
-	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
-		return "tracedby";
-	}
-	return "";
-}
-
-/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-{
-	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-
-	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
-				 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
-
-		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
-					 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
-		}
-	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
-	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
-			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
-}
-
-/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
-/* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
-			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	struct aa_perms perms = { };
-
-	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
-	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
-			       &perms);
-	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
-			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return 0;
-
-	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
-			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
-
-	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
-	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
-		return 0;
-
-	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
-	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
-	aad(sa)->request = 0;
-	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
-				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
-	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task label to be traced
- * @request: permission request
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
- */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
-
-	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
-			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
-			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
-}
 
 
 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)

security/apparmor/task.c

···
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
  */
 
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
···
 	commit_creds(new);
 
 	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	switch (mask) {
+	case MAY_READ:
+		return "read";
+	case MAY_WRITE:
+		return "trace";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+		return "readby";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+		return "tracedby";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+			       &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+		return 0;
+
+	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+	aad(sa)->request = 0;
+	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
 }