Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
NULL pointer checking)"

* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule

security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c

···
 	}
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-		pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
-				   name, PTR_ERR(key));
+		if (keyring)
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' in '%s' keyring. err %ld\n",
+					   name, keyring->description,
+					   PTR_ERR(key));
+		else
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+					   name, PTR_ERR(key));
+
 		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
 			/* Hide some search errors */
 		case -EACCES:

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

···
 {
 	if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
 		evm_fixmode = 1;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
···
 		break;
 	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
 	case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+		/* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
+		if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
 		digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
 		rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

···
 static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
-	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
-		pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
-			str);
-		return 1;
-	}
+	bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = 0;
+		appraisal_state = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+	} else {
+		ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}
 #endif
 	return 1;
 }

security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c

···
 		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
 		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
 					 crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Extend cumulative digest over TPM registers 8-9, which contain

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

···
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
-		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) {
 			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-		else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+		} else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
 			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
-		else
+		} else {
+			pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\" for template \"%s\"",
+				str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
 			return 1;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
-	if (i < 0)
+	if (i < 0) {
+		pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", str);
 		return 1;
+	}
 
 	ima_hash_algo = i;
 out:
···
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+
+	/*
+	 * ima_file_hash can be called when ima_collect_measurement has still
+	 * not been called, we might not always have a hash.
+	 */
+	if (!iint->ima_hash) {
+		mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
 	if (buf) {
 		size_t copied_size;
 

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

···
 
 enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY };
 
+struct ima_rule_opt_list {
+	size_t count;
+	char *items[];
+};
+
 struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int action;
···
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
-	char *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
+	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };
 
···
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
 static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 
-/* Pre-allocated buffer used for matching keyrings. */
-static char *ima_keyrings;
-static size_t ima_keyrings_len;
-
 static int ima_policy __initdata;
 
 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
···
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
 			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
+		else
+			pr_err("policy \"%s\" not found", p);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
···
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+
+static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
+	size_t count = 0;
+	char *src_copy;
+	char *cur, *next;
+	size_t i;
+
+	src_copy = match_strdup(src);
+	if (!src_copy)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	next = src_copy;
+	while ((cur = strsep(&next, "|"))) {
+		/* Don't accept an empty list item */
+		if (!(*cur)) {
+			kfree(src_copy);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't accept an empty list */
+	if (!count) {
+		kfree(src_copy);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	opt_list = kzalloc(struct_size(opt_list, items, count), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!opt_list) {
+		kfree(src_copy);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * strsep() has already replaced all instances of '|' with '\0',
+	 * leaving a byte sequence of NUL-terminated strings. Reference each
+	 * string with the array of items.
+	 *
+	 * IMPORTANT: Ownership of the allocated buffer is transferred from
+	 * src_copy to the first element in the items array. To free the
+	 * buffer, kfree() must only be called on the first element of the
+	 * array.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0, cur = src_copy; i < count; i++) {
+		opt_list->items[i] = cur;
+		cur = strchr(cur, '\0') + 1;
+	}
+	opt_list->count = count;
+
+	return opt_list;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule_opt_list(struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list)
+{
+	if (!opt_list)
+		return;
+
+	if (opt_list->count) {
+		kfree(opt_list->items[0]);
+		opt_list->count = 0;
+	}
+
+	kfree(opt_list);
+}
 
 static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
···
 	 * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
 	 */
 	kfree(entry->fsname);
-	kfree(entry->keyrings);
+	ima_free_rule_opt_list(entry->keyrings);
 	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
 	kfree(entry);
 }
···
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 	int i;
 
-	nentry = kmalloc(sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!nentry)
-		return NULL;
-
 	/*
 	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
 	 * lsm rules can change
 	 */
-	memcpy(nentry, entry, sizeof(*nentry));
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nentry)
+		return NULL;
+
 	memset(nentry->lsm, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
···
 static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			      const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	char *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr;
 	bool matched = false;
+	size_t i;
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
 		return false;
···
 	if (!keyring)
 		return false;
 
-	strcpy(ima_keyrings, rule->keyrings);
-
-	/*
-	 * "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below:
-	 * keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm
-	 */
-	keyrings_ptr = ima_keyrings;
-	while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) {
-		if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) {
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) {
 			matched = true;
 			break;
 		}
···
 	bool uid_token;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	int result = 0;
-	size_t keyrings_len;
 
 	ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
 				       AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
···
 				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
 				entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
+			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) &&
+				 strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
···
 		case Opt_keyrings:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
 
-			keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
-
-			if ((entry->keyrings) ||
-			    (keyrings_len < 2)) {
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) ||
+			    entry->keyrings) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
 
-			if (keyrings_len > ima_keyrings_len) {
-				char *tmpbuf;
-
-				tmpbuf = krealloc(ima_keyrings, keyrings_len,
-						  GFP_KERNEL);
-				if (!tmpbuf) {
-					result = -ENOMEM;
-					break;
-				}
-
-				ima_keyrings = tmpbuf;
-				ima_keyrings_len = keyrings_len;
-			}
-
-			entry->keyrings = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!entry->keyrings) {
-				kfree(ima_keyrings);
-				ima_keyrings = NULL;
-				ima_keyrings_len = 0;
-				result = -ENOMEM;
+			entry->keyrings = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
+			if (IS_ERR(entry->keyrings)) {
+				result = PTR_ERR(entry->keyrings);
+				entry->keyrings = NULL;
 				break;
 			}
-			result = 0;
+
 			entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
 			break;
 		case Opt_fsuuid:
···
 		seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
 }
 
+static void ima_show_rule_opt_list(struct seq_file *m,
+				   const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++)
+		seq_printf(m, "%s%s", i ? "|" : "", opt_list->items[i]);
+}
+
 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
···
 	}
 
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) {
-		if (entry->keyrings != NULL)
-			snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->keyrings);
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_keyrings), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, "keyrings=");
+		ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->keyrings);
 		seq_puts(m, " ");
 	}
 

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c

···
 		return ULONG_MAX;
 	else
 		return binary_runtime_size + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
-};
+}
 
 static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
 {

security/integrity/integrity_audit.c

···
 	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
 	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
 			 task_pid_nr(current),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
 	audit_log_task_context(ab);