Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel os linux

binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag

The bprm_secureexec hook can be moved earlier. Right now, it is called
during create_elf_tables(), via load_binary(), via search_binary_handler(),
via exec_binprm(). Nearly all (see exception below) state used by
bprm_secureexec is created during the bprm_set_creds hook, called from
prepare_binprm().

For all LSMs (except commoncaps described next), only the first execution
of bprm_set_creds takes any effect (they all check bprm->called_set_creds
which prepare_binprm() sets after the first call to the bprm_set_creds
hook). However, all these LSMs also only do anything with bprm_secureexec
when they detected a secure state during their first run of bprm_set_creds.
Therefore, it is functionally identical to move the detection into
bprm_set_creds, since the results from secureexec here only need to be
based on the first call to the LSM's bprm_set_creds hook.

The single exception is that the commoncaps secureexec hook also examines
euid/uid and egid/gid differences which are controlled by bprm_fill_uid(),
via prepare_binprm(), which can be called multiple times (e.g.
binfmt_script, binfmt_misc), and may clear the euid/egid for the final
load (i.e. the script interpreter). However, while commoncaps specifically
ignores bprm->cred_prepared, and runs its bprm_set_creds hook each time
prepare_binprm() may get called, it needs to base the secureexec decision
on the final call to bprm_set_creds. As a result, it will need special
handling.

To begin this refactoring, this adds the secureexec flag to the bprm
struct, and calls the secureexec hook during setup_new_exec(). This is
safe since all the cred work is finished (and past the point of no return).
This explicit call will be removed in later patches once the hook has been
removed.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

+11 -3
+1 -1
fs/binfmt_elf.c
··· 252 252 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); 253 253 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid)); 254 254 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid)); 255 - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); 255 + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec); 256 256 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes); 257 257 #ifdef ELF_HWCAP2 258 258 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP2, ELF_HWCAP2);
+1 -1
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
··· 650 650 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); 651 651 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid)); 652 652 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid)); 653 - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); 653 + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec); 654 654 NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec); 655 655 656 656 #ifdef ARCH_DLINFO
+2
fs/exec.c
··· 1343 1343 1344 1344 void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) 1345 1345 { 1346 + bprm->secureexec |= security_bprm_secureexec(bprm); 1347 + 1346 1348 arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm); 1347 1349 1348 1350 current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
+7 -1
include/linux/binfmts.h
··· 31 31 * binfmt_script/misc). 32 32 */ 33 33 called_set_creds:1, 34 - cap_effective:1;/* true if has elevated effective capabilities, 34 + cap_effective:1,/* true if has elevated effective capabilities, 35 35 * false if not; except for init which inherits 36 36 * its parent's caps anyway */ 37 + /* 38 + * Set by bprm_set_creds hook to indicate a privilege-gaining 39 + * exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment 40 + * and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc. 41 + */ 42 + secureexec:1; 37 43 #ifdef __alpha__ 38 44 unsigned int taso:1; 39 45 #endif