Merge branch 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman:
"This has four sets of changes:

- modernize proc to support multiple private instances

- ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly

- remove has_group_leader_pid

- use pids not tasks in posix-cpu-timers lookup

Alexey updated proc so each mount of proc uses a new superblock. This
allows people to actually use mount options with proc with no fear of
messing up another mount of proc. Given the kernel's internal mounts
of proc for things like uml this was a real problem, and resulted in
Android's hidepid mount options being ignored and introducing security
issues.

The rest of the changes are small cleanups and fixes that came out of
my work to allow this change to proc. In essence it is swapping the
pids in de_thread during exec which removes a special case the code
had to handle. Then updating the code to stop handling that special
case"

* 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
remove the no longer needed pid_alive() check in __task_pid_nr_ns()
posix-cpu-timers: Replace __get_task_for_clock with pid_for_clock
posix-cpu-timers: Replace cpu_timer_pid_type with clock_pid_type
posix-cpu-timers: Extend rcu_read_lock removing task_struct references
signal: Remove has_group_leader_pid
exec: Remove BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid)
posix-cpu-timer: Unify the now redundant code in lookup_task
posix-cpu-timer: Tidy up group_leader logic in lookup_task
proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once
rculist: Add hlists_swap_heads_rcu
proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid
Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
proc: use named enums for better readability
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts

Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst

···
   4	Configuring procfs
   4.1	Mount options
 
+  5	Filesystem behavior
+
 Preface
 =======
 
···
 	=========	========================================================
 	hidepid=	Set /proc/<pid>/ access mode.
 	gid=		Set the group authorized to learn processes information.
+	subset=		Show only the specified subset of procfs.
 	=========	========================================================
 
-hidepid=0 means classic mode - everybody may access all /proc/<pid>/ directories
-(default).
+hidepid=off or hidepid=0 means classic mode - everybody may access all
+/proc/<pid>/ directories (default).
 
-hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories but their
-own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against
-other users.  This makes it impossible to learn whether any user runs
-specific program (given the program doesn't reveal itself by its behaviour).
-As an additional bonus, as /proc/<pid>/cmdline is unaccessible for other users,
-poorly written programs passing sensitive information via program arguments are
-now protected against local eavesdroppers.
+hidepid=noaccess or hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/
+directories but their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now
+protected against other users.  This makes it impossible to learn whether any
+user runs specific program (given the program doesn't reveal itself by its
+behaviour).  As an additional bonus, as /proc/<pid>/cmdline is unaccessible for
+other users, poorly written programs passing sensitive information via program
+arguments are now protected against local eavesdroppers.
 
-hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/<pid>/ will be fully invisible to other
-users.  It doesn't mean that it hides a fact whether a process with a specific
-pid value exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by "kill -0 $PID"),
-but it hides process' uid and gid, which may be learned by stat()'ing
-/proc/<pid>/ otherwise.  It greatly complicates an intruder's task of gathering
-information about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated
-privileges, whether other user runs some sensitive program, whether other users
-run any program at all, etc.
+hidepid=invisible or hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/<pid>/ will be
+fully invisible to other users.  It doesn't mean that it hides a fact whether a
+process with a specific pid value exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g.
+by "kill -0 $PID"), but it hides process' uid and gid, which may be learned by
+stat()'ing /proc/<pid>/ otherwise.  It greatly complicates an intruder's task of
+gathering information about running processes, whether some daemon runs with
+elevated privileges, whether other user runs some sensitive program, whether
+other users run any program at all, etc.
+
+hidepid=ptraceable or hidepid=4 means that procfs should only contain
+/proc/<pid>/ directories that the caller can ptrace.
 
 gid= defines a group authorized to learn processes information otherwise
 prohibited by hidepid=.  If you use some daemon like identd which needs to learn
 information about processes information, just add identd to this group.
+
+subset=pid hides all top level files and directories in the procfs that
+are not related to tasks.
+
+5	Filesystem behavior
+----------------------------
+
+Originally, before the advent of pid namepsace, procfs was a global file
+system. It means that there was only one procfs instance in the system.
+
+When pid namespace was added, a separate procfs instance was mounted in
+each pid namespace. So, procfs mount options are global among all
+mountpoints within the same namespace.
+
+::
+
+# grep ^proc /proc/mounts
+proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
+
+# strace -e mount mount -o hidepid=1 -t proc proc /tmp/proc
+mount("proc", "/tmp/proc", "proc", 0, "hidepid=1") = 0
++++ exited with 0 +++
+
+# grep ^proc /proc/mounts
+proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
+proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
+
+and only after remounting procfs mount options will change at all
+mountpoints.
+
+# mount -o remount,hidepid=1 -t proc proc /tmp/proc
+
+# grep ^proc /proc/mounts
+proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
+proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
+
+This behavior is different from the behavior of other filesystems.
+
+The new procfs behavior is more like other filesystems. Each procfs mount
+creates a new procfs instance. Mount options affect own procfs instance.
+It means that it became possible to have several procfs instances
+displaying tasks with different filtering options in one pid namespace.
+
+# mount -o hidepid=invisible -t proc proc /proc
+# mount -o hidepid=noaccess -t proc proc /tmp/proc
+# grep ^proc /proc/mounts
+proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=invisible 0 0
+proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=noaccess 0 0

fs/exec.c

···
 		tsk->start_boottime = leader->start_boottime;
 
 		BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
-		BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
 		/*
 		 * An exec() starts a new thread group with the
 		 * TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
···
 
 		/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
 		 * The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
-		 * Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
-		 *       is called.  Odd but simple and correct.
 		 */
-		tsk->pid = leader->pid;
-		change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
+		exchange_tids(tsk, leader);
 		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID);
 		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
 		transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);

fs/locks.c

···
 {
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	unsigned int fl_pid;
-	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = file_inode(f->file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(f->file)->i_sb);
 
 	fl_pid = locks_translate_pid(fl, proc_pidns);
 	/*
···
 {
 	struct locks_iterator *iter = f->private;
 	struct file_lock *fl, *bfl;
-	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = file_inode(f->file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(f->file)->i_sb);
 
 	fl = hlist_entry(v, struct file_lock, fl_link);
 

fs/proc/array.c

···
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(seq->file);
 
-	seq_printf(seq, "%d ", pid_nr_ns(v, proc_pid_ns(inode)));
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d ", pid_nr_ns(v, proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb)));
 	return 0;
 }
 

fs/proc/base.c

···
  * May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1)
  * or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)?
  */
-static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
+static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
 				 struct task_struct *task,
-				 int hide_pid_min)
+				 enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min)
 {
-	if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
+	/*
+	 * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
+	 * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
+	 * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
+	 */
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE)
+		return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
+
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
 		return true;
-	if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
+	if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid))
 		return true;
 	return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
 }
···
 
 static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	bool has_perms;
 
 	task = get_proc_task(inode);
 	if (!task)
 		return -ESRCH;
-	has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
+	has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
 	put_task_struct(task);
 
 	if (!has_perms) {
-		if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
+		if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
 			/*
 			 * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
 			 * consistent with each other.  If a process
···
 static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = m->private;
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode);
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	int ret;
···
 static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = m->private;
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	struct task_struct *p;
 
 	p = get_proc_task(inode);
···
 		u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
-	struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
 	struct task_struct *task;
 
 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
···
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
 	if (task) {
-		if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
+		if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			/*
 			 * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
···
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	tp->pid = proc_pid(inode);
-	tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	return 0;
 }
 
···
 {
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	unsigned tgid;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
 	struct pid_namespace *ns;
 	struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
···
 	if (tgid == ~0U)
 		goto out;
 
-	ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
+	fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb);
+	ns = fs_info->pid_ns;
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns);
 	if (task)
···
 	if (!task)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) {
+		if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS))
+			goto out_put_task;
+	}
+
 	result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL);
+out_put_task:
 	put_task_struct(task);
 out:
 	return result;
···
 	pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns);
 	if (pid) {
 		iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns);
-		iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
-		/* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the
-		 * pid of a thread_group_leader.  Testing for task
-		 * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing
-		 * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to
-		 * the pid transfer logic in de_thread.
-		 *
-		 * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing
-		 * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread
-		 * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have
-		 * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader.
-		 * As we don't care in the case of readdir.
-		 */
-		if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) {
+		iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID);
+		if (!iter.task) {
 			iter.tgid += 1;
 			goto retry;
 		}
···
 int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct tgid_iter iter;
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file));
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
 	loff_t pos = ctx->pos;
 
 	if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) {
-		struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self);
+		struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_self);
 		if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK))
 			return 0;
 		ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1;
 	}
 	if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) {
-		struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self);
+		struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
 		if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK))
 			return 0;
 		ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1;
···
 		unsigned int len;
 
 		cond_resched();
-		if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
+		if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
 			continue;
 
 		len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid);
···
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir);
 	unsigned tid;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
 	struct pid_namespace *ns;
 	struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
···
 	if (tid == ~0U)
 		goto out;
 
-	ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
+	fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb);
+	ns = fs_info->pid_ns;
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns);
 	if (task)
···
 	/* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't
 	 * return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0.
 	 */
-	ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	tid = (int)file->f_version;
 	file->f_version = 0;
 	for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns);

fs/proc/generic.c

···
 struct dentry *proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		unsigned int flags)
 {
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(dir->i_sb);
+
+	if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+
 	return proc_lookup_de(dir, dentry, PDE(dir));
 }
 
···
 int proc_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
+
+	if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON)
+		return 1;
 
 	return proc_readdir_de(file, ctx, PDE(inode));
 }

fs/proc/inode.c

···
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
···
 		deactivate_super(old_sb);
 }
 
+static inline const char *hidepid2str(enum proc_hidepid v)
+{
+	switch (v) {
+		case HIDEPID_OFF: return "off";
+		case HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS: return "noaccess";
+		case HIDEPID_INVISIBLE: return "invisible";
+		case HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE: return "ptraceable";
+	}
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "bad hide_pid value: %d\n", v);
+	return "unknown";
+}
+
 static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
-	struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(root->d_sb);
 
-	if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
-		seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
-	if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
-		seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
+	if (!gid_eq(fs_info->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
+		seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, fs_info->pid_gid));
+	if (fs_info->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
+		seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%s", hidepid2str(fs_info->hide_pid));
+	if (fs_info->pidonly != PROC_PIDONLY_OFF)
+		seq_printf(seq, ",subset=pid");
 
 	return 0;
 }
···
 
 static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
 	struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
 	int rv = 0;
 	typeof_member(struct proc_ops, proc_open) open;
···
 			rv = open(inode, file);
 		return rv;
 	}
+
+	if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON)
+		return -ENOENT;
 
 	/*
 	 * Ensure that

fs/proc/root.c

···
 struct proc_fs_context {
 	struct pid_namespace	*pid_ns;
 	unsigned int		mask;
-	int			hidepid;
+	enum proc_hidepid	hidepid;
 	int			gid;
+	enum proc_pidonly	pidonly;
 };
 
 enum proc_param {
 	Opt_gid,
 	Opt_hidepid,
+	Opt_subset,
 };
 
 static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = {
 	fsparam_u32("gid",	Opt_gid),
-	fsparam_u32("hidepid",	Opt_hidepid),
+	fsparam_string("hidepid",	Opt_hidepid),
+	fsparam_string("subset",	Opt_subset),
 	{}
 };
+
+static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
+{
+	return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
+		value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
+		value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
+		value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE);
+}
+
+static int proc_parse_hidepid_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+	struct fs_parameter_spec hidepid_u32_spec = fsparam_u32("hidepid", Opt_hidepid);
+	struct fs_parse_result result;
+	int base = (unsigned long)hidepid_u32_spec.data;
+
+	if (param->type != fs_value_is_string)
+		return invalf(fc, "proc: unexpected type of hidepid value\n");
+
+	if (!kstrtouint(param->string, base, &result.uint_32)) {
+		if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
+			return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
+		ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(param->string, "off"))
+		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "noaccess"))
+		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS;
+	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "invisible"))
+		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_INVISIBLE;
+	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "ptraceable"))
+		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE;
+	else
+		return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int proc_parse_subset_param(struct fs_context *fc, char *value)
+{
+	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+	while (value) {
+		char *ptr = strchr(value, ',');
+
+		if (ptr != NULL)
+			*ptr++ = '\0';
+
+		if (*value != '\0') {
+			if (!strcmp(value, "pid")) {
+				ctx->pidonly = PROC_PIDONLY_ON;
+			} else {
+				return invalf(fc, "proc: unsupported subset option - %s\n", value);
+			}
+		}
+		value = ptr;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
 {
···
 		break;
 
 	case Opt_hidepid:
-		ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
-		if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF ||
-		    ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
-			return invalfc(fc, "hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
+		if (proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+
+	case Opt_subset:
+		if (proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 
 	default:
···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void proc_apply_options(struct super_block *s,
+static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
 			       struct fs_context *fc,
-			       struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
 			       struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
 
 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid))
-		pid_ns->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
+		fs_info->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid))
-		pid_ns->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
+		fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
+	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset))
+		fs_info->pidonly = ctx->pidonly;
 }
 
 static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
+	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
 	struct inode *root_inode;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
 	int ret;
 
-	proc_apply_options(s, fc, pid_ns, current_user_ns());
+	fs_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fs_info)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
+	proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
 
 	/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
 	s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
···
 	s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
 	s->s_op = &proc_sops;
 	s->s_time_gran = 1;
+	s->s_fs_info = fs_info;
 
 	/*
 	 * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
···
 	 * top of it
 	 */
 	s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
-	
+
 	/* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */
 	s->s_shrink.seeks = 0;
 
···
 static int proc_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
 	struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
-	struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
 
 	sync_filesystem(sb);
 
-	proc_apply_options(sb, fc, pid, current_user_ns());
+	proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
-	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
-
-	return get_tree_keyed(fc, proc_fill_super, ctx->pid_ns);
+	return get_tree_nodev(fc, proc_fill_super);
 }
 
 static void proc_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
···
 
 static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *ns;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
 
-	ns = (struct pid_namespace *)sb->s_fs_info;
-	if (ns->proc_self)
-		dput(ns->proc_self);
-	if (ns->proc_thread_self)
-		dput(ns->proc_thread_self);
+	if (fs_info->proc_self)
+		dput(fs_info->proc_self);
+
+	if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
+		dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
+
 	kill_anon_super(sb);
-
-	/* Make the pid namespace safe for the next mount of proc */
-	ns->proc_self = NULL;
-	ns->proc_thread_self = NULL;
-	ns->pid_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
-	ns->hide_pid = 0;
-
-	put_pid_ns(ns);
+	put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
+	kfree(fs_info);
 }
 
 static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {

fs/proc/self.c

···
 				      struct inode *inode,
 				      struct delayed_call *done)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	pid_t tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns);
 	char *name;
 
···
 int proc_setup_self(struct super_block *s)
 {
 	struct inode *root_inode = d_inode(s->s_root);
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(root_inode);
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(s);
 	struct dentry *self;
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
-	
+
 	inode_lock(root_inode);
 	self = d_alloc_name(s->s_root, "self");
 	if (self) {
···
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/self\n");
 	else
-		ns->proc_self = self;
+		fs_info->proc_self = self;
 
 	return ret;
 }

fs/proc/thread_self.c

···
 					     struct inode *inode,
 					     struct delayed_call *done)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode);
+	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
 	pid_t tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns);
 	pid_t pid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, ns);
 	char *name;
···
 int proc_setup_thread_self(struct super_block *s)
 {
 	struct inode *root_inode = d_inode(s->s_root);
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(root_inode);
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(s);
 	struct dentry *thread_self;
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 
···
 	inode_unlock(root_inode);
 
 	if (ret)
-		pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/thread_self\n");
+		pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/thread-self\n");
 	else
-		ns->proc_thread_self = thread_self;
+		fs_info->proc_thread_self = thread_self;
 
 	return ret;
 }

fs/proc_namespace.c

···
 	return res;
 }
 
-struct proc_fs_info {
+struct proc_fs_opts {
 	int flag;
 	const char *str;
 };
 
 static int show_sb_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	static const struct proc_fs_info fs_info[] = {
+	static const struct proc_fs_opts fs_opts[] = {
 		{ SB_SYNCHRONOUS, ",sync" },
 		{ SB_DIRSYNC, ",dirsync" },
 		{ SB_MANDLOCK, ",mand" },
 		{ SB_LAZYTIME, ",lazytime" },
 		{ 0, NULL }
 	};
-	const struct proc_fs_info *fs_infop;
+	const struct proc_fs_opts *fs_infop;
 
-	for (fs_infop = fs_info; fs_infop->flag; fs_infop++) {
+	for (fs_infop = fs_opts; fs_infop->flag; fs_infop++) {
 		if (sb->s_flags & fs_infop->flag)
 			seq_puts(m, fs_infop->str);
 	}
···
 
 static void show_mnt_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 {
-	static const struct proc_fs_info mnt_info[] = {
+	static const struct proc_fs_opts mnt_opts[] = {
 		{ MNT_NOSUID, ",nosuid" },
 		{ MNT_NODEV, ",nodev" },
 		{ MNT_NOEXEC, ",noexec" },
···
 		{ MNT_RELATIME, ",relatime" },
 		{ 0, NULL }
 	};
-	const struct proc_fs_info *fs_infop;
+	const struct proc_fs_opts *fs_infop;
 
-	for (fs_infop = mnt_info; fs_infop->flag; fs_infop++) {
+	for (fs_infop = mnt_opts; fs_infop->flag; fs_infop++) {
 		if (mnt->mnt_flags & fs_infop->flag)
 			seq_puts(m, fs_infop->str);
 	}

include/linux/pid.h

···
 extern void detach_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type);
 extern void change_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type,
 			struct pid *pid);
+extern void exchange_tids(struct task_struct *task, struct task_struct *old);
 extern void transfer_pid(struct task_struct *old, struct task_struct *new,
 			 enum pid_type);
 

include/linux/pid_namespace.h

···
 
 struct fs_pin;
 
-enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */
-	HIDEPID_OFF	  = 0,
-	HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
-	HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
-};
-
 struct pid_namespace {
 	struct kref kref;
 	struct idr idr;
···
 	struct kmem_cache *pid_cachep;
 	unsigned int level;
 	struct pid_namespace *parent;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-	struct dentry *proc_self;
-	struct dentry *proc_thread_self;
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
 	struct fs_pin *bacct;
 #endif
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
 	struct ucounts *ucounts;
-	kgid_t pid_gid;
-	int hide_pid;
 	int reboot;	/* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */
 	struct ns_common ns;
 } __randomize_layout;

include/linux/proc_fs.h

···
 	unsigned long (*proc_get_unmapped_area)(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 } __randomize_layout;
 
+/* definitions for hide_pid field */
+enum proc_hidepid {
+	HIDEPID_OFF	  = 0,
+	HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
+	HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+	HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE = 4, /* Limit pids to only ptraceable pids */
+};
+
+/* definitions for proc mount option pidonly */
+enum proc_pidonly {
+	PROC_PIDONLY_OFF = 0,
+	PROC_PIDONLY_ON  = 1,
+};
+
+struct proc_fs_info {
+	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
+	struct dentry *proc_self;        /* For /proc/self */
+	struct dentry *proc_thread_self; /* For /proc/thread-self */
+	kgid_t pid_gid;
+	enum proc_hidepid hide_pid;
+	enum proc_pidonly pidonly;
+};
+
+static inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb_info(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return sb->s_fs_info;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 
 typedef int (*proc_write_t)(struct file *, char *, size_t);
···
 		   struct ns_common *(*get_ns)(struct ns_common *ns));
 
 /* get the associated pid namespace for a file in procfs */
-static inline struct pid_namespace *proc_pid_ns(const struct inode *inode)
+static inline struct pid_namespace *proc_pid_ns(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	return proc_sb_info(sb)->pid_ns;
 }
 
 bool proc_ns_file(const struct file *file);

include/linux/rculist.h

···
 	WRITE_ONCE(old->pprev, LIST_POISON2);
 }
 
+/**
+ * hlists_swap_heads_rcu - swap the lists the hlist heads point to
+ * @left:  The hlist head on the left
+ * @right: The hlist head on the right
+ *
+ * The lists start out as [@left  ][node1 ... ] and
+                          [@right ][node2 ... ]
+ * The lists end up as    [@left  ][node2 ... ]
+ *                        [@right ][node1 ... ]
+ */
+static inline void hlists_swap_heads_rcu(struct hlist_head *left, struct hlist_head *right)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *node1 = left->first;
+	struct hlist_node *node2 = right->first;
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(left->first, node2);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(right->first, node1);
+	WRITE_ONCE(node2->pprev, &left->first);
+	WRITE_ONCE(node1->pprev, &right->first);
+}
+
 /*
  * return the first or the next element in an RCU protected hlist
  */

include/linux/sched/signal.h

···
 	return p->exit_signal >= 0;
 }
 
-/* Do to the insanities of de_thread it is possible for a process
- * to have the pid of the thread group leader without actually being
- * the thread group leader.  For iteration through the pids in proc
- * all we care about is that we have a task with the appropriate
- * pid, we don't actually care if we have the right task.
- */
-static inline bool has_group_leader_pid(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return task_pid(p) == task_tgid(p);
-}
-
 static inline
 bool same_thread_group(struct task_struct *p1, struct task_struct *p2)
 {

kernel/fork.c

···
 	pid_t nr = -1;
 
 	if (likely(pid_has_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID))) {
-		ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file));
+		ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file)->i_sb);
 		nr = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns);
 	}
 

kernel/pid.c

···
 	attach_pid(task, type);
 }
 
+void exchange_tids(struct task_struct *left, struct task_struct *right)
+{
+	struct pid *pid1 = left->thread_pid;
+	struct pid *pid2 = right->thread_pid;
+	struct hlist_head *head1 = &pid1->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID];
+	struct hlist_head *head2 = &pid2->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID];
+
+	/* Swap the single entry tid lists */
+	hlists_swap_heads_rcu(head1, head2);
+
+	/* Swap the per task_struct pid */
+	rcu_assign_pointer(left->thread_pid, pid2);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(right->thread_pid, pid1);
+
+	/* Swap the cached value */
+	WRITE_ONCE(left->pid, pid_nr(pid2));
+	WRITE_ONCE(right->pid, pid_nr(pid1));
+}
+
 /* transfer_pid is an optimization of attach_pid(new), detach_pid(old) */
 void transfer_pid(struct task_struct *old, struct task_struct *new,
 			   enum pid_type type)
···
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!ns)
 		ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
-	if (likely(pid_alive(task)))
-		nr = pid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(*task_pid_ptr(task, type)), ns);
+	nr = pid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(*task_pid_ptr(task, type)), ns);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return nr;

kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c

···
 /*
  * Functions for validating access to tasks.
  */
-static struct task_struct *lookup_task(const pid_t pid, bool thread,
-				       bool gettime)
+static struct pid *pid_for_clock(const clockid_t clock, bool gettime)
 {
-	struct task_struct *p;
+	const bool thread = !!CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(clock);
+	const pid_t upid = CPUCLOCK_PID(clock);
+	struct pid *pid;
+
+	if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(clock) >= CPUCLOCK_MAX)
+		return NULL;
 
 	/*
 	 * If the encoded PID is 0, then the timer is targeted at current
 	 * or the process to which current belongs.
 	 */
+	if (upid == 0)
+		return thread ? task_pid(current) : task_tgid(current);
+
+	pid = find_vpid(upid);
 	if (!pid)
-		return thread ? current : current->group_leader;
+		return NULL;
 
-	p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
-	if (!p)
-		return p;
-
-	if (thread)
-		return same_thread_group(p, current) ? p : NULL;
-
-	if (gettime) {
-		/*
-		 * For clock_gettime(PROCESS) the task does not need to be
-		 * the actual group leader. tsk->sighand gives
-		 * access to the group's clock.
-		 *
-		 * Timers need the group leader because they take a
-		 * reference on it and store the task pointer until the
-		 * timer is destroyed.
-		 */
-		return (p == current || thread_group_leader(p)) ? p : NULL;
+	if (thread) {
+		struct task_struct *tsk = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
+		return (tsk && same_thread_group(tsk, current)) ? pid : NULL;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * For processes require that p is group leader.
+	 * For clock_gettime(PROCESS) allow finding the process by
+	 * with the pid of the current task.  The code needs the tgid
+	 * of the process so that pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID) can be
+	 * used to find the process.
 	 */
-	return has_group_leader_pid(p) ? p : NULL;
-}
+	if (gettime && (pid == task_pid(current)))
+		return task_tgid(current);
 
-static struct task_struct *__get_task_for_clock(const clockid_t clock,
-						bool getref, bool gettime)
-{
-	const bool thread = !!CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(clock);
-	const pid_t pid = CPUCLOCK_PID(clock);
-	struct task_struct *p;
-
-	if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(clock) >= CPUCLOCK_MAX)
-		return NULL;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	p = lookup_task(pid, thread, gettime);
-	if (p && getref)
-		get_task_struct(p);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return p;
-}
-
-static inline struct task_struct *get_task_for_clock(const clockid_t clock)
-{
-	return __get_task_for_clock(clock, true, false);
-}
-
-static inline struct task_struct *get_task_for_clock_get(const clockid_t clock)
-{
-	return __get_task_for_clock(clock, true, true);
+	/*
+	 * For processes require that pid identifies a process.
+	 */
+	return pid_has_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID) ? pid : NULL;
 }
 
 static inline int validate_clock_permissions(const clockid_t clock)
 {
-	return __get_task_for_clock(clock, false, false) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = pid_for_clock(clock, false) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
-static inline enum pid_type cpu_timer_pid_type(struct k_itimer *timer)
+static inline enum pid_type clock_pid_type(const clockid_t clock)
 {
-	return CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(timer->it_clock) ? PIDTYPE_PID : PIDTYPE_TGID;
+	return CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(clock) ? PIDTYPE_PID : PIDTYPE_TGID;
 }
 
 static inline struct task_struct *cpu_timer_task_rcu(struct k_itimer *timer)
 {
-	return pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, cpu_timer_pid_type(timer));
+	return pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, clock_pid_type(timer->it_clock));
 }
 
 /*
···
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	u64 t;
 
-	tsk = get_task_for_clock_get(clock);
-	if (!tsk)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tsk = pid_task(pid_for_clock(clock, true), clock_pid_type(clock));
+	if (!tsk) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(clock))
 		t = cpu_clock_sample(clkid, tsk);
 	else
 		t = cpu_clock_sample_group(clkid, tsk, false);
-	put_task_struct(tsk);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	*tp = ns_to_timespec64(t);
 	return 0;
···
  */
 static int posix_cpu_timer_create(struct k_itimer *new_timer)
 {
-	struct task_struct *p = get_task_for_clock(new_timer->it_clock);
+	struct pid *pid;
 
-	if (!p)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	pid = pid_for_clock(new_timer->it_clock, false);
+	if (!pid) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	new_timer->kclock = &clock_posix_cpu;
 	timerqueue_init(&new_timer->it.cpu.node);
-	new_timer->it.cpu.pid = get_task_pid(p, cpu_timer_pid_type(new_timer));
-	/*
-	 * get_task_for_clock() took a reference on @p. Drop it as the timer
-	 * holds a reference on the pid of @p.
-	 */
-	put_task_struct(p);
+	new_timer->it.cpu.pid = get_pid(pid);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return 0;
 }
 

net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c

···
 {
 	struct ip6fl_iter_state *state = ip6fl_seq_private(seq);
 
-	state->pid_ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(seq->file));
+	state->pid_ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(seq->file)->i_sb);
 
 	rcu_read_lock_bh();
 	return *pos ? ip6fl_get_idx(seq, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN;

security/tomoyo/realpath.c

···
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 
 /**
  * tomoyo_encode2 - Encode binary string to ascii string.
···
 	if (sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && *pos == '/') {
 		char *ep;
 		const pid_t pid = (pid_t) simple_strtoul(pos + 1, &ep, 10);
+		struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(sb);
 
 		if (*ep == '/' && pid && pid ==
-		    task_tgid_nr_ns(current, sb->s_fs_info)) {
+		    task_tgid_nr_ns(current, proc_pidns)) {
 			pos = ep - 5;
 			if (pos < buffer)
 				goto out;

tools/testing/selftests/proc/.gitignore

···
 /fd-001-lookup
 /fd-002-posix-eq
 /fd-003-kthread
+/proc-fsconfig-hidepid
 /proc-loadavg-001
+/proc-multiple-procfs
 /proc-pid-vm
 /proc-self-map-files-001
 /proc-self-map-files-002

tools/testing/selftests/proc/Makefile

···
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += setns-dcache
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += setns-sysvipc
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += thread-self
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += proc-multiple-procfs
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += proc-fsconfig-hidepid
 
 include ../lib.mk

tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c

···
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2020 Alexey Gladkov <[e-mail]>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+
+static inline int fsopen(const char *fsname, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_fsopen, fsname, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int fsconfig(int fd, unsigned int cmd, const char *key, const void *val, int aux)
+{
+	return syscall(__NR_fsconfig, fd, cmd, key, val, aux);
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	int fsfd, ret;
+	int hidepid = 2;
+
+	assert((fsfd = fsopen("proc", 0)) != -1);
+
+	ret = fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY, "hidepid", &hidepid, 0);
+	assert(ret == -1);
+	assert(errno == EINVAL);
+
+	assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "hidepid", "2", 0));
+	assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "hidepid", "invisible", 0));
+
+	assert(!close(fsfd));
+
+	return 0;
+}

tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c

···
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2020 Alexey Gladkov <[e-mail]>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	struct stat proc_st1, proc_st2;
+	char procbuff[] = "/tmp/proc.XXXXXX/meminfo";
+	char procdir1[] = "/tmp/proc.XXXXXX";
+	char procdir2[] = "/tmp/proc.XXXXXX";
+
+	assert(mkdtemp(procdir1) != NULL);
+	assert(mkdtemp(procdir2) != NULL);
+
+	assert(!mount("proc", procdir1, "proc", 0, "hidepid=1"));
+	assert(!mount("proc", procdir2, "proc", 0, "hidepid=2"));
+
+	snprintf(procbuff, sizeof(procbuff), "%s/meminfo", procdir1);
+	assert(!stat(procbuff, &proc_st1));
+
+	snprintf(procbuff, sizeof(procbuff), "%s/meminfo", procdir2);
+	assert(!stat(procbuff, &proc_st2));
+
+	umount(procdir1);
+	umount(procdir2);
+
+	assert(proc_st1.st_dev != proc_st2.st_dev);
+
+	return 0;
+}