Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the following issues:
- Zero-length DMA mapping in caam
- Invalidly mapping stack memory for DMA in talitos
- Use after free in cavium/nitrox
- Key parsing in authenc
- Undefined shift in sm3
- Bogus completion call in authencesn
- SHA support detection in caam"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: sm3 - fix undefined shift by >= width of value
crypto: talitos - fix ablkcipher for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
crypto: talitos - reorder code in talitos_edesc_alloc()
crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Use after free in process_response_list()
crypto: authencesn - Avoid twice completion call in decrypt path
crypto: caam - fix SHA support detection
crypto: caam - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
crypto: ccree - convert to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys()
crypto: bcm - convert to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys()
crypto: authenc - fix parsing key with misaligned rta_len

crypto/adiantum.c

···
 	ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
 
 	/* Stream cipher, e.g. "xchacha12" */
+	crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn,
+				  skcipher_crypto_instance(inst));
 	err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn, streamcipher_name,
 				   0, crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
 							   algt->mask));
···
 	streamcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn);
 
 	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn,
+			 skcipher_crypto_instance(inst));
 	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn, blockcipher_name,
 				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
 	if (err)

crypto/authenc.c

···
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+
+	/*
+	 * RTA_OK() didn't align the rtattr's payload when validating that it
+	 * fits in the buffer.  Yet, the keys should start on the next 4-byte
+	 * aligned boundary.  To avoid confusion, require that the rtattr
+	 * payload be exactly the param struct, which has a 4-byte aligned size.
+	 */
+	if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) != sizeof(*param))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*param) % RTA_ALIGNTO);
 
 	param = RTA_DATA(rta);
 	keys->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
 
-	key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
-	keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+	key += rta->rta_len;
+	keylen -= rta->rta_len;
 
 	if (keylen < keys->enckeylen)
 		return -EINVAL;

crypto/authencesn.c

···
 	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
 
 	err = err ?: crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt_tail(req, 0);
-	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+	authenc_esn_request_complete(req, err);
 }
 
 static int crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)

crypto/sm3_generic.c

···
 
 	for (i = 0; i <= 63; i++) {
 
-		ss1 = rol32((rol32(a, 12) + e + rol32(t(i), i)), 7);
+		ss1 = rol32((rol32(a, 12) + e + rol32(t(i), i & 31)), 7);
 
 		ss2 = ss1 ^ rol32(a, 12);
 

drivers/crypto/Kconfig

···
 	depends on ARCH_BCM_IPROC
 	depends on MAILBOX
 	default m
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
 	select CRYPTO_DES
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1

drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c

···
 	struct spu_hw *spu = &iproc_priv.spu;
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(cipher);
-	struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;
-	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
-	const u8 *origkey = key;
-	const unsigned int origkeylen = keylen;
-
-	int ret = 0;
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	int ret;
 
 	flow_log("%s() aead:%p key:%p keylen:%u\n", __func__, cipher, key,
 		 keylen);
 	flow_dump("  key: ", key, keylen);
 
-	if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
-		goto badkey;
-	if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
-		goto badkey;
-	if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+	ret = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen);
+	if (ret)
 		goto badkey;
 
-	param = RTA_DATA(rta);
-	ctx->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
-
-	key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
-	keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
-
-	if (keylen < ctx->enckeylen)
-		goto badkey;
-	if (ctx->enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+	if (keys.enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE ||
+	    keys.authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
 		goto badkey;
 
-	ctx->authkeylen = keylen - ctx->enckeylen;
+	ctx->enckeylen = keys.enckeylen;
+	ctx->authkeylen = keys.authkeylen;
 
-	if (ctx->authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
-		goto badkey;
-
-	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->authkeylen, ctx->enckeylen);
+	memcpy(ctx->enckey, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
 	/* May end up padding auth key. So make sure it's zeroed. */
 	memset(ctx->authkey, 0, sizeof(ctx->authkey));
-	memcpy(ctx->authkey, key, ctx->authkeylen);
+	memcpy(ctx->authkey, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen);
 
 	switch (ctx->alg->cipher_info.alg) {
 	case CIPHER_ALG_DES:
···
 			u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS];
 			u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
 
-			if (des_ekey(tmp, key) == 0) {
+			if (des_ekey(tmp, keys.enckey) == 0) {
 				if (crypto_aead_get_flags(cipher) &
 				    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY) {
 					crypto_aead_set_flags(cipher, flags);
···
 		break;
 	case CIPHER_ALG_3DES:
 		if (ctx->enckeylen == (DES_KEY_SIZE * 3)) {
-			const u32 *K = (const u32 *)key;
+			const u32 *K = (const u32 *)keys.enckey;
 			u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
 
 			if (!((K[0] ^ K[2]) | (K[1] ^ K[3])) ||
···
 		ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
 		ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags |=
 		    tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
-		ret =
-		    crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, origkey,
-				       origkeylen);
+		ret = crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, key, keylen);
 		if (ret) {
 			flow_log("  fallback setkey() returned:%d\n", ret);
 			tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;

drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c

···
 		 * Skip algorithms requiring message digests
 		 * if MD or MD size is not supported by device.
 		 */
-		if ((c2_alg_sel & ~OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SUBMASK) == 0x40 &&
+		if (is_mdha(c2_alg_sel) &&
 		    (!md_inst || t_alg->aead.maxauthsize > md_limit))
 			continue;
 

drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c

···
 
 	desc = edesc->hw_desc;
 
-	state->buf_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, buf, buflen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-	if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, state->buf_dma)) {
-		dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map src\n");
-		goto unmap;
-	}
+	if (buflen) {
+		state->buf_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, buf, buflen,
+						DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, state->buf_dma)) {
+			dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map src\n");
+			goto unmap;
+		}
 
-	append_seq_in_ptr(desc, state->buf_dma, buflen, 0);
+		append_seq_in_ptr(desc, state->buf_dma, buflen, 0);
+	}
 
 	edesc->dst_dma = map_seq_out_ptr_result(desc, jrdev, req->result,
 						digestsize);

drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h

···
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_DES	(0x20 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_3DES	(0x21 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_ARC4	(0x30 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
+#define OP_ALG_CHA_MDHA		(0x40 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_MD5	(0x40 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHA1	(0x41 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHA224	(0x42 << OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SHIFT)

drivers/crypto/caam/error.h

···
 
 #ifndef CAAM_ERROR_H
 #define CAAM_ERROR_H
+
+#include "desc.h"
+
 #define CAAM_ERROR_STR_MAX 302
 
 void caam_strstatus(struct device *dev, u32 status, bool qi_v2);
···
 void caam_dump_sg(const char *level, const char *prefix_str, int prefix_type,
 		  int rowsize, int groupsize, struct scatterlist *sg,
 		  size_t tlen, bool ascii);
+
+static inline bool is_mdha(u32 algtype)
+{
+	return (algtype & OP_ALG_ALGSEL_MASK & ~OP_ALG_ALGSEL_SUBMASK) ==
+	       OP_ALG_CHA_MDHA;
+}
 #endif /* CAAM_ERROR_H */

drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_reqmgr.c

···
 
 		/* ORH error code */
 		err = READ_ONCE(*sr->resp.orh) & 0xff;
-		softreq_destroy(sr);
 
 		if (sr->callback)
 			sr->callback(sr->cb_arg, err);
+		softreq_destroy(sr);
 
 		req_completed++;
 	}

drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c

···
 			  unsigned int keylen)
 {
 	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
-	struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)key;
 	struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
-	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
 	struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
-	int rc = -EINVAL;
 	unsigned int seq_len = 0;
 	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	const u8 *enckey, *authkey;
+	int rc;
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n",
 		ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen);
···
 	/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
 
 	if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* authenc() alg. */
-		if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
+		struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+
+		rc = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen);
+		if (rc)
 			goto badkey;
-		if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
-			goto badkey;
-		if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
-			goto badkey;
-		param = RTA_DATA(rta);
-		ctx->enc_keylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
-		key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
-		keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
-		if (keylen < ctx->enc_keylen)
-			goto badkey;
-		ctx->auth_keylen = keylen - ctx->enc_keylen;
+		enckey = keys.enckey;
+		authkey = keys.authkey;
+		ctx->enc_keylen = keys.enckeylen;
+		ctx->auth_keylen = keys.authkeylen;
 
 		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
 			/* the nonce is stored in bytes at end of key */
+			rc = -EINVAL;
 			if (ctx->enc_keylen <
 			    (AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
 				goto badkey;
 			/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
 			 *  first 4 bytes in CTR IV
 			 */
-			memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen +
-			       ctx->enc_keylen - CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
-			       CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
+			memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, enckey + ctx->enc_keylen -
+			       CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
 			/* Set CTR key size */
 			ctx->enc_keylen -= CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
 		}
 	} else { /* non-authenc - has just one key */
+		enckey = key;
+		authkey = NULL;
 		ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
 		ctx->auth_keylen = 0;
 	}
···
 	/* STAT_PHASE_1: Copy key to ctx */
 
 	/* Get key material */
-	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->auth_keylen, ctx->enc_keylen);
+	memcpy(ctx->enckey, enckey, ctx->enc_keylen);
 	if (ctx->enc_keylen == 24)
 		memset(ctx->enckey + 24, 0, CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX - 24);
 	if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
-		memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, key, ctx->auth_keylen);
+		memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, authkey,
+		       ctx->auth_keylen);
 	} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC */
-		rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, key, ctx->auth_keylen);
+		rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, authkey, ctx->auth_keylen);
 		if (rc)
 			goto badkey;
 	}

drivers/crypto/talitos.c

···
 	struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
 	int max_len = is_sec1 ? TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN : TALITOS2_MAX_DATA_LEN;
-	void *err;
 
 	if (cryptlen + authsize > max_len) {
 		dev_err(dev, "length exceeds h/w max limit\n");
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
-	if (ivsize)
-		iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-
 	if (!dst || dst == src) {
 		src_len = assoclen + cryptlen + authsize;
 		src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, src_len);
 		if (src_nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
-			err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-			goto error_sg;
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 		src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
 		dst_nents = dst ? src_nents : 0;
···
 		src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, src_len);
 		if (src_nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
-			err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-			goto error_sg;
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 		src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
 		dst_len = assoclen + cryptlen + (encrypt ? authsize : 0);
 		dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(dst, dst_len);
 		if (dst_nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of dst SG.\n");
-			err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-			goto error_sg;
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 		dst_nents = (dst_nents == 1) ? 0 : dst_nents;
 	}
···
 	/* if its a ahash, add space for a second desc next to the first one */
 	if (is_sec1 && !dst)
 		alloc_len += sizeof(struct talitos_desc);
+	alloc_len += ivsize;
 
 	edesc = kmalloc(alloc_len, GFP_DMA | flags);
-	if (!edesc) {
-		err = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-		goto error_sg;
+	if (!edesc)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	if (ivsize) {
+		iv = memcpy(((u8 *)edesc) + alloc_len - ivsize, iv, ivsize);
+		iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 	}
 	memset(&edesc->desc, 0, sizeof(edesc->desc));
 
···
 						     DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
 	}
 	return edesc;
-error_sg:
-	if (iv_dma)
-		dma_unmap_single(dev, iv_dma, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-	return err;
 }
 
 static struct talitos_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *areq, u8 *iv,