Merge tag 'thunderbolt-for-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/westeri/thunderbolt into char-misc-next

Mika writes:

thunderbolt: Changes for v4.21 merge window

* tag 'thunderbolt-for-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/westeri/thunderbolt:
thunderbolt: Export IOMMU based DMA protection support to userspace
iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for untrusted devices
iommu/vt-d: Force IOMMU on for platform opt in hint
PCI / ACPI: Identify untrusted PCI devices

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt

···
 		If a device is authorized automatically during boot its
 		boot attribute is set to 1.
 
+What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/iommu_dma_protection
+Date:		Mar 2019
+KernelVersion:	4.21
+Contact:	[e-mail]
+Description:	This attribute tells whether the system uses IOMMU
+		for DMA protection. Value of 1 means IOMMU is used 0 means
+		it is not (DMA protection is solely based on Thunderbolt
+		security levels).
+
 What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security
 Date:		Sep 2017
 KernelVersion:	4.13

Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst

···
 the device without a key or write a new key and write 1 to the
 ``authorized`` file to get the new key stored on the device NVM.
 
+DMA protection utilizing IOMMU
+------------------------------
+Recent systems from 2018 and forward with Thunderbolt ports may natively
+support IOMMU. This means that Thunderbolt security is handled by an IOMMU
+so connected devices cannot access memory regions outside of what is
+allocated for them by drivers. When Linux is running on such system it
+automatically enables IOMMU if not enabled by the user already. These
+systems can be identified by reading ``1`` from
+``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/domainX/iommu_dma_protection`` attribute.
+
+The driver does not do anything special in this case but because DMA
+protection is handled by the IOMMU, security levels (if set) are
+redundant. For this reason some systems ship with security level set to
+``none``. Other systems have security level set to ``user`` in order to
+support downgrade to older OS, so users who want to automatically
+authorize devices when IOMMU DMA protection is enabled can use the
+following ``udev`` rule::
+
+  ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="thunderbolt", ATTRS{iommu_dma_protection}=="1", ATTR{authorized}=="0", ATTR{authorized}="1"
+
 Upgrading NVM on Thunderbolt device or host
 -------------------------------------------
 Since most of the functionality is handled in firmware running on a

drivers/acpi/property.c

···
 					acpi_object_type type,
 					const union acpi_object **obj);
 
+/*
+ * The GUIDs here are made equivalent to each other in order to avoid extra
+ * complexity in the properties handling code, with the caveat that the
+ * kernel will accept certain combinations of GUID and properties that are
+ * not defined without a warning. For instance if any of the properties
+ * from different GUID appear in a property list of another, it will be
+ * accepted by the kernel. Firmware validation tools should catch these.
+ */
 static const guid_t prp_guids[] = {
 	/* ACPI _DSD device properties GUID: daffd814-6eba-4d8c-8a91-bc9bbf4aa301 */
 	GUID_INIT(0xdaffd814, 0x6eba, 0x4d8c,
···
 	/* Hotplug in D3 GUID: 6211e2c0-58a3-4af3-90e1-927a4e0c55a4 */
 	GUID_INIT(0x6211e2c0, 0x58a3, 0x4af3,
 		  0x90, 0xe1, 0x92, 0x7a, 0x4e, 0x0c, 0x55, 0xa4),
+	/* External facing port GUID: efcc06cc-73ac-4bc3-bff0-76143807c389 */
+	GUID_INIT(0xefcc06cc, 0x73ac, 0x4bc3,
+		  0xbf, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x14, 0x38, 0x07, 0xc3, 0x89),
 };
 
 static const guid_t ads_guid =

drivers/iommu/dmar.c

···
 {
 	return dmar_device_hotplug(handle, false);
 }
+
+/*
+ * dmar_platform_optin - Is %DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG set in DMAR table
+ *
+ * Returns true if the platform has %DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG set in
+ * the ACPI DMAR table. This means that the platform boot firmware has made
+ * sure no device can issue DMA outside of RMRR regions.
+ */
+bool dmar_platform_optin(void)
+{
+	struct acpi_table_dmar *dmar;
+	acpi_status status;
+	bool ret;
+
+	status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_DMAR, 0,
+				(struct acpi_table_header **)&dmar);
+	if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+		return false;
+
+	ret = !!(dmar->flags & DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN);
+	acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)dmar);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dmar_platform_optin);

drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c

···
  */
 static int force_on = 0;
 int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce;
+static int no_platform_optin;
 
 #define ROOT_ENTRY_NR (VTD_PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct root_entry))
 
···
 			pr_info("IOMMU enabled\n");
 		} else if (!strncmp(str, "off", 3)) {
 			dmar_disabled = 1;
+			no_platform_optin = 1;
 			pr_info("IOMMU disabled\n");
 		} else if (!strncmp(str, "igfx_off", 8)) {
 			dmar_map_gfx = 0;
···
 	if (info->pri_supported && !pci_reset_pri(pdev) && !pci_enable_pri(pdev, 32))
 		info->pri_enabled = 1;
 #endif
-	if (info->ats_supported && !pci_enable_ats(pdev, VTD_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
+	if (!pdev->untrusted && info->ats_supported &&
+	    !pci_enable_ats(pdev, VTD_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
 		info->ats_enabled = 1;
 		domain_update_iotlb(info->domain);
 		info->ats_qdep = pci_ats_queue_depth(pdev);
···
 		struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
 
 		if (device_is_rmrr_locked(dev))
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Prevent any device marked as untrusted from getting
+		 * placed into the statically identity mapping domain.
+		 */
+		if (pdev->untrusted)
 			return 0;
 
 		if ((iommu_identity_mapping & IDENTMAP_AZALIA) && IS_AZALIA(pdev))
···
 	NULL,
 };
 
+static int __init platform_optin_force_iommu(void)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
+	bool has_untrusted_dev = false;
+
+	if (!dmar_platform_optin() || no_platform_optin)
+		return 0;
+
+	for_each_pci_dev(pdev) {
+		if (pdev->untrusted) {
+			has_untrusted_dev = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!has_untrusted_dev)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (no_iommu || dmar_disabled)
+		pr_info("Intel-IOMMU force enabled due to platform opt in\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * If Intel-IOMMU is disabled by default, we will apply identity
+	 * map for all devices except those marked as being untrusted.
+	 */
+	if (dmar_disabled)
+		iommu_identity_mapping |= IDENTMAP_ALL;
+
+	dmar_disabled = 0;
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_SWIOTLB)
+	swiotlb = 0;
+#endif
+	no_iommu = 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
 int __init intel_iommu_init(void)
 {
 	int ret = -ENODEV;
 	struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd;
 	struct intel_iommu *iommu;
 
-	/* VT-d is required for a TXT/tboot launch, so enforce that */
-	force_on = tboot_force_iommu();
+	/*
+	 * Intel IOMMU is required for a TXT/tboot launch or platform
+	 * opt in, so enforce that.
+	 */
+	force_on = tboot_force_iommu() || platform_optin_force_iommu();
 
 	if (iommu_init_mempool()) {
 		if (force_on)

drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c

···
 	ACPI_FREE(obj);
 }
 
+static void pci_acpi_set_untrusted(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+	u8 val;
+
+	if (pci_pcie_type(dev) != PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT)
+		return;
+	if (device_property_read_u8(&dev->dev, "ExternalFacingPort", &val))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These root ports expose PCIe (including DMA) outside of the
+	 * system so make sure we treat them and everything behind as
+	 * untrusted.
+	 */
+	if (val)
+		dev->untrusted = 1;
+}
+
 static void pci_acpi_setup(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct pci_dev *pci_dev = to_pci_dev(dev);
···
 		return;
 
 	pci_acpi_optimize_delay(pci_dev, adev->handle);
+	pci_acpi_set_untrusted(pci_dev);
 
 	pci_acpi_add_pm_notifier(adev, pci_dev);
 	if (!adev->wakeup.flags.valid)

drivers/pci/probe.c

···
 	}
 }
 
+static void set_pcie_untrusted(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *parent;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the upstream bridge is untrusted we treat this device
+	 * untrusted as well.
+	 */
+	parent = pci_upstream_bridge(dev);
+	if (parent && parent->untrusted)
+		dev->untrusted = true;
+}
+
 /**
  * pci_ext_cfg_is_aliased - Is ext config space just an alias of std config?
  * @dev: PCI device
···
 
 	/* Need to have dev->cfg_size ready */
 	set_pcie_thunderbolt(dev);
+
+	set_pcie_untrusted(dev);
 
 	/* "Unknown power state" */
 	dev->current_state = PCI_UNKNOWN;

drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c

···
  */
 
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dmar.h>
 #include <linux/idr.h>
+#include <linux/iommu.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
···
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(boot_acl);
 
+static ssize_t iommu_dma_protection_show(struct device *dev,
+					 struct device_attribute *attr,
+					 char *buf)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Kernel DMA protection is a feature where Thunderbolt security is
+	 * handled natively using IOMMU. It is enabled when IOMMU is
+	 * enabled and ACPI DMAR table has DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN set.
+	 */
+	return sprintf(buf, "%d\n",
+		       iommu_present(&pci_bus_type) && dmar_platform_optin());
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(iommu_dma_protection);
+
 static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			     char *buf)
 {
···
 
 static struct attribute *domain_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_boot_acl.attr,
+	&dev_attr_iommu_dma_protection.attr,
 	&dev_attr_security.attr,
 	NULL,
 };

include/linux/dmar.h

···
 /* DMAR Flags */
 #define DMAR_INTR_REMAP		0x1
 #define DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT	0x2
+#define DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN	0x4
 
 struct intel_iommu;
 
···
 { return 0; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP */
 
+extern bool dmar_platform_optin(void);
+
 #else /* CONFIG_DMAR_TABLE */
 
 static inline int dmar_device_add(void *handle)
···
 static inline int dmar_device_remove(void *handle)
 {
 	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool dmar_platform_optin(void)
+{
+	return false;
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_DMAR_TABLE */

include/linux/pci.h

···
 	unsigned int	is_hotplug_bridge:1;
 	unsigned int	shpc_managed:1;		/* SHPC owned by shpchp */
 	unsigned int	is_thunderbolt:1;	/* Thunderbolt controller */
+	/*
+	 * Devices marked being untrusted are the ones that can potentially
+	 * execute DMA attacks and similar. They are typically connected
+	 * through external ports such as Thunderbolt but not limited to
+	 * that. When an IOMMU is enabled they should be getting full
+	 * mappings to make sure they cannot access arbitrary memory.
+	 */
+	unsigned int	untrusted:1;
 	unsigned int	__aer_firmware_first_valid:1;
 	unsigned int	__aer_firmware_first:1;
 	unsigned int	broken_intx_masking:1;	/* INTx masking can't be used */