Merge tag 'meminit-v5.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull compiler-based variable initialization updates from Kees Cook:
"This is effectively part of my gcc-plugins tree, but as this adds some
Clang support, it felt weird to still call it "gcc-plugins". :)

This consolidates Kconfig for the existing stack variable
initialization (via structleak and stackleak gcc plugins) and adds
Alexander Potapenko's support for Clang's new similar functionality.

Summary:

- Consolidate memory initialization Kconfigs (Kees)

- Implement support for Clang's stack variable auto-init (Alexander)"

* tag 'meminit-v5.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
security: Implement Clang's stack initialization
security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening
security: Create "kernel hardening" config area

Makefile

···
 endif
 endif
 
+# Initialize all stack variables with a pattern, if desired.
+ifdef CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern
+endif
+
 DEBUG_CFLAGS	:= $(call cc-option, -fno-var-tracking-assignments)
 
 ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO

scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig

···
 	  An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
 	  GCC plugins.
 
-menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
-	bool "GCC plugins"
+config GCC_PLUGINS
+	bool
 	depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
 	depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
+	default y
 	help
 	  GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
 	  compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
 
 	  See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
 
-if GCC_PLUGINS
+menu "GCC plugins"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
 
 config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY
 	bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT
···
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
 
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-	bool "Zero initialize stack variables"
-	help
-	  While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
-	  stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
-	  anything passed by reference to another function, under the
-	  occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
-	  the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
-	  flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
-	  such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
-
-	  This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
-	  information at:
-	   * https://grsecurity.net/
-	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-choice
-	prompt "Coverage"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
-	help
-	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
-	  uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
-	  zero-initialized before use.
-
-	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
-		bool "structs marked for userspace"
-		help
-		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
-		  a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
-		  uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
-		  exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
-		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
-
-	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
-		bool "structs passed by reference"
-		help
-		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
-		  be passed by reference and had not already been
-		  explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
-		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
-		  exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
-		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
-
-	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
-		bool "anything passed by reference"
-		help
-		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
-		  by reference and had not already been explicitly
-		  initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
-		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
-		  exposures.
-
-endchoice
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
-	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
-	help
-	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
-	  structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
-	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
-	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
-
 config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
 	bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
 	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
···
 	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
 	  at the cost of weakened randomization.
 
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-	bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
-	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
-	help
-	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
-	  returning from system calls. That reduces the information which
-	  kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized
-	  stack variable attacks.
-
-	  The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
-	  compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
-	  and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
-	  before deploying it.
-
-	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
-	   * https://grsecurity.net/
-	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
-	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
-	default 100
-	range 0 4096
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-	help
-	  The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
-	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
-	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
-	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
-	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
-
-config STACKLEAK_METRICS
-	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-	depends on PROC_FS
-	help
-	  If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
-	  the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
-	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
-	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
-	  can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
-	  your workloads.
-
-config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
-	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-	help
-	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
-	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
-	  CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
-
 config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
 	bool
 	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM
 
-endif
+endmenu

security/Kconfig

···
 
 	  If unsure, leave this as the default.
 
+source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+
 endmenu
 

security/Kconfig.hardening

···
+menu "Kernel hardening options"
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
+	bool
+	help
+	  While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
+	  stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
+	  anything passed by reference to another function, under the
+	  occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
+	  the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
+	  flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
+	  such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
+
+	  This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
+	  information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
+menu "Memory initialization"
+
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
+
+choice
+	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
+	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
+	default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+	default INIT_STACK_NONE
+	help
+	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
+	  function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
+	  greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
+	  variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
+	  on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
+	  syscalls.
+
+	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
+	  uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
+	  initialized before use in a function.
+
+	config INIT_STACK_NONE
+		bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
+		help
+		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
+		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
+		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
+		  and information exposures.
+
+	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
+		bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
+		help
+		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
+		  a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
+		  uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+		  exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
+		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
+
+	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
+		bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
+		help
+		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
+		  be passed by reference and had not already been
+		  explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
+		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+		  exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
+		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
+
+	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
+		bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
+		help
+		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
+		  by reference and had not already been explicitly
+		  initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
+		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+		  exposures.
+
+	config INIT_STACK_ALL
+		bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
+		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+		help
+		  Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
+		  pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
+		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+		  exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
+		  left uninitialized.
+
+endchoice
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
+	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
+	help
+	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
+	  structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
+	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
+	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+	help
+	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
+	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
+	  the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
+	  the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
+	  potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
+	  exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
+	  depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
+	  most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
+	  impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
+	  the function calling complexity.
+
+	  The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
+	  sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
+	  are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
+	  deploying it.
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
+config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
+	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
+	default 100
+	range 0 4096
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	help
+	  The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
+	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
+	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
+	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
+	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
+
+config STACKLEAK_METRICS
+	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	help
+	  If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
+	  the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
+	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
+	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
+	  can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
+	  your workloads.
+
+config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	help
+	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
+	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
+	  CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+
+endmenu
+
+endmenu