proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat

While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.

Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.

Addresses CVE-2011-0726

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[e-mail]>
Cc: <[e-mail]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[e-mail]>
Cc: David Howells <[e-mail]>
Cc: Eugene Teo <[e-mail]>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[e-mail]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[e-mail]>

fs/proc/array.c

···
 		vsize,
 		mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
 		rsslim,
-		mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
-		mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+		mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0,
+		mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0,
 		(permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0,
 		esp,
 		eip,