apparmor: allow restricting unprivileged change_profile

unprivileged unconfined can use change_profile to alter the confinement
set by the mac admin.

Allow restricting unprivileged unconfined by still allowing change_profile
but stacking the change against unconfined. This allows unconfined to
still apply system policy but allows the task to enter the new confinement.

If unprivileged unconfined is required a sysctl is provided to switch
to the previous behavior.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[e-mail]>

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

···
 	{ }
 };
 
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_unconfined[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
···
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband",		MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions",   aa_sfs_entry_unconfined),
 	{ }
 };
 

security/apparmor/domain.c

···
 	return error;
 }
 
+const char *stack_msg = "change_profile unprivileged unconfined converted to stacking";
+
 /**
  * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
  * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL)
···
 			op = OP_STACK;
 		else
 			op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+	}
+
+	/* This should move to a per profile test. Requires pushing build
+	 * into callback
+	 */
+	if (!stack && unconfined(label) &&
+	    label == &labels_ns(label)->unconfined->label &&
+	    aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted &&
+	    /* TODO: refactor so this check is a fn */
+	    cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
+			CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
+		/* regardless of the request in this case apparmor
+		 * stacks against unconfined so admin set policy can't be
+		 * by-passed
+		 */
+		stack = true;
+		perms.audit = request;
+		(void) fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
+				aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, op,
+					      request, auditname, NULL, target,
+					      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, stack_msg, 0));
+		perms.audit = 0;
 	}
 
 	if (*fqname == '&') {

security/apparmor/include/policy.h

···
 struct aa_ns;
 
 extern int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy;
+extern int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted;
 
 extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 4

security/apparmor/lsm.c

···
 		.mode           = 0600,
 		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
 	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
+		.data           = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
+	},
 
 	{ }
 };

security/apparmor/policy.c

···
 #include "include/resource.h"
 
 int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy = 1;
+int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted;
 
 const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[] = {
 	"enforce",