Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel os linux

x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
Call Trace:
<TASK>
asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
Call Trace:
<TASK>
asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

authored by

Sean Christopherson and committed by
Paolo Bonzini
b45f7217 95cc9e7c

+38 -3
+29 -3
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
··· 319 319 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 320 320 void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) 321 321 { 322 + struct fpstate *fpstate = guest_fpu->fpstate; 323 + 322 324 fpregs_lock(); 323 - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; 324 - if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) 325 - xfd_update_state(guest_fpu->fpstate); 325 + 326 + /* 327 + * KVM's guest ABI is that setting XFD[i]=1 *can* immediately revert the 328 + * save state to its initial configuration. Likewise, KVM_GET_XSAVE does 329 + * the same as XSAVE and returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 whenever XFD[i]=1. 330 + * 331 + * If the guest's FPU state is in hardware, just update XFD: the XSAVE 332 + * in fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate will clear XSTATE_BV[i] whenever XFD[i]=1. 333 + * 334 + * If however the guest's FPU state is NOT resident in hardware, clear 335 + * disabled components in XSTATE_BV now, or a subsequent XRSTOR will 336 + * attempt to load disabled components and generate #NM _in the host_. 337 + */ 338 + if (xfd && test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) 339 + fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~xfd; 340 + 341 + fpstate->xfd = xfd; 342 + if (fpstate->in_use) 343 + xfd_update_state(fpstate); 344 + 326 345 fpregs_unlock(); 327 346 } 328 347 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_update_guest_xfd); ··· 447 428 } 448 429 449 430 if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0) 431 + return -EINVAL; 432 + 433 + /* 434 + * Disabled features must be in their initial state, otherwise XRSTOR 435 + * causes an exception. 436 + */ 437 + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & kstate->xfd)) 450 438 return -EINVAL; 451 439 452 440 /*
+9
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
··· 5807 5807 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 5808 5808 struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave) 5809 5809 { 5810 + union fpregs_state *xstate = (union fpregs_state *)guest_xsave->region; 5811 + 5810 5812 if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu)) 5811 5813 return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0; 5814 + 5815 + /* 5816 + * For backwards compatibility, do not expect disabled features to be in 5817 + * their initial state. XSTATE_BV[i] must still be cleared whenever 5818 + * XFD[i]=1, or XRSTOR would cause a #NM. 5819 + */ 5820 + xstate->xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; 5812 5821 5813 5822 return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, 5814 5823 guest_xsave->region,