Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt

···
 Why:	Deprecated by the new (standard) device driver binding model. Use
 	i2c_driver->probe() and ->remove() instead.
 Who:	Jean Delvare <[e-mail]>
+
+---------------------------
+
+What:	SELinux "compat_net" functionality
+When:	2.6.30 at the earliest
+Why:	In 2.6.18 the Secmark concept was introduced to replace the "compat_net"
+	network access control functionality of SELinux.  Secmark offers both
+	better performance and greater flexibility than the "compat_net"
+	mechanism.  Now that the major Linux distributions have moved to
+	Secmark, it is time to deprecate the older mechanism and start the
+	process of removing the old code.
+Who:	Paul Moore <[e-mail]>

include/linux/capability.h

···
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
+#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
+ * check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
+	(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
 
 extern int capable(int cap);
 

include/linux/security.h

···
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
  */
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
 extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
···
  *	@permitted contains the permitted capability set.
  *	Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
  * @capable:
- *	Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
+ *	Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ *	credentials.
  *	@tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
+ *	@cred contains the credentials to use.
  *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
  *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
  * @acct:
  *	Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting.  If
···
 		       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
+	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+			int cap, int audit);
 	int (*acct) (struct file *file);
 	int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
···
 		    const kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_capable(int cap);
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 int security_acct(struct file *file);
 int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
···
 	return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(int cap)
 {
-	return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	return cap_capable(current, current_cred(), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-static inline int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
-	return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
+			       SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)

include/net/cipso_ipv4.h

···
  */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def);
+int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+		     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 void cipso_v4_doi_free(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def);
 int cipso_v4_doi_remove(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 struct cipso_v4_doi *cipso_v4_doi_getdef(u32 doi);
···
 		     int (*callback) (struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, void *arg),
 	             void *cb_arg);
 #else
-static inline int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
+static inline int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+				   struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }

include/net/netlabel.h

···
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
 
···
 /*
  * LSM configuration operations
  */
-int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+		       u16 family,
+		       const void *addr,
+		       const void *mask,
+		       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+			     u16 family,
+			     const void *addr,
+			     const void *mask,
 			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+				const char *dev_name,
+				const void *addr,
+				const void *mask,
+				u16 family,
+				u32 secid,
+				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+				const char *dev_name,
+				const void *addr,
+				const void *mask,
+				u16 family,
+				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+			   struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
 			       const char *domain,
+			       const struct in_addr *addr,
+			       const struct in_addr *mask,
 			       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-
 /*
  * LSM security attribute operations
  */
···
 void netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
 int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 		     const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+
+/*
+ * Protocol engine operations
+ */
+struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+					struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 #else
 static inline int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+				     u16 family,
+				     const void *addr,
+				     const void *mask,
 				     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
-static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+					   u16 family,
+					   void *addr,
+					   void *mask,
 					   struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
-static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+					      const char *dev_name,
+					      const void *addr,
+					      const void *mask,
+					      u16 family,
+					      u32 secid,
+					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+					      const char *dev_name,
+					      const void *addr,
+					      const void *mask,
+					      u16 family,
+					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+					 struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi,
+					  struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
 					     const char *domain,
+					     const struct in_addr *addr,
+					     const struct in_addr *mask,
 					     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
···
 				   const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return 0;
+}
+static inline struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+						struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return NULL;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 

kernel/capability.c

···
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
+	if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
 		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
 		return 1;
 	}

net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c

···
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
···
 /**
  * cipso_v4_doi_add - Add a new DOI to the CIPSO protocol engine
  * @doi_def: the DOI structure
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * The caller defines a new DOI for use by the CIPSO engine and calls this
···
  * zero on success and non-zero on failure.
  *
  */
-int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
+int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+		     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
+	int ret_val = -EINVAL;
 	u32 iter;
+	u32 doi;
+	u32 doi_type;
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+
+	doi = doi_def->doi;
+	doi_type = doi_def->type;
 
 	if (doi_def == NULL || doi_def->doi == CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto doi_add_return;
 	for (iter = 0; iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; iter++) {
 		switch (doi_def->tags[iter]) {
 		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
 			break;
 		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
-			if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS)
-				return -EINVAL;
-			break;
-		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID:
-			if (iter == 0)
-				return -EINVAL;
-			break;
 		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
 			if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS)
-				return -EINVAL;
+				goto doi_add_return;
 			break;
 		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
 			if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL)
-				return -EINVAL;
+				goto doi_add_return;
+			break;
+		case CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID:
+			if (iter == 0)
+				goto doi_add_return;
 			break;
 		default:
-			return -EINVAL;
+			goto doi_add_return;
 		}
 	}
 
 	atomic_set(&doi_def->refcount, 1);
 
 	spin_lock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
-	if (cipso_v4_doi_search(doi_def->doi) != NULL)
-		goto doi_add_failure;
+	if (cipso_v4_doi_search(doi_def->doi) != NULL) {
+		spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
+		ret_val = -EEXIST;
+		goto doi_add_return;
+	}
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&doi_def->list, &cipso_v4_doi_list);
 	spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
+	ret_val = 0;
 
-	return 0;
+doi_add_return:
+	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD, audit_info);
+	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+		const char *type_str;
+		switch (doi_type) {
+		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
+			type_str = "trans";
+			break;
+		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
+			type_str = "pass";
+			break;
+		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
+			type_str = "local";
+			break;
+		default:
+			type_str = "(unknown)";
+		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
+				 doi, type_str, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+	}
 
-doi_add_failure:
-	spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
-	return -EEXIST;
+	return ret_val;
 }
 
 /**
···
  */
 int cipso_v4_doi_remove(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
+	int ret_val;
 	struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def;
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
 	spin_lock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
 	doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(doi);
 	if (doi_def == NULL) {
 		spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
-		return -ENOENT;
+		ret_val = -ENOENT;
+		goto doi_remove_return;
 	}
 	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&doi_def->refcount)) {
 		spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
-		return -EBUSY;
+		ret_val = -EBUSY;
+		goto doi_remove_return;
 	}
 	list_del_rcu(&doi_def->list);
 	spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
 
 	cipso_v4_cache_invalidate();
 	call_rcu(&doi_def->rcu, cipso_v4_doi_free_rcu);
+	ret_val = 0;
 
-	return 0;
+doi_remove_return:
+	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL, audit_info);
+	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " cipso_doi=%u res=%u",
+				 doi, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+	}
+
+	return ret_val;
 }
 
 /**

net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c

···
 /**
  * netlbl_cipsov4_add_std - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
  * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS DOI definition based on the given ADD
···
  * non-zero on error.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info,
+				  struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -EINVAL;
 	struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
···
 			}
 	}
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_std_failure;
 	return 0;
···
 /**
  * netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
  * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS DOI definition based on the given ADD message
···
  * error.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(struct genl_info *info,
+				   struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
···
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_pass_failure;
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_pass_failure;
 	return 0;
···
 /**
  * netlbl_cipsov4_add_local - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
  * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
  * Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL DOI definition based on the given ADD
···
  * non-zero on error.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(struct genl_info *info,
+				    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
···
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_local_failure;
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
 		goto add_local_failure;
 	return 0;
···
 
 {
 	int ret_val = -EINVAL;
-	u32 type;
-	u32 doi;
 	const char *type_str = "(unknown)";
-	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 
 	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI] ||
 	    !info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
 	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
-
-	type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE]);
-	switch (type) {
+	switch (nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE])) {
 	case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
 		type_str = "trans";
-		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(info);
+		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(info, &audit_info);
 		break;
 	case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
 		type_str = "pass";
-		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(info);
+		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(info, &audit_info);
 		break;
 	case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
 		type_str = "local";
-		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(info);
+		ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(info, &audit_info);
 		break;
 	}
 	if (ret_val == 0)
 		atomic_inc(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
-
-	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD,
-					      &audit_info);
-	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
-		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
-				 " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
-				 doi,
-				 type_str,
-				 ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
-		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
-	}
 
 	return ret_val;
 }
···
 static int netlbl_cipsov4_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -EINVAL;
-	u32 doi = 0;
 	struct netlbl_domhsh_walk_arg cb_arg;
-	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
 	u32 skip_bkt = 0;
 	u32 skip_chain = 0;
···
 	if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
 	netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
-
-	cb_arg.doi = doi;
+	cb_arg.doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
 	cb_arg.audit_info = &audit_info;
 	ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_walk(&skip_bkt, &skip_chain,
 				     netlbl_cipsov4_remove_cb, &cb_arg);
 	if (ret_val == 0 || ret_val == -ENOENT) {
-		ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, &audit_info);
+		ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_remove(cb_arg.doi, &audit_info);
 		if (ret_val == 0)
 			atomic_dec(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
-	}
-
-	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL,
-					      &audit_info);
-	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
-		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
-				 " cipso_doi=%u res=%u",
-				 doi,
-				 ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
-		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 	}
 
 	return ret_val;

net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c

···
 }
 
 /**
+ * netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4 - Removes an address selector entry
+ * @domain: the domain
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ * @mask: IPv4 address mask
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Removes an individual address selector from a domain mapping and potentially
+ * the entire mapping if it is empty.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(const char *domain,
+			     const struct in_addr *addr,
+			     const struct in_addr *mask,
+			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry_map;
+	struct netlbl_af4list *entry_addr;
+	struct netlbl_af4list *iter4;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	struct netlbl_af6list *iter6;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+	struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *entry;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	if (domain)
+		entry_map = netlbl_domhsh_search(domain);
+	else
+		entry_map = netlbl_domhsh_search_def(domain);
+	if (entry_map == NULL || entry_map->type != NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT)
+		goto remove_af4_failure;
+
+	spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
+	entry_addr = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
+					   &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list4);
+	spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
+
+	if (entry_addr == NULL)
+		goto remove_af4_failure;
+	netlbl_af4list_foreach_rcu(iter4, &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list4)
+		goto remove_af4_single_addr;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	netlbl_af6list_foreach_rcu(iter6, &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list6)
+		goto remove_af4_single_addr;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+	/* the domain mapping is empty so remove it from the mapping table */
+	netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(entry_map, audit_info);
+
+remove_af4_single_addr:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	/* yick, we can't use call_rcu here because we don't have a rcu head
+	 * pointer but hopefully this should be a rare case so the pause
+	 * shouldn't be a problem */
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	entry = netlbl_domhsh_addr4_entry(entry_addr);
+	cipso_v4_doi_putdef(entry->type_def.cipsov4);
+	kfree(entry);
+	return 0;
+
+remove_af4_failure:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
  * netlbl_domhsh_remove - Removes an entry from the domain hash table
  * @domain: the domain to remove
  * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information

net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h

···
 			      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
 			       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(const char *domain,
+			     const struct in_addr *addr,
+			     const struct in_addr *mask,
+			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_domhsh_remove_default(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_getentry(const char *domain);

net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c

···
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
···
 #include "netlabel_cipso_v4.h"
 #include "netlabel_user.h"
 #include "netlabel_mgmt.h"
+#include "netlabel_addrlist.h"
 
 /*
  * Configuration Functions
···
 /**
  * netlbl_cfg_map_del - Remove a NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
  * @domain: the domain mapping to remove
+ * @family: address family
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
  * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
···
  * values on failure.
  *
  */
-int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+		       u16 family,
+		       const void *addr,
+		       const void *mask,
+		       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	return netlbl_domhsh_remove(domain, audit_info);
+	if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL) {
+		return netlbl_domhsh_remove(domain, audit_info);
+	} else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+		switch (family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			return netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(domain, addr, mask,
+							audit_info);
+		default:
+			return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /**
- * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map - Add an unlabeled NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add - Add a new unlabeled mapping
  * @domain: the domain mapping to add
+ * @family: address family
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
  * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
···
  * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+			     u16 family,
+			     const void *addr,
+			     const void *mask,
 			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+	struct netlbl_domaddr_map *addrmap = NULL;
+	struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *map4 = NULL;
+	struct netlbl_domaddr6_map *map6 = NULL;
+	const struct in_addr *addr4, *mask4;
+	const struct in6_addr *addr6, *mask6;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (entry == NULL)
···
 	if (domain != NULL) {
 		entry->domain = kstrdup(domain, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (entry->domain == NULL)
-			goto cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure;
+			goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
 	}
-	entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+
+	if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL)
+		entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+	else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+		addrmap = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrmap), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (addrmap == NULL)
+			goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list4);
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list6);
+
+		switch (family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			addr4 = addr;
+			mask4 = mask;
+			map4 = kzalloc(sizeof(*map4), GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (map4 == NULL)
+				goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+			map4->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+			map4->list.addr = addr4->s_addr & mask4->s_addr;
+			map4->list.mask = mask4->s_addr;
+			map4->list.valid = 1;
+			ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&map4->list,
+						     &addrmap->list4);
+			if (ret_val != 0)
+				goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			addr6 = addr;
+			mask6 = mask;
+			map6 = kzalloc(sizeof(*map6), GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (map4 == NULL)
+				goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+			map6->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+			ipv6_addr_copy(&map6->list.addr, addr6);
+			map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[0] &= mask6->s6_addr32[0];
+			map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[1] &= mask6->s6_addr32[1];
+			map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[2] &= mask6->s6_addr32[2];
+			map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask6->s6_addr32[3];
+			ipv6_addr_copy(&map6->list.mask, mask6);
+			map6->list.valid = 1;
+			ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&map4->list,
+						     &addrmap->list4);
+			if (ret_val != 0)
+				goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		entry->type_def.addrsel = addrmap;
+		entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT;
+	} else {
+		ret_val = -EINVAL;
+		goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+	}
 
 	ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_add(entry, audit_info);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
-		goto cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure;
+		goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
 
 	return 0;
 
-cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure:
+cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure:
 	if (entry != NULL)
 		kfree(entry->domain);
 	kfree(entry);
+	kfree(addrmap);
+	kfree(map4);
+	kfree(map6);
 	return ret_val;
 }
 
+
 /**
- * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition and mapping
- * @doi_def: the DOI definition
- * @domain: the domain mapping to add
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add - Adds a new static label
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @family: address family
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
  * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
  *
  * Description:
- * Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition and NetLabel/LSM domain mapping for this
- * new DOI definition to the NetLabel subsystem.  A @domain value of NULL adds
- * a new default domain mapping.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
- * failure.
+ * Adds a new NetLabel static label to be used when protocol provided labels
+ * are not present on incoming traffic.  If @dev_name is NULL then the default
+ * interface will be used.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+				const char *dev_name,
+				const void *addr,
+				const void *mask,
+				u16 family,
+				u32 secid,
+				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	u32 addr_len;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		addr_len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addr_len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
+				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+				 secid, audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del - Removes an existing static label
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @family: address family
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Removes an existing NetLabel static label used when protocol provided labels
+ * are not present on incoming traffic.  If @dev_name is NULL then the default
+ * interface will be used.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+				const char *dev_name,
+				const void *addr,
+				const void *mask,
+				u16 family,
+				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	u32 addr_len;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		addr_len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addr_len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+
+	return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(net,
+				    dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+				    audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition
+ * @doi_def: CIPSO DOI definition
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new CIPSO DOI definition as defined by @doi_def.  Returns zero on
+ * success and negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+			   struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del - Remove an existing CIPSOv4 DOI definition
+ * @doi: CIPSO DOI
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing CIPSO DOI definition matching @doi.  Returns zero on
+ * success and negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI mapping
+ * @doi: the CIPSO DOI
+ * @domain: the domain mapping to add
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new NetLabel/LSM domain mapping for the given CIPSO DOI to the NetLabel
+ * subsystem.  A @domain value of NULL adds a new default domain mapping.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
 			       const char *domain,
+			       const struct in_addr *addr,
+			       const struct in_addr *mask,
 			       struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
-	u32 doi;
-	u32 doi_type;
+	struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
-	const char *type_str;
-	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	struct netlbl_domaddr_map *addrmap = NULL;
+	struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *addrinfo = NULL;
 
-	doi = doi_def->doi;
-	doi_type = doi_def->type;
+	doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_getdef(doi);
+	if (doi_def == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (entry == NULL)
···
 	if (domain != NULL) {
 		entry->domain = kstrdup(domain, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (entry->domain == NULL)
-			goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure;
+			goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
 	}
 
-	ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
-	if (ret_val != 0)
-		goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi;
-	entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
-	entry->type_def.cipsov4 = cipso_v4_doi_getdef(doi);
-	if (entry->type_def.cipsov4 == NULL) {
-		ret_val = -ENOENT;
-		goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi;
+	if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL) {
+		entry->type_def.cipsov4 = doi_def;
+		entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+	} else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+		addrmap = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrmap), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (addrmap == NULL)
+			goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list4);
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list6);
+
+		addrinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrinfo), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (addrinfo == NULL)
+			goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+		addrinfo->type_def.cipsov4 = doi_def;
+		addrinfo->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+		addrinfo->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
+		addrinfo->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
+		addrinfo->list.valid = 1;
+		ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&addrinfo->list, &addrmap->list4);
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+
+		entry->type_def.addrsel = addrmap;
+		entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT;
+	} else {
+		ret_val = -EINVAL;
+		goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
 	}
+
 	ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_add(entry, audit_info);
 	if (ret_val != 0)
-		goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_release_doi;
+		goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
 
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_return:
-	audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD,
-					      audit_info);
-	if (audit_buf != NULL) {
-		switch (doi_type) {
-		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
-			type_str = "trans";
-			break;
-		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
-			type_str = "pass";
-			break;
-		case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
-			type_str = "local";
-			break;
-		default:
-			type_str = "(unknown)";
-		}
-		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
-				 " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
-				 doi, type_str, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
-		audit_log_end(audit_buf);
-	}
+	return 0;
 
-	return ret_val;
-
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_release_doi:
+cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure:
 	cipso_v4_doi_putdef(doi_def);
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi:
-	cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, audit_info);
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure:
 	if (entry != NULL)
 		kfree(entry->domain);
 	kfree(entry);
-	goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_return;
+	kfree(addrmap);
+	kfree(addrinfo);
+	return ret_val;
 }
 
 /*
···
 		return cipso_v4_cache_add(skb, secattr);
 
 	return -ENOMSG;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Protocol Engine Functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_audit_start - Start an audit message
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Start an audit message using the type specified in @type and fill the audit
+ * message with some fields common to all NetLabel audit messages.  This
+ * function should only be used by protocol engines, not LSMs.  Returns a
+ * pointer to the audit buffer on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+					struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+	return netlbl_audit_start_common(type, audit_info);
 }
 
 /*

net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c

···
  * success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
-			     const char *dev_name,
-			     const void *addr,
-			     const void *mask,
-			     u32 addr_len,
-			     u32 secid,
-			     struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
+		      const char *dev_name,
+		      const void *addr,
+		      const void *mask,
+		      u32 addr_len,
+		      u32 secid,
+		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	int ifindex;
···
  * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
-				const char *dev_name,
-				const void *addr,
-				const void *mask,
-				u32 addr_len,
-				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
+			 const char *dev_name,
+			 const void *addr,
+			 const void *mask,
+			 u32 addr_len,
+			 struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct net_device *dev;

net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h

···
 /* General Unlabeled init function */
 int netlbl_unlabel_init(u32 size);
 
+/* Static/Fallback label management functions */
+int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
+		      const char *dev_name,
+		      const void *addr,
+		      const void *mask,
+		      u32 addr_len,
+		      u32 secid,
+		      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
+			 const char *dev_name,
+			 const void *addr,
+			 const void *mask,
+			 u32 addr_len,
+			 struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+
 /* Process Unlabeled incoming network packets */
 int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 			   u16 family,

security/commoncap.c

···
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
  * @tsk: The task to query
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
  * @cap: The capability to check for
  * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
  *
  * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
  * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
  *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
- * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
- * case.
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
+		int audit)
 {
-	__u32 cap_raised;
-
-	/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
+	return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
 /**
···
 	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
 	 * capability
 	 */
-	if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
 		return 0;
 #endif
 	return 1;
···
 		     & (new->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
 		    || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
 		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
-		    || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
+		    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+				    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)		/*[4]*/
 			/*
 			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 			 * [2] no unlocking of locks
···
 {
 	int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-	if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }

security/keys/keyctl.c

···
 
 	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
 		return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
-					   (char *) arg3,
+					   (char __user *) arg3,
 					   (size_t) arg4);
 
 	default:

security/security.c

···
 				    effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_capable(int cap)
 {
-	return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	return security_ops->capable(current, current_cred(), cap,
+				     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
-	return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	int ret;
+
+	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	int ret;
+
+	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int security_acct(struct file *file)

security/selinux/Kconfig

···
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
 
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
-	bool "NSA SELinux enable new secmark network controls by default"
-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
-	default n
-	help
-	  This option determines whether the new secmark-based network
-	  controls will be enabled by default.  If not, the old internal
-	  per-packet controls will be enabled by default, preserving
-	  old behavior.
-
-	  If you enable the new controls, you will need updated
-	  SELinux userspace libraries, tools and policy.  Typically,
-	  your distribution will provide these and enable the new controls
-	  in the kernel they also distribute.
-
-	  Note that this option can be overridden at boot with the
-	  selinux_compat_net parameter, and after boot via
-	  /selinux/compat_net.  See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-	  for details on this parameter.
-
-	  If you enable the new network controls, you will likely
-	  also require the SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, as
-	  well as any conntrack helpers for protocols which you
-	  wish to control.
-
-	  If you are unsure what to do here, select N.
-
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 	bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX

security/selinux/avc.c

···
 #undef S_
 
 static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
+#define S_(c, i, b) {	.tclass = c,\
+			.common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\
+			.common_base =  b },
 #include "av_inherit.h"
 #undef S_
 };
 
 const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
-	av_perm_to_string,
-	ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
-	class_to_string,
-	ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
-	av_inherit,
-	ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
+	.av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
+	.av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
+	.class_to_string = class_to_string,
+	.cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
+	.av_inherit = av_inherit,
+	.av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
 };
 
 #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512

security/selinux/hooks.c

···
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	u16 sclass;
-	u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
 	int rc;
 
···
 	return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+			   int cap, int audit)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
+	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
+	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
···
 {
 	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-	rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			     SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
 
···
 	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
 	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
 	 */
-	error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+				SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
···
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       u16 family)
 {
-	int err;
+	int err = 0;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
···
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
 		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
 							   family, addrp);
-	else
+	else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
 		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 	if (err)
···
 		if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
 							 &ad, family, addrp))
 			return NF_DROP;
-	} else {
+	} else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
 		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP;

security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h

···
 };
 
 struct av_inherit {
-	u16 tclass;
 	const char **common_pts;
 	u32 common_base;
+	u16 tclass;
 };
 
 struct selinux_class_perm {
 	const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
 	u32 av_pts_len;
-	const char **class_to_string;
 	u32 cts_len;
+	const char **class_to_string;
 	const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
 	u32 av_inherit_len;
 };

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

···
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 0
-#else
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 1
-#endif
-
-int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
+int selinux_compat_net = 0;
 
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
···
 	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	selinux_compat_net = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	if (new_value) {
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE
+		       "SELinux: compat_net is deprecated, please use secmark"
+		       " instead\n");
+		selinux_compat_net = 1;
+	} else
+		selinux_compat_net = 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	free_page((unsigned long) page);

security/selinux/ss/context.h

···
 	u32 user;
 	u32 role;
 	u32 type;
+	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
 	struct mls_range range;
 	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
-	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
 };
 
 static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)

security/smack/smack.h

···
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 /*
···
 struct socket_smack {
 	char		*smk_out;			/* outbound label */
 	char		*smk_in;			/* inbound label */
+	int		smk_labeled;			/* label scheme */
 	char		smk_packet[SMK_LABELLEN];	/* TCP peer label */
 };
 
···
 struct smack_cipso {
 	int	smk_level;
 	char	smk_catset[SMK_LABELLEN];
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr {
+	struct smk_netlbladdr	*smk_next;
+	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
 };
 
 /*
···
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
 
 /*
+ * How communications on this socket are treated.
+ * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
+ * but there are certain cases, including single label hosts
+ * and potentially single label interfaces for which the
+ * treatment can not be known in advance.
+ *
+ * The possibility of additional labeling schemes being
+ * introduced in the future exists as well.
+ */
+#define SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET	0
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET	1
+
+/*
+ * smackfs magic number
  * smackfs macic number
  */
 #define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
···
  * CIPSO defaults.
  */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID		-1	/* Not a DOI */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT	250	/* Arbitrary */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL		63	/* Bigger gets harder */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL            255     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
···
  * Shared data.
  */
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
-extern int smack_net_nltype;
 extern char *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
 
···
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
-extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
 
 extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+extern struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
 extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
 
 /*

security/smack/smack_access.c

···
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
-struct smack_known smack_known_unset = {
-	.smk_next	= NULL,
-	.smk_known	= "UNSET",
-	.smk_secid	= 1,
-	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
-};
-
 struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
-	.smk_next	= &smack_known_unset,
+	.smk_next	= NULL,
 	.smk_known	= "?",
 	.smk_secid	= 2,
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
···
 	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
 };
 
-struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_invalid;
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_invalid,
+	.smk_known	= "@",
+	.smk_secid	= 7,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_web;
 
 /*
  * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
···
 	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
 	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
 		return -EACCES;
+	/*
+	 * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+	 * An internet subject can access any object.
+	 */
+	if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+	    subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+	    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
+		return 0;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
 	 */

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

···
 
 	ssp->smk_in = csp;
 	ssp->smk_out = csp;
+	ssp->smk_labeled = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
 	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
 	sk->sk_security = ssp;
···
 	struct smack_cipso cipso;
 	int rc;
 
-	switch (smack_net_nltype) {
-	case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
-		nlsp->domain = smack;
-		nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+	nlsp->domain = smack;
+	nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 
-		rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
-		if (rc == 0) {
-			nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
-			smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
-		} else {
-			nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
-			smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
+	rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+		smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+	} else {
+		nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+		smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
 	}
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
  * @sk: the socket
+ * @labeled: socket label scheme
  *
  * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
  * secattr and attach it to the socket.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or an error code
  */
-static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk)
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	ssp = sk->sk_security;
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
-	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	/*
+	 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
+	 * packet labeling based on the label.
+	 * The case of a single label host is different, because
+	 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
+	 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
+	 * label.
+	 */
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+	if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
+	    labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+	else {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	}
+
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+	/*
+	 * Remember the label scheme used so that it is not
+	 * necessary to do the netlabel setting if it has not
+	 * changed the next time through.
+	 *
+	 * The -EDESTADDRREQ case is an indication that there's
+	 * a single level host involved.
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0)
+		ssp->smk_labeled = labeled;
 
 	return rc;
 }
···
 		ssp->smk_in = sp;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
 		ssp->smk_out = sp;
-		rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+		rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
 			       __func__, -rc);
···
 	/*
 	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
 	 */
-	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+ * @sip: the object end
+ *
+ * looks for host based access restrictions
+ *
+ * This version will only be appropriate for really small
+ * sets of single label hosts. Because of the masking
+ * it cannot shortcut out on the first match. There are
+ * numerious ways to address the problem, but none of them
+ * have been applied here.
+ *
+ * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+ */
+static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+	char *bestlabel = NULL;
+	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+	struct in_addr *liap;
+	struct in_addr *miap;
+	struct in_addr bestmask;
+
+	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	bestmask.s_addr = 0;
+
+	for (snp = smack_netlbladdrs; snp != NULL; snp = snp->smk_next) {
+		liap = &snp->smk_host.sin_addr;
+		miap = &snp->smk_mask;
+		/*
+		 * If the addresses match after applying the list entry mask
+		 * the entry matches the address. If it doesn't move along to
+		 * the next entry.
+		 */
+		if ((liap->s_addr & miap->s_addr) !=
+		    (siap->s_addr & miap->s_addr))
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If the list entry mask identifies a single address
+		 * it can't get any more specific.
+		 */
+		if (miap->s_addr == 0xffffffff)
+			return snp->smk_label;
+		/*
+		 * If the list entry mask is less specific than the best
+		 * already found this entry is uninteresting.
+		 */
+		if ((miap->s_addr | bestmask.s_addr) == bestmask.s_addr)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * This is better than any entry found so far.
+		 */
+		bestmask.s_addr = miap->s_addr;
+		bestlabel = snp->smk_label;
+	}
+
+	return bestlabel;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	char *hostsp;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hostsp = smack_host_label((struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+	if (hostsp == NULL) {
+		if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+			return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+		return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
···
 	if (newsmack == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+	 */
+	if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
+	if (new == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	new->security = newsmack;
 	commit_creds(new);
···
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msghdr: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
+ * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
+ * label host.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	char *hostsp;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+	 */
+	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+
+	hostsp = smack_host_label(sip);
+	if (hostsp == NULL) {
+		if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+			return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+		return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+
+	return 0;
+
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
  * 	pair to smack
  * @sap: netlabel secattr
···
 static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
 {
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *sp;
 	int pcat;
 
-	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0) {
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
 		/*
+		 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
 		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
 		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
 		 *
+		 * Get the categories, if any
 		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
 		 * for the packet fall back on the network
 		 * ambient value.
 		 */
-		strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
-		return;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Get the categories, if any
-	 */
-	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
-	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
-		for (pcat = -1;;) {
-			pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
-							  pcat + 1);
-			if (pcat < 0)
-				break;
-			smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+		memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+		if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+			for (pcat = -1;;) {
+				pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
+					sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
+				if (pcat < 0)
+					break;
+				smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+			}
+		/*
+		 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+		 * we are already done. WeeHee.
+		 */
+		if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+			memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+			return;
 		}
-	/*
-	 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
-	 * we are already done. WeeHee.
-	 */
-	if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
-		memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+		/*
+		 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
+		 * a direct mapping.
+		 */
+		smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+		 */
+		sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+		/*
+		 * This has got to be a bug because it is
+		 * impossible to specify a fallback without
+		 * specifying the label, which will ensure
+		 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
+		 * secid is from a fallback.
+		 */
+		BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
+		strncpy(sip, sp, SMK_MAXLEN);
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
-	 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not a direct mapping.
+	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+	 * for the packet fall back on the network
+	 * ambient value.
 	 */
-	smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
+	strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
 	return;
 }
 
···
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *csp;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
···
 	/*
 	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
 	 */
-	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	if (rc == 0) {
 		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
-	else
-		strncpy(smack, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+		csp = smack;
+	} else
+		csp = smack_net_ambient;
+
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
 	/*
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
 	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
 	 * This is the simplist possible security model
 	 * for networking.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+	rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
 	return rc;
···
 	/*
 	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
 	 */
-	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
···
 	ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
 	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
-	rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
+	rc = smack_netlabel(sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
 		       __func__, -rc);
···
 	if (skb == NULL)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &skb_secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
···
 	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
 
 	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_connect =		smack_socket_connect,
+	.socket_sendmsg =		smack_socket_sendmsg,
 	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
 	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
 	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
···
 	/*
 	 * Initialize locks
 	 */
-	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_unset.smk_cipsolock);
 	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
 	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
 	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);

security/smack/smackfs.c

···
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
···
 	SMK_DOI		= 5,	/* CIPSO DOI */
 	SMK_DIRECT	= 6,	/* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
 	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
-	SMK_NLTYPE	= 8,	/* label scheme to use by default */
+	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 };
 
···
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 
 /*
  * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
···
  * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
  */
 char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-
-/*
- * This is the default packet marking scheme for network traffic.
- * It can be reset via smackfs/nltype
- */
-int smack_net_nltype = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
 
 /*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
···
  * will be used if any label is used.
  */
 char *smack_onlycap;
+
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
 
 static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
···
 #define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
 #define SMK_LOADLEN   (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
 
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+	nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ * "192.168.138.129/32 abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN	9
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX	42
 
 /*
  * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
···
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
-	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
 
-	audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-	audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
 
-	rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
 		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
···
 	for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
 		doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
 
-	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(doip, NULL, &audit_info);
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
 	if (rc != 0) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d cipso add rc = %d\n",
 		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
 		kfree(doip);
+		return;
+	}
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(doip->doi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+		kfree(doip);
+		return;
 	}
 }
 
···
 static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
 
-	audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-	audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
 
 	if (oldambient != NULL) {
-		rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
 			       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
 	}
 
-	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(smack_net_ambient, &audit_info);
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+				      NULL, NULL, &nai);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
 		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
···
 	.read		= seq_read,
 	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
 	.write		= smk_write_cipso,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return smack_netlbladdrs;
+}
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = ((struct smk_netlbladdr *) v)->smk_next;
+
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+
+	return skp;
+}
+/*
+#define BEMASK	0x80000000
+*/
+#define BEMASK	0x00000001
+#define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = (struct smk_netlbladdr *) v;
+	unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	__be32 bebits;
+	int maskn = 0;
+
+	for (bebits = BEMASK; bebits != 0; maskn++, bebits <<= 1)
+		if ((skp->smk_mask.s_addr & bebits) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
+		hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void netlbladdr_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
+	.stop  = netlbladdr_seq_stop,
+	.next  = netlbladdr_seq_next,
+	.show  = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp;
+	struct sockaddr_in newname;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *sp;
+	char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX];
+	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct in_addr mask;
+	unsigned int m;
+	__be32 bebits = BEMASK;
+	__be32 nsa;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+	 * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data[count] = '\0';
+
+	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+	if (rc != 6) {
+		rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+			&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+		if (rc != 5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		m = BEBITS;
+	}
+	if (m > BEBITS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (mask.s_addr = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+		mask.s_addr |= bebits;
+		bebits <<= 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	for (skp = smack_netlbladdrs; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
+		    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr)
+			break;
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		else {
+			rc = 0;
+			skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+			skp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+			skp->smk_next = smack_netlbladdrs;
+			skp->smk_label = sp;
+			smack_netlbladdrs = skp;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+			PF_INET, &audit_info);
+		skp->smk_label = sp;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+	 */
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+			smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = count;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_netlbladdr,
 	.release        = seq_release,
 };
 
···
 	.write		= smk_write_onlycap,
 };
 
-struct option_names {
-	int	o_number;
-	char	*o_name;
-	char	*o_alias;
-};
-
-static struct option_names netlbl_choices[] = {
-	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO,
-		NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO_NAME,	"ripso" },
-	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
-		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,	"cipsov4" },
-	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
-		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,	"cipso" },
-	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6,
-		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6_NAME,	"cipsov6" },
-	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED,
-		NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED_NAME,	"unlabeled" },
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_read_nltype - read() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @count: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_read_nltype(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char bound[40];
-	ssize_t rc;
-	int i;
-
-	if (count < SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (*ppos != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	sprintf(bound, "unknown");
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
-		if (smack_net_nltype == netlbl_choices[i].o_number) {
-			sprintf(bound, "%s", netlbl_choices[i].o_name);
-			break;
-		}
-
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, bound, strlen(bound));
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * smk_write_nltype - write() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to get the data from
- * @count: bytes sent
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_write_nltype(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char bound[40];
-	char *cp;
-	int i;
-
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (count >= 40)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(bound, buf, count) != 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	bound[count] = '\0';
-	cp = strchr(bound, ' ');
-	if (cp != NULL)
-		*cp = '\0';
-	cp = strchr(bound, '\n');
-	if (cp != NULL)
-		*cp = '\0';
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
-		if (strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_name) == 0 ||
-		    strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_alias) == 0) {
-			smack_net_nltype = netlbl_choices[i].o_number;
-			return count;
-		}
-	/*
-	 * Not a valid choice.
-	 */
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations smk_nltype_ops = {
-	.read		= smk_read_nltype,
-	.write		= smk_write_nltype,
-};
-
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
···
 			{"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_AMBIENT]	=
 			{"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_NLTYPE]	=
-			{"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
+			{"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_ONLYCAP]	=
 			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}