Merge tag 'landlock-6.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

Pull landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes TCP handling, tests, documentation, non-audit elided code,
and minor cosmetic changes"

* tag 'landlock-6.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Clarify documentation for the IOCTL access right
selftests/landlock: Properly close a file descriptor
landlock: Improve the comment for domain_is_scoped
selftests/landlock: Use scoped_base_variants.h for ptrace_test
selftests/landlock: Fix missing semicolon
selftests/landlock: Fix typo in fs_test
landlock: Optimize stack usage when !CONFIG_AUDIT
landlock: Fix spelling
landlock: Clean up hook_ptrace_access_check()
landlock: Improve erratum documentation
landlock: Remove useless include
landlock: Fix wrong type usage
selftests/landlock: NULL-terminate unix pathname addresses
selftests/landlock: Remove invalid unix socket bind()
selftests/landlock: Add missing connect(minimal AF_UNSPEC) test
selftests/landlock: Fix TCP bind(AF_UNSPEC) test case
landlock: Fix TCP handling of short AF_UNSPEC addresses
landlock: Fix formatting

include/uapi/linux/landlock.h

···
  *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
  *   ``O_TRUNC``.  This access right is available since the third version of the
  *   Landlock ABI.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV: Invoke :manpage:`ioctl(2)` commands on an opened
+ *   character or block device.
+ *
+ *   This access right applies to all `ioctl(2)` commands implemented by device
+ *   drivers.  However, the following common IOCTL commands continue to be
+ *   invokable independent of the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right:
+ *
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptors (``FIOCLEX``, ``FIONCLEX``),
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptions (``FIONBIO``, ``FIOASYNC``),
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file systems (``FIFREEZE``, ``FITHAW``,
+ *     ``FIGETBSZ``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSUUID``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH``)
+ *   * Some IOCTL commands which do not make sense when used with devices, but
+ *     whose implementations are safe and return the right error codes
+ *     (``FS_IOC_FIEMAP``, ``FICLONE``, ``FICLONERANGE``, ``FIDEDUPERANGE``)
+ *
+ *   This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock
+ *   ABI.
  *
  * Whether an opened file can be truncated with :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` or used
  * with `ioctl(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the same way as
···
  *
  *   If multiple requirements are not met, the ``EACCES`` error code takes
  *   precedence over ``EXDEV``.
- *
- * The following access right applies both to files and directories:
- *
- * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV: Invoke :manpage:`ioctl(2)` commands on an opened
- *   character or block device.
- *
- *   This access right applies to all `ioctl(2)` commands implemented by device
- *   drivers.  However, the following common IOCTL commands continue to be
- *   invokable independent of the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right:
- *
- *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptors (``FIOCLEX``, ``FIONCLEX``),
- *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptions (``FIONBIO``, ``FIOASYNC``),
- *   * IOCTL commands targeting file systems (``FIFREEZE``, ``FITHAW``,
- *     ``FIGETBSZ``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSUUID``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH``)
- *   * Some IOCTL commands which do not make sense when used with devices, but
- *     whose implementations are safe and return the right error codes
- *     (``FS_IOC_FIEMAP``, ``FICLONE``, ``FICLONERANGE``, ``FIDEDUPERANGE``)
- *
- *   This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock
- *   ABI.
  *
  * .. warning::
  *

security/landlock/audit.c

···
 	long youngest_layer = -1;
 
 	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, layer_masks_size) {
-		const access_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit];
+		const layer_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit];
 		long layer;
 
 		if (!mask)

security/landlock/domain.h

···
 	 */
 	atomic64_t num_denials;
 	/**
-	 * @id: Landlock domain ID, sets once at domain creation time.
+	 * @id: Landlock domain ID, set once at domain creation time.
 	 */
 	u64 id;
 	/**

security/landlock/errata/abi-6.h

···
  * This fix addresses an issue where signal scoping was overly restrictive,
  * preventing sandboxed threads from signaling other threads within the same
  * process if they belonged to different domains.  Because threads are not
- * security boundaries, user space might assume that any thread within the same
+ * security boundaries, user space might assume that all threads within the same
  * process can send signals between themselves (see :manpage:`nptl(7)` and
  * :manpage:`libpsx(3)`).  Consistent with :manpage:`ptrace(2)` behavior, direct
  * interaction between threads of the same process should always be allowed.

security/landlock/fs.c

···
 	}
 	path_put(&walker_path);
 
-	if (!allowed_parent1) {
+	/*
+	 * Check CONFIG_AUDIT to enable elision of log_request_parent* and
+	 * associated caller's stack variables thanks to dead code elimination.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (!allowed_parent1 && log_request_parent1) {
 		log_request_parent1->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
 		log_request_parent1->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 		log_request_parent1->audit.u.path = *path;
···
 			ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1);
 	}
 
-	if (!allowed_parent2) {
+	if (!allowed_parent2 && log_request_parent2) {
 		log_request_parent2->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
 		log_request_parent2->audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 		log_request_parent2->audit.u.path = *path;
···
 		log_request_parent2->layer_masks_size =
 			ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2);
 	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
 	return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
 }
 
···
 		 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
 		 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
 		 */
-		if (inode_state_read(inode) & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
+		if (inode_state_read(inode) &
+		    (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
 			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 			continue;
 		}

security/landlock/net.c

···
 
 	switch (address->sa_family) {
 	case AF_UNSPEC:
+		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
+			/*
+			 * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves
+			 * the TCP association, which have the same effect as
+			 * closing the connection while retaining the socket
+			 * object (i.e., the file descriptor).  As for dropping
+			 * privileges, closing connections is always allowed.
+			 *
+			 * For a TCP access control system, this request is
+			 * legitimate. Let the network stack handle potential
+			 * inconsistencies and return -EINVAL if needed.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+			/*
+			 * Binding to an AF_UNSPEC address is treated
+			 * differently by IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. The socket's
+			 * family may change under our feet due to
+			 * setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM), but that's ok: we either
+			 * reject entirely or require
+			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP for the given port, so
+			 * it cannot be used to bypass the policy.
+			 *
+			 * IPv4 sockets map AF_UNSPEC to AF_INET for
+			 * retrocompatibility for bind accesses, only if the
+			 * address is INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). IPv6
+			 * sockets always reject it.
+			 *
+			 * Checking the address is required to not wrongfully
+			 * return -EACCES instead of -EAFNOSUPPORT or -EINVAL.
+			 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle
+			 * these checks, but it is safer to return a proper
+			 * error and test consistency thanks to kselftest.
+			 */
+			if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family == AF_INET) {
+				const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
+					(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+
+				if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+					return -EINVAL;
+
+				if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr !=
+				    htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+					return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+			} else {
+				if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				else
+					return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+			}
+		} else {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		}
+		/* Only for bind(AF_UNSPEC+INADDR_ANY) on IPv4 socket. */
+		fallthrough;
 	case AF_INET: {
 		const struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
 
···
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
-	if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
-		/*
-		 * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
-		 * association, which have the same effect as closing the
-		 * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
-		 * descriptor).  As for dropping privileges, closing
-		 * connections is always allowed.
-		 *
-		 * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate.
-		 * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and
-		 * return -EINVAL if needed.
-		 */
-		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
-			return 0;
-
-		/*
-		 * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
-		 * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
-		 * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind).  Checking the address is
-		 * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
-		 * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
-		 *
-		 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these
-		 * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
-		 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
-		 */
-		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
-			/* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */
-			const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
-				(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
-
-			if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET)
-				return -EINVAL;
-
-			if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
-				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
-		}
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
-		 * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL.  Valid sa_family changes are
-		 * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
-		 *
-		 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
-		 * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
-		 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
-		 */
-		if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family)
-			return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	/*
+	 * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
+	 * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL.  Valid sa_family changes are
+	 * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
+	 *
+	 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
+	 * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
+	 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
+	 */
+	if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family &&
+	    address->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));

security/landlock/ruleset.c

···
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 
 #include "access.h"
-#include "audit.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "limits.h"
 #include "object.h"

security/landlock/task.c

···
 				    const unsigned int mode)
 {
 	const struct landlock_cred_security *parent_subject;
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *child_dom;
 	int err;
 
 	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
···
 
 	scoped_guard(rcu)
 	{
-		child_dom = landlock_get_task_domain(child);
+		const struct landlock_ruleset *const child_dom =
+			landlock_get_task_domain(child);
 		err = domain_ptrace(parent_subject->domain, child_dom);
 	}
 
···
 }
 
 /**
- * domain_is_scoped - Checks if the client domain is scoped in the same
- *		      domain as the server.
+ * domain_is_scoped - Check if an interaction from a client/sender to a
+ *		      server/receiver should be restricted based on scope controls.
  *
  * @client: IPC sender domain.
  * @server: IPC receiver domain.
  * @scope: The scope restriction criteria.
  *
- * Returns: True if the @client domain is scoped to access the @server,
- * unless the @server is also scoped in the same domain as @client.
+ * Returns: True if @server is in a different domain from @client, and @client
+ * is scoped to access @server (i.e. access should be denied).
  */
 static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
 			     const struct landlock_ruleset *const server,

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h

···
 			struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
 			socklen_t unix_addr_len;
 		};
+		struct sockaddr_storage _largest;
 	};
 };
 

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c

···
 {
 	const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
 	int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd;
-	socklen_t size;
-	struct sockaddr_un srv_un, cli_un;
+	struct sockaddr_un srv_un = {
+		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+	};
+	struct sockaddr_un cli_un = {
+		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+	};
 	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
 		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
 	};
 
 	/* Sets up a server */
-	srv_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	strncpy(srv_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(srv_un.sun_path));
-
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
 	srv_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, srv_fd);
 
-	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(srv_un.sun_path);
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, size));
+	strncpy(srv_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(srv_un.sun_path));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, sizeof(srv_un)));
+
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(srv_fd, 10 /* qlen */));
 
 	/* Enables Landlock. */
···
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 
 	/* Sets up a client connection to it */
-	cli_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
 
-	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(cli_un.sun_path);
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size));
-
-	bzero(&cli_un, sizeof(cli_un));
-	cli_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strncpy(cli_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(cli_un.sun_path));
-	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(cli_un.sun_path);
-
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0,
+		  connect(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, sizeof(cli_un)));
 
 	/* FIONREAD and other IOCTLs should not be forbidden. */
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(cli_fd));
 
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
 }
 
 /* clang-format off */
···
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	/*
-	 * It is assume that absolute_path does not contain control characters nor
-	 * spaces, see audit_string_contains_control().
+	 * It is assumed that absolute_path does not contain control
+	 * characters nor spaces, see audit_string_contains_control().
 	 */
 	absolute_path = realpath(path, NULL);
 	if (!absolute_path)

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c

···
 {
 	switch (srv->protocol.domain) {
 	case AF_UNSPEC:
+		if (minimal)
+			return sizeof(sa_family_t);
+		return sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+
 	case AF_INET:
 		return sizeof(srv->ipv4_addr);
 
···
 	bind_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, bind_fd);
 
+	/* Tries to bind with too small addrlen. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, bind_variant_addrlen(
+				   bind_fd, &self->unspec_any0,
+				   get_addrlen(&self->unspec_any0, true) - 1));
+
 	/* Allowed bind on AF_UNSPEC/INADDR_ANY. */
 	ret = bind_variant(bind_fd, &self->unspec_any0);
 	if (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET) {
···
 			TH_LOG("Failed to bind to unspec/any socket: %s",
 			       strerror(errno));
 		}
+	} else if (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET6) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, ret);
 	} else {
 		EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret);
 	}
···
 		} else {
 			EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
 		}
+	} else if (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET6) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, ret);
 	} else {
 		EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret);
 	}
···
 	bind_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, bind_fd);
 	ret = bind_variant(bind_fd, &self->unspec_srv0);
-	if (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET) {
+	if (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET ||
+	    variant->prot.domain == AF_INET6) {
 		EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, ret);
 	} else {
 		EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret)
···
 			EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 		}
 
-		ret = connect_variant(connect_fd, &self->unspec_any0);
+		/* Try to re-disconnect with a truncated address struct. */
+		EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL,
+			  connect_variant_addrlen(
+				  connect_fd, &self->unspec_any0,
+				  get_addrlen(&self->unspec_any0, true) - 1));
+
+		/*
+		 * Re-disconnect, with a minimal sockaddr struct (just a
+		 * bare af_family=AF_UNSPEC field).
+		 */
+		ret = connect_variant_addrlen(connect_fd, &self->unspec_any0,
+					      get_addrlen(&self->unspec_any0,
+							  true));
 		if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX &&
 		    self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM) {
 			EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret);

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c

···
 }
 
 /* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE(hierarchy) {};
+FIXTURE(scoped_domains) {};
 /* clang-format on */
-
-FIXTURE_VARIANT(hierarchy)
-{
-	const bool domain_both;
-	const bool domain_parent;
-	const bool domain_child;
-};
 
 /*
  * Test multiple tracing combinations between a parent process P1 and a child
···
  * restriction is enforced in addition to any Landlock check, which means that
  * all P2 requests to trace P1 would be denied.
  */
+#include "scoped_base_variants.h"
 
-/*
- *        No domain
- *
- *   P1-.               P1 -> P2 : allow
- *       \              P2 -> P1 : allow
- *        'P2
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_without_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = false,
-	.domain_parent = false,
-	.domain_child = false,
-};
-
-/*
- *        Child domain
- *
- *   P1--.              P1 -> P2 : allow
- *        \             P2 -> P1 : deny
- *        .'-----.
- *        |  P2  |
- *        '------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_with_one_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = false,
-	.domain_parent = false,
-	.domain_child = true,
-};
-
-/*
- *        Parent domain
- * .------.
- * |  P1  --.           P1 -> P2 : deny
- * '------'  \          P2 -> P1 : allow
- *            '
- *            P2
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_parent_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = false,
-	.domain_parent = true,
-	.domain_child = false,
-};
-
-/*
- *        Parent + child domain (siblings)
- * .------.
- * |  P1  ---.          P1 -> P2 : deny
- * '------'   \         P2 -> P1 : deny
- *         .---'--.
- *         |  P2  |
- *         '------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_sibling_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = false,
-	.domain_parent = true,
-	.domain_child = true,
-};
-
-/*
- *         Same domain (inherited)
- * .-------------.
- * | P1----.     |      P1 -> P2 : allow
- * |        \    |      P2 -> P1 : allow
- * |         '   |
- * |         P2  |
- * '-------------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_sibling_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = true,
-	.domain_parent = false,
-	.domain_child = false,
-};
-
-/*
- *         Inherited + child domain
- * .-----------------.
- * |  P1----.        |  P1 -> P2 : allow
- * |         \       |  P2 -> P1 : deny
- * |        .-'----. |
- * |        |  P2  | |
- * |        '------' |
- * '-----------------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_with_nested_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = true,
-	.domain_parent = false,
-	.domain_child = true,
-};
-
-/*
- *         Inherited + parent domain
- * .-----------------.
- * |.------.         |  P1 -> P2 : deny
- * ||  P1  ----.     |  P2 -> P1 : allow
- * |'------'    \    |
- * |             '   |
- * |             P2  |
- * '-----------------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_nested_and_parent_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = true,
-	.domain_parent = true,
-	.domain_child = false,
-};
-
-/*
- *         Inherited + parent and child domain (siblings)
- * .-----------------.
- * | .------.        |  P1 -> P2 : deny
- * | |  P1  .        |  P2 -> P1 : deny
- * | '------'\       |
- * |          \      |
- * |        .--'---. |
- * |        |  P2  | |
- * |        '------' |
- * '-----------------'
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_forked_domain) {
-	/* clang-format on */
-	.domain_both = true,
-	.domain_parent = true,
-	.domain_child = true,
-};
-
-FIXTURE_SETUP(hierarchy)
+FIXTURE_SETUP(scoped_domains)
 {
 }
 
-FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(hierarchy)
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(scoped_domains)
 {
 }
 
 /* Test PTRACE_TRACEME and PTRACE_ATTACH for parent and child. */
-TEST_F(hierarchy, trace)
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, trace)
 {
 	pid_t child, parent;
 	int status, err_proc_read;

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c

···
 
 		ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_child[1], ".", 1));
 		ASSERT_EQ(grand_child, waitpid(grand_child, &status, 0));
-		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(stream_server_child))
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(stream_server_child));
 		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(dgram_server_child));
 		return;
 	}
···
 
 TEST_F(various_address_sockets, scoped_pathname_sockets)
 {
-	socklen_t size_stream, size_dgram;
 	pid_t child;
 	int status;
 	char buf_child, buf_parent;
···
 	/* Pathname address. */
 	snprintf(stream_pathname_addr.sun_path,
 		 sizeof(stream_pathname_addr.sun_path), "%s", stream_path);
-	size_stream = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
-		      strlen(stream_pathname_addr.sun_path);
 	snprintf(dgram_pathname_addr.sun_path,
 		 sizeof(dgram_pathname_addr.sun_path), "%s", dgram_path);
-	size_dgram = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
-		     strlen(dgram_pathname_addr.sun_path);
 
 	/* Abstract address. */
 	memset(&stream_abstract_addr, 0, sizeof(stream_abstract_addr));
···
 		/* Connects with pathname sockets. */
 		stream_pathname_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 		ASSERT_LE(0, stream_pathname_socket);
-		ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(stream_pathname_socket,
-				     &stream_pathname_addr, size_stream));
+		ASSERT_EQ(0,
+			  connect(stream_pathname_socket, &stream_pathname_addr,
+				  sizeof(stream_pathname_addr)));
 		ASSERT_EQ(1, write(stream_pathname_socket, "b", 1));
 		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(stream_pathname_socket));
 
···
 		dgram_pathname_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
 		ASSERT_LE(0, dgram_pathname_socket);
 		err = sendto(dgram_pathname_socket, "c", 1, 0,
-			     &dgram_pathname_addr, size_dgram);
+			     &dgram_pathname_addr, sizeof(dgram_pathname_addr));
 		EXPECT_EQ(1, err);
 
 		/* Sends with connection. */
-		ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(dgram_pathname_socket,
-				     &dgram_pathname_addr, size_dgram));
+		ASSERT_EQ(0,
+			  connect(dgram_pathname_socket, &dgram_pathname_addr,
+				  sizeof(dgram_pathname_addr)));
 		ASSERT_EQ(1, write(dgram_pathname_socket, "d", 1));
 		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(dgram_pathname_socket));
 
···
 	stream_pathname_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, stream_pathname_socket);
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(stream_pathname_socket, &stream_pathname_addr,
-			  size_stream));
+			  sizeof(stream_pathname_addr)));
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(stream_pathname_socket, backlog));
 
 	dgram_pathname_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, dgram_pathname_socket);
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(dgram_pathname_socket, &dgram_pathname_addr,
-			  size_dgram));
+			  sizeof(dgram_pathname_addr)));
 
 	/* Sets up abstract servers. */
 	stream_abstract_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_base_variants.h

···
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 /*
- * Landlock scoped_domains variants
+ * Landlock scoped_domains test variant definition.
  *
- * See the hierarchy variants from ptrace_test.c
+ * This file defines a fixture variant "scoped_domains" that has all
+ * permutations of parent/child process being in separate or shared
+ * Landlock domain, or not being in a Landlock domain at all.
+ *
+ * Scoped access tests can include this file to avoid repeating these
+ * combinations.
  *
  * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <[e-mail]>
  * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI