Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc2-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:

- Another fixup to the fast_init/crng_init split, this time in how much
entropy is being credited, from Jan Varho.

- As discussed, we now opportunistically call try_to_generate_entropy()
in /dev/urandom reads, as a replacement for the reverted commit. I
opted to not do the more invasive wait_for_random_bytes() change at
least for now, preferring to do something smaller and more obvious
for the time being, but maybe that can be revisited as things evolve
later.

- Userspace can use FUSE or userfaultfd or simply move a process to
idle priority in order to make a read from the random device never
complete, which breaks forward secrecy, fixed by overwriting
sensitive bytes early on in the function.

- Jann Horn noticed that /dev/urandom reads were only checking for
pending signals if need_resched() was true, a bug going back to the
genesis commit, now fixed by always checking for signal_pending() and
calling cond_resched(). This explains various noticeable signal
delivery delays I've seen in programs over the years that do long
reads from /dev/urandom.

- In order to be more like other devices (e.g. /dev/zero) and to
mitigate the impact of fixing the above bug, which has been around
forever (users have never really needed to check the return value of
read() for medium-sized reads and so perhaps many didn't), we now
move signal checking to the bottom part of the loop, and do so every
PAGE_SIZE-bytes.

* tag 'random-5.18-rc2-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random
random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check
random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack
random: opportunistically initialize on /dev/urandom reads
random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness()

drivers/char/random.c

···
  * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
  * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
  * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
- *
- * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded
- * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true.
  */
-static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
+static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
 {
 	static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 	struct blake2s_state hash;
···
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
 	if (crng_init != 0) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-		return 0;
+		return;
 	}
-
-	if (account)
-		len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
 
 	blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
 	blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
 	blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
 
 	if (account) {
-		crng_init_cnt += len;
+		crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
 		if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 			++base_crng.generation;
 			crng_init = 1;
···
 
 	if (crng_init == 1)
 		pr_notice("fast init done\n");
-
-	return len;
 }
 
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
···
 
 static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
 	ssize_t ret = 0;
 	size_t len;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
···
 	if (!nbytes)
 		return 0;
 
-	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
-	crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len);
+	/*
+	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
+	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
+	 * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
+	 */
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+	/*
+	 * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
+	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
+	 * the user directly.
+	 */
+	if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes;
+		goto out_zero_chacha;
+	}
 
-	if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len))
-		return -EFAULT;
-	nbytes -= len;
-	buf += len;
-	ret += len;
-
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
-			if (signal_pending(current))
-				break;
-			schedule();
-		}
-
+	do {
 		chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
···
 		nbytes -= len;
 		buf += len;
 		ret += len;
-	}
 
-	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
+		if (!(ret % PAGE_SIZE) && nbytes) {
+			if (signal_pending(current))
+				break;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	} while (nbytes);
+
 	memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
+out_zero_chacha:
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 	return ret;
 }
 
···
 				size_t entropy)
 {
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) {
-		size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
-		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret);
-		count -= ret;
-		buffer += ret;
-		if (!count || crng_init == 0)
-			return;
+		crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
+		mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
+		return;
 	}
 
 	/*
···
 			    loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
+
+	/*
+	 * Opportunistically attempt to initialize the RNG on platforms that
+	 * have fast cycle counters, but don't (for now) require it to succeed.
+	 */
+	if (!crng_ready())
+		try_to_generate_entropy();
 
 	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
 		maxwarn--;