Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.

Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API

drivers/char/random.c

···
 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE		512
 #define EXTRACT_SIZE		10
 
-#define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0
 
 #define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
 
···
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
 				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
 /**********************************************************************
  *
···
 		_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
 				 sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
 	else
-		get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+		_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
···
 		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
 		pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
 	}
-}
-
-static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)
-{
-	wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
 }
 
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
···
 	return ret;
 }
 
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
+				      void **previous)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+	const bool print_once = false;
+#else
+	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+#endif
+
+	if (print_once ||
+	    crng_ready() ||
+	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+		return;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+	print_once = true;
+#endif
+	pr_notice("random: %s called from %pF with crng_init=%d\n",
+		  func_name, caller, crng_init);
+}
+
 /*
  * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
  * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
  * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
  * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch().
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
 	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-#if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0
-	if (!crng_ready())
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called "
-		       "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
-#endif
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
 	while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
···
 		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 }
+
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+	static void *previous;
+
+	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+
+/*
+ * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+	if (likely(crng_ready()))
+		return 0;
+	return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
 
 /*
  * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
···
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
 		unsigned int, flags)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
···
 	if (!crng_ready()) {
 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
-		crng_wait_ready();
-		if (signal_pending(current))
-			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
 	}
 	return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
 }
···
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
  * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the
- * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
+ * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
 {
 	u64 ret;
-	bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
+	bool use_lock;
 	unsigned long flags = 0;
 	struct batched_entropy *batch;
+	static void *previous;
 
 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
 	if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))
···
 	    return ret;
 #endif
 
+	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+	use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
 	batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
 	if (use_lock)
 		read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
···
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
 {
 	u32 ret;
-	bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
+	bool use_lock;
 	unsigned long flags = 0;
 	struct batched_entropy *batch;
+	static void *previous;
 
 	if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
 		return ret;
 
+	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+	use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
 	batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
 	if (use_lock)
 		read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);

drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c

···
 	}
 }
 
-static void chap_gen_challenge(
+static int chap_gen_challenge(
 	struct iscsi_conn *conn,
 	int caller,
 	char *c_str,
 	unsigned int *c_len)
 {
+	int ret;
 	unsigned char challenge_asciihex[CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
 	struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
 
 	memset(challenge_asciihex, 0, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1);
 
-	get_random_bytes(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+	ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
 	chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge,
 				CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
 	/*
···
 
 	pr_debug("[%s] Sending CHAP_C=0x%s\n\n", (caller) ? "server" : "client",
 			challenge_asciihex);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int chap_check_algorithm(const char *a_str)
···
 	case CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN:
 	default:
 		pr_err("Unsupported CHAP_A value\n");
+		kfree(conn->auth_protocol);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
···
 	/*
 	 * Generate Challenge.
 	 */
-	chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len);
+	if (chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len) < 0) {
+		kfree(conn->auth_protocol);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	return chap;
 }

drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c

···
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void iscsi_login_set_conn_values(
+static int iscsi_login_set_conn_values(
 	struct iscsi_session *sess,
 	struct iscsi_conn *conn,
 	__be16 cid)
 {
+	int ret;
 	conn->sess		= sess;
 	conn->cid		= be16_to_cpu(cid);
 	/*
 	 * Generate a random Status sequence number (statsn) for the new
 	 * iSCSI connection.
 	 */
-	get_random_bytes(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32));
+	ret = get_random_bytes_wait(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32));
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
 
 	mutex_lock(&auth_id_lock);
 	conn->auth_id		= iscsit_global->auth_id++;
 	mutex_unlock(&auth_id_lock);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 __printf(2, 3) int iscsi_change_param_sprintf(
···
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
+	ret = iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		kfree(sess);
+		return ret;
+	}
 	sess->init_task_tag	= pdu->itt;
 	memcpy(&sess->isid, pdu->isid, 6);
 	sess->exp_cmd_sn	= be32_to_cpu(pdu->cmdsn);
···
 {
 	struct iscsi_login_req *pdu = (struct iscsi_login_req *)buf;
 
-	iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid);
-	return 0;
+	return iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid);
 }
 
 /*
···
 		atomic_set(&sess->session_continuation, 1);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sess->conn_lock);
 
-	iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
-
-	if (iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list,
+	if (iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid) < 0 ||
+	    iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list,
 			conn->tpg->param_list, 0) < 0) {
 		iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_TARGET_ERR,
 				ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_NO_RESOURCES);

fs/cifs/cifsfs.c

···
 	spin_lock_init(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&GlobalMid_Lock);
 
-	get_random_bytes(&cifs_lock_secret, sizeof(cifs_lock_secret));
+	cifs_lock_secret = get_random_u32();
 
 	if (cifs_max_pending < 2) {
 		cifs_max_pending = 2;

include/linux/net.h

···
 
 #define net_get_random_once(buf, nbytes)			\
 	get_random_once((buf), (nbytes))
+#define net_get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes)			\
+	get_random_once_wait((buf), (nbytes))
 
 int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec,
 		   size_t num, size_t len);

include/linux/once.h

···
 
 #define get_random_once(buf, nbytes)					     \
 	DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes, (buf), (nbytes))
+#define get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes)                                    \
+	DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes_wait, (buf), (nbytes))                      \
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_ONCE_H */

include/linux/random.h

···
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
···
 
 	return val & CANARY_MASK;
 }
+
+/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
+ * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+	int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
+	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
+		if (unlikely(ret)) \
+			return ret; \
+		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		return 0; \
+	}
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+#undef declare_get_random_var
 
 unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 

lib/Kconfig.debug

···
 	  It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require
 	  stack trace generation.
 
+config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+	bool "Warn for all uses of unseeded randomness"
+	default n
+	help
+	  Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of
+	  cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible
+	  to generate those numbers securely. This setting ensures that these
+	  flaws don't go unnoticed, by enabling a message, should this ever
+	  occur. This will allow people with obscure setups to know when things
+	  are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing
+	  it.
+
+	  Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting
+	  a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can
+	  result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long
+	  time.  This is really bad from a security perspective, and
+	  so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
+	  to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
+	  However, since users can not do anything actionble to
+	  address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
+	  warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+
+	  Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
+	  unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for
+	  those developers interersted in improving the security of
+	  Linux kernels running on their architecture (or
+	  subarchitecture).
+
 config DEBUG_KOBJECT
 	bool "kobject debugging"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL

lib/rhashtable.c

···
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tbl->walkers);
 
-	get_random_bytes(&tbl->hash_rnd, sizeof(tbl->hash_rnd));
+	tbl->hash_rnd = get_random_u32();
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nbuckets; i++)
 		INIT_RHT_NULLS_HEAD(tbl->buckets[i], ht, i);

net/ceph/ceph_common.c

···
 {
 	struct ceph_client *client;
 	struct ceph_entity_addr *myaddr = NULL;
-	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	int err;
+
+	err = wait_for_random_bytes();
+	if (err < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
 
 	client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (client == NULL)

net/core/neighbour.c

···
 
 static void neigh_get_hash_rnd(u32 *x)
 {
-	get_random_bytes(x, sizeof(*x));
-	*x |= 1;
+	*x = get_random_u32() | 1;
 }
 
 static struct neigh_hash_table *neigh_hash_alloc(unsigned int shift)

net/ipv4/route.c

···
 {
 	atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0);
 	atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0);
-	get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid,
-			 sizeof(net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid));
+	atomic_set(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, get_random_int());
 	return 0;
 }