selinux: wrap global selinux state

Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[e-mail]>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[e-mail]>

security/selinux/avc.c

···
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ssid,
+				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
 	else {
···
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, tsid,
+				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
 	else {
···
 {
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
-	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	security_compute_av(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+			    avd, &xp_node->xp);
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
···
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+	if (is_enforcing(&selinux_state) &&
+	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
···
 			goto decision;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
-						&local_xpd);
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
+						 tclass, driver, &local_xpd);
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
 				ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);

security/selinux/hooks.c

···
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
 /* SECMARK reference count */
 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-int selinux_enforcing;
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
 
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enforcing;
 	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
-		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+		selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
···
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
+static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
+	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+		selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
 
···
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 }
 
 /**
···
  */
 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 }
 
 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
···
 
 	might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 
-	if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+	if (selinux_state.initialized &&
+	    isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 		if (!may_sleep)
 			return -ECHILD;
 
···
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
-		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
+		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 }
···
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
···
 
 	i = 0;
 	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
+					     sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
···
 		struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
 
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
···
 
 	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
 		if (!num_opts) {
 			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
···
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
···
 		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 		 * filesystem type.
 		 */
-		rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
 				"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
···
 		}
 		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
-			rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
+			rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
+						     current_sid(),
+						     current_sid(),
 						     SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 						     &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 			if (rc)
···
 	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 	 */
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
···
 
 	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
 		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
-		rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
···
 
 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 {
-	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
+	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
···
 				path++;
 			}
 		}
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
+					path, tclass, sid);
 	}
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
···
 			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 			rc = 0;
 		} else {
-			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
+							     context, rc, &sid,
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
···
 		sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
+					     sclass, NULL, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
···
 		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
 	} else {
 		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
-		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+		return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+					       dsec->sid, tclass,
 					       name, _new_isid);
 	}
 
···
 	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
 		av |= FILE__OPEN;
 
 	return av;
···
 	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
 	 * the old and new contexts.
 	 */
-	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
 		av = 0;
 		if (nnp)
 			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
···
 	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
 	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
 	 */
-	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					 new_tsec->sid);
 	if (!rc)
 		return 0;
 
···
 			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
 					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
···
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
···
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
+				       ctxlen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
···
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 	}
 
-	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name)
 		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
 
 	if (value && len) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+						   &context, &clen);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		*value = context;
···
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm &&
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
 	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
 	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
 	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
···
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
 		if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 			struct audit_buffer *ab;
···
 
 			return rc;
 		}
-		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
+						   size, &newsid);
 	}
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
···
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
-					  isec->sclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
+					  sid, isec->sclass);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
···
 		return;
 	}
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
+					   &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
 		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
···
 	 */
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
-		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
+						      isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
 	else
-		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
+		error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+						&context, &size);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	error = size;
···
 	if (!value || !size)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
···
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
···
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	if (default_noexec &&
···
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
+					   nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
···
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
-		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
+					    conn_sid);
 	else
 		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
 
···
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
-				       socksid);
+	return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				       secclass, NULL, socksid);
 }
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
···
 
 	/* server child socket */
 	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
-				    &sksec_new->sid);
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
+				    sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
···
 	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
···
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 
-	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
+				      &scontext_len);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
···
 	u32 conn_sid;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return 0;
 
 	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
···
 	struct sockaddr *addr;
 	struct socket *sock;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
···
 	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
 	 * the non-sctp clone version.
 	 */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
···
 			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
 			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
 			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
+			if (!is_enforcing(&selinux_state) ||
+			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
 				err = 0;
 		}
 
···
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
···
 	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
···
 		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
 		 * message queue this message will be stored in
 		 */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
-					     NULL, &msec->sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
···
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+	error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	return len;
···
 			str[size-1] = 0;
 			size--;
 		}
-		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
+						&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 			if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 				struct audit_buffer *ab;
···
 
 				return error;
 			}
-			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
-							      &sid);
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(
+						      &selinux_state,
+						      value, size, &sid);
 		}
 		if (error)
 			return error;
···
 		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
 		error = -EPERM;
 		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
-			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+			error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
+							    tsec->sid, sid);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
 		}
···
 
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+				       secdata, seclen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
···
 	unsigned len;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
+				     &context, &len);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = len;
 	*_buffer = context;
···
 	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
 	struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
 
-	err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid);
+	err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
+				      &sid);
 
 	if (err)
 		return err;
···
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
+	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+	set_enforcing(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
+	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+
 	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
 	cred_init_security();
 
···
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
+	avtab_cache_init();
+
+	ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+	hashtab_cache_init();
+
 	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
 
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
···
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
 	else
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
···
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
-static int selinux_disabled;
-
-int selinux_disable(void)
+int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	if (ss_initialized) {
+	if (state->initialized) {
 		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_disabled) {
+	if (state->disabled) {
 		/* Only do this once. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	state->disabled = 1;
+
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
-	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
 	security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));

security/selinux/ibpkey.c

···
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(&selinux_state, subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+				   sid);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 

security/selinux/include/avc.h

···
 #include "av_permissions.h"
 #include "security.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-extern int selinux_enforcing;
-#else
-#define selinux_enforcing 1
-#endif
-
 /*
  * An entry in the AVC.
  */

security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h

···
 
 extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
 
-/*
- * The security server must be initialized before
- * any labeling or access decisions can be provided.
- */
-extern int ss_initialized;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
 

security/selinux/include/conditional.h

···
 #ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 #define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+#include "security.h"
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values);
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index);
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index);
 
 #endif

security/selinux/include/objsec.h

···
 	u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
 };
 
-extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */

security/selinux/include/security.h

···
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 
 #define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
···
 
 extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
 
-extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-extern int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
-
 /*
  * type_datum properties
  * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
···
 /* limitation of boundary depth  */
 #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void);
+struct selinux_ss;
 
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
-size_t security_policydb_len(void);
+struct selinux_state {
+	bool disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool enforcing;
+#endif
+	bool checkreqprot;
+	bool initialized;
+	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+	struct selinux_ss *ss;
+};
 
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->enforcing;
+}
+
+static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+	state->enforcing = value;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION];
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap);
 
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
···
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-			 u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
-	u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+			    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid);
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 callsid, char *username,
 			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
 
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 tclass);
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				      u16 tclass);
 
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
 
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid);
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
···
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE		7 /* use native label support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX		7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
 
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb);
 
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
-	u32 *sid);
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid);
 
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid,
 				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(
+static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 					    struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 					    u32 *sid)
 {
 	return -EIDRM;
 }
 
-static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
-					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+					 u32 sid,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
···
 /*
  * status notifier using mmap interface
  */
-extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION	1
 struct selinux_kernel_status {
···
 	 */
 } __packed;
 
-extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
-extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
-extern int selinux_disable(void);
+extern int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state);
 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
···
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 
-#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
 
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */

security/selinux/netif.c

···
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
+	ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 	new->nsec.ns = ns;

security/selinux/netlabel.c

···
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid);
 	if (rc == 0 &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
···
 	secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid,
+					    secattr);
 	if (rc != 0) {
 		netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
 		return NULL;
···
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		secattr = &secattr_storage;
 		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
-		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid,
+						    secattr);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			goto skbuff_setsid_return;
 	}
···
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state,
+					    ep->secid, &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto assoc_request_return;
 
···
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid,
+					    &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto inet_conn_request_return;
 	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);

security/selinux/netnode.c

···
 		goto out;
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_INET:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
 		break;
 	case PF_INET6:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
 		break;

security/selinux/netport.c

···
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (new == NULL)
 		goto out;
-	ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid);
+	ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

···
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
-unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-
-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
-{
-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
-		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
 /* global data for booleans */
···
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   is_enforcing(&selinux_state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
···
 {
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
-	int new_value;
+	int old_value, new_value;
 
 	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
···
 
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
-	if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
+	old_value = is_enforcing(&selinux_state);
+
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
 		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
 				      NULL);
···
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-			new_value, selinux_enforcing,
+			new_value, old_value,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
-		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
-		if (selinux_enforcing)
+		set_enforcing(&selinux_state, new_value);
+		if (new_value)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
-		selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(&selinux_state,
+						 new_value);
+		if (!new_value)
 			call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 	}
 	length = count;
···
 	ssize_t length;
 	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
 	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
-		security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		security_get_reject_unknown(&selinux_state) :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state);
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
···
 
 static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(&selinux_state);
 
 	if (!status)
 		return -ENOMEM;
···
 		goto out;
 
 	if (new_value) {
-		length = selinux_disable();
+		length = selinux_disable(&selinux_state);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
···
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   security_mls_enabled());
+			   security_mls_enabled(&selinux_state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
···
 	if (!plm)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(&selinux_state)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
-		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(&selinux_state));
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+	rc = security_read_policy(&selinux_state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
···
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_load_policy(data, count);
+	length = security_load_policy(&selinux_state, data, count);
 	if (length) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
 		goto out;
···
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, buf, size,
+					 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &canon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
···
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_state.checkreqprot);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
···
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	kfree(page);
···
 	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, oldcon, &osid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, newcon, &nsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, taskcon, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(&selinux_state, osid, nsid,
+					       tsid, tclass);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = count;
 out:
···
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+	security_compute_av_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
···
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-					      objname, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
+					      tclass, objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
···
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_change_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				     &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
···
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, con, &sid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+	length = security_get_user_sids(&selinux_state, sid, user, &sids,
+					&nsids);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
 	ptr = buf + length;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sids[i],
+					     &newcon, &len);
 		if (rc) {
 			length = rc;
 			goto out;
···
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_member_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				     &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
···
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(&selinux_state, index);
 	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
 		ret = cur_enforcing;
 		goto out;
···
 
 	length = 0;
 	if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
-		length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+		length = security_set_bools(&selinux_state, bool_num,
+					    bool_pending_values);
 
 	if (!length)
 		length = count;
···
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
+	ret = security_get_bools(&selinux_state, &num, &names, &values);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
···
 			goto out;
 
 		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
-		ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+		ret = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, "selinuxfs", page,
+					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
 					   page);
···
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
-	ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &con, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
···
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 
-	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	value = security_policycap_supported(&selinux_state,
+					     i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
···
 	int i, rc, nperms;
 	char **perms;
 
-	rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	rc = security_get_permissions(&selinux_state, objclass, &perms,
+				      &nperms);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
···
 	/* delete any existing entries */
 	sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
 
-	rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+	rc = security_get_classes(&selinux_state, &classes, &nclasses);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

···
 
 	return rc;
 }
-void avtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
 					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
···
 	avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
 						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
 						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
-}
-
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
 }

security/selinux/ss/avtab.h

···
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
 
-void avtab_cache_init(void);
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
 

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c

···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
 {
 	ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
 							sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
 							0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
-}
-
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(ebitmap_node_cachep);
 }

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h

···
 int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);

security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c

···
 	info->slots_used = slots_used;
 	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
 }
-void hashtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 		hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
 			sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
 			0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
-}
-
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-		kmem_cache_destroy(hashtab_node_cachep);
 }

security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h

···
 /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
 
-/* Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node */
-void hashtab_cache_init(void);
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */

security/selinux/ss/mls.c

···
  * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
  * security context string representation of `context'.
  */
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
 {
 	int i, l, len, head, prev;
 	char *nm;
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
 		int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
-		len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
 
 		/* categories */
 		head = -2;
···
 			if (i - prev > 1) {
 				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
 				if (head != prev) {
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				}
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				head = i;
 			}
 			prev = i;
 		}
 		if (prev != head) {
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 		}
 		if (l == 0) {
···
  * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
  * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
  */
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+			struct context *context,
 			char **scontext)
 {
 	char *scontextp, *nm;
···
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	scontextp = *scontext;
···
 	scontextp++;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS,
+		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
 					   context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
 		scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
 
···
 						*scontextp++ = '.';
 					else
 						*scontextp++ = ',';
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 					scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				}
···
 					*scontextp++ = ':';
 				else
 					*scontextp++ = ',';
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 				scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				head = i;
···
 				*scontextp++ = '.';
 			else
 				*scontextp++ = ',';
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 			scontextp += strlen(nm);
 		}
···
  * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
  * given constraints of gfp_mask.
  */
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
···
 	if (!tmpstr) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 	} else {
-		rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
 					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
 		kfree(freestr);
 	}
···
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon)
 {
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
 		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
···
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 	int l, i;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
···
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	int default_range = 0;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (specified) {
···
 		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
 		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
 		rtr.target_class = tclass;
-		r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
+		r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr);
 		if (r)
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 
-		if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
-			cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+		if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 			if (cladatum)
 				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
 		}
···
 
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
···
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
  *
  */
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
···
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
  *
  */
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
···
  * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
···
  * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,

security/selinux/ss/mls.h

···
 #include "context.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext);
 int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
···
 		       struct sidtab *s,
 		       u32 def_sid);
 
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
 int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
 
···
 			struct policydb *newp,
 			struct context *context);
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
 		    struct context *newcontext,
 		    bool sock);
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
-static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;

security/selinux/ss/services.c

···
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition"
 };
 
-int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
+static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
 
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-
-static struct sidtab sidtab;
-struct policydb policydb;
-int ss_initialized;
-
-/*
- * The largest sequence number that has been used when
- * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
- * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
- * occurs.
- */
-static u32 latest_granting;
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
+{
+	rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
+	mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
+	*ss = &selinux_ss;
+}
 
 /* Forward declaration. */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext,
 				    u32 *scontext_len);
 
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms);
-
-struct selinux_mapping {
-	u16 value; /* policy value */
-	unsigned num_perms;
-	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
-};
-
-static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
-static u16 current_mapping_size;
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
-			       struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
-			       u16 *out_map_size)
+			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
 {
-	struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
-	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
 	u16 i, j;
 	unsigned k;
 	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
···
 		i++;
 
 	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
-	out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!out_map)
+	out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map->mapping)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
 	j = 0;
 	while (map[j].name) {
 		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
-		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
 
 		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
 		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
···
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
 		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
 
-	*out_map_p = out_map;
-	*out_map_size = i;
+	out_map->size = i;
 	return 0;
 err:
-	kfree(out_map);
+	kfree(out_map->mapping);
+	out_map->mapping = NULL;
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
···
  * Get real, policy values from mapped values
  */
 
-static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
-		return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+	if (tclass < map->size)
+		return map->mapping[tclass].value;
 
 	return tclass;
 }
···
 /*
  * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
  */
-static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
-		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+	for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+		if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
 			return i;
 	}
 
 	return SECCLASS_NULL;
 }
 
-static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 int allow_unknown)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
-		unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+	if (tclass < map->size) {
+		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
 		u32 result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		avd->allowed = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
-			if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		avd->auditallow = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		/*
···
 	}
 }
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void)
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.mls_enabled;
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	return p->mls_enabled;
 }
 
 /*
···
  * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
  * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
  */
-static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+				struct context *scontext,
 				struct context *tcontext,
 				struct context *xcontext,
 				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
···
 			case CEXPR_ROLE:
 				val1 = scontext->role;
 				val2 = tcontext->role;
-				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
-				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
 				switch (e->op) {
 				case CEXPR_DOM:
 					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *scontext,
 				    struct context *tcontext,
 				    u16 tclass,
 				    u32 permissions,
···
 	if (!permissions)
 		return;
 
-	tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
-	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
 
 	/* init permission_names */
···
 		goto out;
 
 	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
 				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
 				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
···
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
-static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				     struct context *scontext,
 				     struct context *tcontext,
 				     u16 tclass,
 				     struct av_decision *avd)
···
 	struct type_datum *target;
 	u32 masked = 0;
 
-	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!source);
 
 	if (!source->bounds)
 		return;
 
-	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!target);
 
···
 		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
 				  tcontextp,
 				  tclass,
 				  &lo_avd,
···
 	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
 	/* audit masked permissions */
-	security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				tclass, masked, "bounds");
 }
 
···
  * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
  * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
  */
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms)
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *constraint;
 	struct role_allow *ra;
···
 		xperms->len = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		if (printk_ratelimit())
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/*
 	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
···
 	 */
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
 				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
···
 			}
 
 			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
-			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
 					avd, xperms);
 
 		}
···
 	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
 	while (constraint) {
 		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
-		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
 			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 		}
···
 	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
 	 * pair.
 	 */
-	if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
-	    (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
+	if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
 	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
-		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
 			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
 			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
 	}
 
 	/*
···
 	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
 	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
 	 */
-	type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				 tclass, avd);
 }
 
-static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+					   struct context *ocontext,
 					   struct context *ncontext,
 					   struct context *tcontext,
 					   u16 tclass)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
 	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
 		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
-		  o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(o);
 	kfree(n);
 	kfree(t);
 
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!is_enforcing(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+					  u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *ocontext;
 	struct context *ncontext;
 	struct context *tcontext;
···
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	if (!user)
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	else
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
 
-	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
-	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
 	if (!ocontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, oldsid);
···
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
 	if (!ncontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, newsid);
···
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, tasksid);
···
 
 	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
 	while (constraint) {
-		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
-					  constraint->expr)) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext,
+					  tcontext, constraint->expr)) {
 			if (user)
 				rc = -EPERM;
 			else
-				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+								     ocontext,
 								     ncontext,
 								     tcontext,
 								     tclass);
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
-					u16 tclass)
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						tclass, true);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      tclass, true);
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 orig_tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						orig_tclass, false);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      orig_tclass, false);
 }
 
 /*
···
  * @oldsid : current security identifier
  * @newsid : destinated security identifier
  */
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *old_context, *new_context;
 	struct type_datum *type;
 	int index;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
+	old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
 	if (!old_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, old_sid);
···
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
+	new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
 	if (!new_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, new_sid);
···
 
 	index = new_context->type;
 	while (true) {
-		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 					  index - 1);
 		BUG_ON(!type);
 
···
 		char *new_name = NULL;
 		u32 length;
 
-		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context,
 					      &old_name, &length) &&
-		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+		    !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context,
 					      &new_name, &length)) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context,
 				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
···
 		kfree(old_name);
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	avd->allowed = 0;
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
-	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 	avd->flags = 0;
 }
 
···
 	}
 }
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
-				u32 tsid,
-				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u8 driver,
-				struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid,
+				      u32 tsid,
+				      u16 orig_tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
···
 	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
 	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
 				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
 
-			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
 						&avkey, xpermd);
 		}
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
···
  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
  */
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid,
 			 u32 tsid,
 			 u16 orig_tclass,
 			 struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
 	xperms->len = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
···
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
-	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  xperms);
+	map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+		     policydb->allow_unknown);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
 	goto out;
 }
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid,
 			      u32 tsid,
 			      u16 tclass,
 			      struct av_decision *avd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
···
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
···
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  NULL);
  out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
···
  * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
  * the length of the string.
  */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
 	char *scontextp;
 
···
 	}
 
 	/* Compute the size of the context. */
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
 
 	if (!scontext)
 		return 0;
···
 	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
 	 */
 	scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+		sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
 
-	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+	mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
 
 	*scontextp = 0;
 
···
 	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
 }
 
-static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					u32 sid, char **scontext,
 					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
···
 		*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len  = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
 			char *scontextp;
 
···
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	if (force)
-		context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
 	else
-		context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
+				      scontext_len);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	return rc;
 
···
  * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
  * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
  */
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 0);
 }
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1);
 }
 
 /*
···
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
 					int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
 	struct context context;
 	int rc = 0;
···
 	if (!scontext2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		int i;
 
 		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
···
 		if (!str)
 			goto out;
 	}
-
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
 				      scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
 		context.str = str;
···
 		str = NULL;
 	} else if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
 	context_destroy(&context);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	kfree(scontext2);
 	kfree(str);
···
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
 			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
 }
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
+	return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+				       sid, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
···
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
 }
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
 }
 
 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
 	struct context *scontext,
 	struct context *tcontext,
 	u16 tclass,
 	struct context *newcontext)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
 	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
 		  " scontext=%s"
 		  " tcontext=%s"
 		  " tclass=%s",
-		  n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(s);
 	kfree(t);
 	kfree(n);
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!is_enforcing(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct context *newcontext,
 				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
 				  const char *objname)
 {
···
 	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
 	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
 	 */
-	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
 		return;
 
 	ft.stype = stype;
···
 	ft.tclass = tclass;
 	ft.name = objname;
 
-	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
 	if (otype)
 		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
···
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
 	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
···
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		switch (orig_tclass) {
 		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
 			*out_sid = ssid;
···
 
 	context_init(&newcontext);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (kern) {
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
 	} else {
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
-		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map,
+							  tclass));
 	}
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
···
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
-		cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/* Set the user identity. */
 	switch (specified) {
···
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		else
 			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
···
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) {
 			/* Use the type of process. */
 			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
 		} else {
···
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
 	if (!avdatum) {
-		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
 				avdatum = &node->datum;
···
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
 	if (objname)
-		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+		filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
 				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
 		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
-		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+		for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
+		     roletr = roletr->next) {
 			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
 			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
 			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
···
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
 	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
-	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
 			     &newcontext, sock);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
-		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext,
 							tcontext,
 							tclass,
 							&newcontext);
···
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcontext);
 out:
 	return rc;
···
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    objname, out_sid, false);
 }
 
···
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
···
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state,
+				    ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
···
 		return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
+	struct context *context)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s;
 	u32 len;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (is_enforcing(state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
 		kfree(s);
 	}
···
 }
 
 struct convert_context_args {
+	struct selinux_state *state;
 	struct policydb *oldp;
 	struct policydb *newp;
 };
···
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+							    &oldc);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
···
 	return rc;
 bad:
 	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
···
 	goto out;
 }
 
-static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	unsigned int i;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
-	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
-	selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-					  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
-	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
-	selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
-	selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+		state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
 		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
 			selinux_policycap_names[i],
-			ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
 
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
 			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
 				i);
 	}
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *newpolicydb);
 
 /**
  * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
···
  * This function will flush the access vector cache after
  * loading the new policy.
  */
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
 	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
-	struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
+	struct selinux_map newmap;
 	struct convert_context_args args;
 	u32 seqno;
-	u16 map_size;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
 
···
 	}
 	newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
-		avtab_cache_init();
-		ebitmap_cache_init();
-		hashtab_cache_init();
-		rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		policydb->len = len;
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &state->ss->map);
 		if (rc) {
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		policydb.len = len;
-		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
-					 &current_mapping,
-					 &current_mapping_size);
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
 		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
-		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		security_load_policycaps();
-		ss_initialized = 1;
-		seqno = ++latest_granting;
+		security_load_policycaps(state);
+		state->initialized = 1;
+		seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 		selinux_complete_init();
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 #if 0
-	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+	sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
 #endif
 
 	rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
···
 
 	newpolicydb->len = len;
 	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
-	else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
 
 	rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
···
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	/* Clone the SID table. */
-	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+	sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
 
-	rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
···
 	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
 	 * in the new SID table.
 	 */
-	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.state = state;
+	args.oldp = policydb;
 	args.newp = newpolicydb;
 	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
 	if (rc) {
···
 	}
 
 	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
-	memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+	memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
 
 	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
-	memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
-	security_load_policycaps();
-	oldmap = current_mapping;
-	current_mapping = map;
-	current_mapping_size = map_size;
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps(state);
+	oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.size = newmap.size;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
 	policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
 	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
-	kfree(oldmap);
+	kfree(oldmapping);
 
 	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 
···
 	goto out;
 
 err:
-	kfree(map);
+	kfree(newmap.mapping);
 	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
 	policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
 
···
 	return rc;
 }
 
-size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	size_t len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	len = policydb.len;
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	len = p->len;
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return len;
 }
···
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
 		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
···
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * @pkey_num: pkey number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
 		    c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
···
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
···
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
 		    !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
···
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
···
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * @name: interface name
  * @if_sid: interface SID
  */
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
···
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						  &c->context[0],
 						  &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[1],
 						   &c->sid[1]);
 			if (rc)
···
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * @addrlen: address length in bytes
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain,
 		      void *addrp,
 		      u32 addrlen,
 		      u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	switch (domain) {
 	case AF_INET: {
···
 
 		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
 
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
 		while (c) {
 			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
 				break;
···
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
 			goto out;
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
 		while (c) {
 			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
 						c->u.node6.mask))
···
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
···
 
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * number of elements in the array.
  */
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 fromsid,
 			   char *username,
 			   u32 **sids,
 			   u32 *nel)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
 	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
 	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
···
 	*sids = NULL;
 	*nel = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto out;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	context_init(&usercon);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
 	if (!fromcon)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username);
 	if (!user)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
···
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
-		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
 		usercon.role = i + 1;
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
 			usercon.type = j + 1;
 
-			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+						 &usercon))
 				continue;
 
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
 			if (mynel < maxnel) {
···
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (rc || !mynel) {
 		kfree(mysids);
 		goto out;
···
  *
  * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
  */
-static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				       const char *fstype,
 				       char *path,
 				       u16 orig_sclass,
 				       u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
···
 	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
 		path++;
 
-	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+	sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass);
 	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
-	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+	for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
 		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
 		if (cmp <= 0)
 			break;
···
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!c->sid[0]) {
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
···
  * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
  * it afterward.
  */
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype,
 		       char *path,
 		       u16 orig_sclass,
 		       u32 *sid)
 {
 	int retval;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return retval;
 }
 
···
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
  * @sb: superblock in question
  */
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
···
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
 	} else {
-		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
 					  &sbsec->sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
 	*names = NULL;
 	*values = NULL;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	*len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (!*len)
 		goto out;
 
···
 		goto err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
-		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		(*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
 
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				      GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!(*names)[i])
 			goto err;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 err:
 	if (*names) {
···
 }
 
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 	int lenp, seqno = 0;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (len != lenp)
 		goto out;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
 				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-				sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
 				!!values[i],
-				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
 				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 				audit_get_sessionid(current));
 		}
 		if (values[i])
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		else
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 	}
 
-	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (!rc) {
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index)
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (index >= len)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+	rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *policydb)
 {
 	int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
 	char **bnames = NULL;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
-		booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+		booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
 		if (booldatum)
 			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
 	}
-	for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
···
  * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
  * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
  */
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	struct context *context1;
 	struct context *context2;
 	struct context newcon;
···
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) {
 		*new_sid = sid;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	context_init(&newcon);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
···
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
+	context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
 	if (!context2) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, mls_sid);
···
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon);
 		if (rc) {
-			if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+						      &len)) {
 				audit_log(current->audit_context,
 					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
···
 		}
 	}
 
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcon);
 out:
 	return rc;
···
  *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
  *
  */
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
 	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
···
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
 	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
-	 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+	 */
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
 	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
 	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
···
 	 * expressive */
 	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+	*nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
 	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!*classes)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			*classes);
 	if (rc) {
 		int i;
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc, i;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
 	if (!match) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
 			__func__, class);
···
 		goto err;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 
 err:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
 		kfree((*perms)[i]);
 	kfree(*perms);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.reject_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown;
 }
 
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.allow_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown;
 }
 
 /**
···
  * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
  *
  */
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
···
 
 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
 	struct role_datum *roledatum;
 	struct type_datum *typedatum;
···
 
 	*rule = NULL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	switch (field) {
···
 
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+	tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 
 	switch (field) {
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr);
 		if (!userdatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
···
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr);
 		if (!roledatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
···
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr);
 		if (!typedatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
···
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
-		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc) {
 		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
···
 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			     struct audit_context *actx)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct context *ctxt;
 	struct mls_level *level;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
···
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+	if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) {
 		match = -ESTALE;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			  sid);
···
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return match;
 }
 
···
  * failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 	struct context ctx_new;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
···
 		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			goto out;
 
···
 		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
 		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
 		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
-		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
-			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
 			goto out_free;
 
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
···
 	} else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return 0;
 out_free:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
···
  * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOENT;
-	ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
 				  GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
-	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
-	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
···
  * @len: length of data in bytes
  *
  */
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct policy_file fp;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*len = security_policydb_len();
+	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
 
 	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
 	if (!*data)
···
 	fp.data = *data;
 	fp.len = *len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;

security/selinux/ss/services.h

···
 #include "policydb.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
 
-extern struct policydb policydb;
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+	struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+	u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_ss {
+	struct sidtab sidtab;
+	struct policydb policydb;
+	rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
+	u32 latest_granting;
+	struct selinux_map map;
+	struct page *status_page;
+	struct mutex status_lock;
+};
 
 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
 				struct avtab_node *node);
···
 					struct avtab_node *node);
 
 #endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
-

security/selinux/ss/status.c

···
  * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
  * changed without any system call invocations.
  */
-static struct page *selinux_status_page;
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
 
 /*
  * selinux_kernel_status_page
···
  * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
  * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
  */
-struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 	struct page		       *result = NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (!selinux_status_page) {
-		selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (!state->ss->status_page) {
+		state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
 
-		if (selinux_status_page) {
-			status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+		if (state->ss->status_page) {
+			status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
 			status->sequence = 0;
-			status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+			status->enforcing = is_enforcing(state);
 			/*
 			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
 			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
···
 			 * So, application can know it was updated.
 			 */
 			status->policyload = 0;
-			status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+			status->deny_unknown =
+				!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 		}
 	}
-	result = selinux_status_page;
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	result = state->ss->status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 
 	return result;
 }
···
  *
  * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int enforcing)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
···
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }
 
 /*
···
  * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
  * setting of deny_unknown.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int seqno)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
 
 		status->policyload = seqno;
-		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }

security/selinux/xfrm.c

···
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
 	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+				     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
···
 	if (secid == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+				     &str_len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;