Merge tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull AT_EXECVE_CHECK from Kees Cook:

- Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün)

- Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
(Mickaël Salaün)

- Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün)

* tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook
samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests
selftests: ktap_helpers: Fix uninitialized variable
samples/check-exec: Add set-exec
selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits
security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst

···
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+
+===================
+Executability check
+===================
+
+The ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` :manpage:`execveat(2)` flag, and the
+``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` securebits
+are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a
+consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel.  See the
+`samples/check-exec/inc.c`_ example.
+
+Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the
+security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution
+environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or
+not.  For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary
+syscalls and access arbitrary files.  Such interpreters should then be
+enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security policy.
+However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should already be
+sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's environment.
+
+Script interpreters or dynamic linkers built for tailored execution environments
+(e.g. hardened Linux distributions or hermetic container images) could use
+``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` without checking the related securebits if backward
+compatibility is handled by something else (e.g. atomic update ensuring that
+all legitimate libraries are allowed to be executed).  It is then recommended
+for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to check the securebits at run time
+by default, but also to provide the ability for custom builds to behave like if
+``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` or ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` were always
+set to 1 (i.e. always enforce restrictions).
+
+AT_EXECVE_CHECK
+===============
+
+Passing the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag to :manpage:`execveat(2)` only performs a
+check on a regular file and returns 0 if execution of this file would be
+allowed, ignoring the file format and then the related interpreter dependencies
+(e.g. ELF libraries, script's shebang).
+
+Programs should always perform this check to apply kernel-level checks against
+files that are not directly executed by the kernel but passed to a user space
+interpreter instead.  All files that contain executable code, from the point of
+view of the interpreter, should be checked.  However the result of this check
+should only be enforced according to ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` or
+``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE.``.
+
+The main purpose of this flag is to improve the security and consistency of an
+execution environment to ensure that direct file execution (e.g.
+``./script.sh``) and indirect file execution (e.g. ``sh script.sh``) lead to
+the same result.  For instance, this can be used to check if a file is
+trustworthy according to the caller's environment.
+
+In a secure environment, libraries and any executable dependencies should also
+be checked.  For instance, dynamic linking should make sure that all libraries
+are allowed for execution to avoid trivial bypass (e.g. using ``LD_PRELOAD``).
+For such secure execution environment to make sense, only trusted code should
+be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees.
+
+To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues,
+``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a
+file descriptor instead of a path.
+
+SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE
+==========================================================
+
+When ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` is set, a process should only interpret or
+execute a file if a call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file
+descriptor and the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
+
+This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
+container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
+related ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
+
+Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the
+securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration.
+Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code
+vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be
+careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration.
+
+However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as
+environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits
+checks.  For instance, the ``PATH`` and ``LD_PRELOAD`` variables can be set by
+a script's caller.  Changing these variables may lead to unintended code
+executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK.  For this to
+make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to avoid
+arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute policy.
+
+When ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set, a process should never interpret
+interactive user commands (e.g. scripts).  However, if such commands are passed
+through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be interpreted if a
+call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file descriptor and the
+``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
+
+For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument
+should always deny such execution if ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set.
+
+This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
+container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
+related ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
+
+Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to combination
+of any exec securebits:
+
+1. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
+
+   Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands (default).
+
+   No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of
+   potential issues thanks to the call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with
+   ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` which should always be performed but ignored by the
+   script interpreter.  Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems
+   administrators to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for
+   migration to a secure mode.
+
+2. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
+
+   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow
+   arbitrary user commands.
+
+   The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not fooled)
+   users.  That can protect against unintended script executions (e.g. ``sh
+   /tmp/*.sh``).  This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
+
+3. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
+
+   Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
+
+   This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without interactive
+   user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g.  with IMA/EVM or
+   dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be ready yet.  Indeed,
+   arbitrary interactive commands would be much more difficult to check.
+
+4. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
+
+   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
+   any arbitrary user commands.
+
+   The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted code).
+   This makes sense for system services that may only execute trusted scripts.
+
+.. Links
+.. _samples/check-exec/inc.c:
+   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/check-exec/inc.c

Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst

···
    mfd_noexec
    spec_ctrl
    tee
+   check_exec
 
 Devices and I/O
 ===============

fs/exec.c

···
 		.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
 	};
 
-	if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
+	if ((flags &
+	     ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK)) != 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
 		open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
···
 	}
 	bprm->interp = bprm->filename;
 
+	/*
+	 * At this point, security_file_open() has already been called (with
+	 * __FMODE_EXEC) and access control checks for AT_EXECVE_CHECK will
+	 * stop just after the security_bprm_creds_for_exec() call in
+	 * bprm_execve().  Indeed, the kernel should not try to parse the
+	 * content of the file with exec_binprm() nor change the calling
+	 * thread, which means that the following security functions will not
+	 * be called:
+	 * - security_bprm_check()
+	 * - security_bprm_creds_from_file()
+	 * - security_bprm_committing_creds()
+	 * - security_bprm_committed_creds()
+	 */
+	bprm->is_check = !!(flags & AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+
 	retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
 	if (!retval)
 		return bprm;
···
 
 	/* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */
 	retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm);
-	if (retval)
+	if (retval || bprm->is_check)
 		goto out;
 
 	retval = exec_binprm(bprm);

include/linux/binfmts.h

···
 		 */
 		point_of_no_return:1,
 		/* Set when "comm" must come from the dentry. */
-		comm_from_dentry:1;
+		comm_from_dentry:1,
+		/*
+		 * Set by user space to check executability according to the
+		 * caller's environment.
+		 */
+		is_check:1;
 	struct file *executable; /* Executable to pass to the interpreter */
 	struct file *interpreter;
 	struct file *file;

include/uapi/linux/audit.h

···
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR   1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE   1808 /* Userspace enforced data integrity */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 

include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h

···
 #define AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE	0x001	/* Return the u64 unique mount ID. */
 #define AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE	0x002	/* Request a connectable file handle */
 
+/* Flags for execveat2(2). */
+#define AT_EXECVE_CHECK		0x10000	/* Only perform a check if execution
+					   would be allowed. */
+
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FCNTL_H */

include/uapi/linux/securebits.h

···
 #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
 			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
 
+/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
+#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE		8
+#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED	9  /* make bit-8 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
+
+/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
+#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE		10
+#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED	11  /* make bit-10 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
+
 #define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
 				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
 				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
 #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+
+#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */

samples/Kconfig

···
 	help
 	  Build samples that demonstrate the usage of the cgroup API.
 
+config SAMPLE_CHECK_EXEC
+	bool "Exec secure bits examples"
+	depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL
+	help
+	  Build a tool to easily configure SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
+	  SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and a simple script interpreter to
+	  demonstrate how they should be used with execveat(2) +
+	  AT_EXECVE_CHECK.
+
 source "samples/rust/Kconfig"
 
 endif # SAMPLES

samples/Makefile

···
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_AUXDISPLAY)	+= auxdisplay
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_ANDROID_BINDERFS) += binderfs
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_CHECK_EXEC)	+= check-exec
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_CGROUP) += cgroup
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_CONFIGFS)		+= configfs/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_CONNECTOR)		+= connector/

samples/check-exec/.gitignore

···
+/inc
+/set-exec

samples/check-exec/Makefile

···
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+userprogs-always-y := \
+	inc \
+	set-exec
+
+userccflags += -I usr/include
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+all:
+	$(MAKE) -C ../.. samples/check-exec/
+
+clean:
+	$(MAKE) -C ../.. M=samples/check-exec/ clean

samples/check-exec/inc.c

···
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Very simple script interpreter that can evaluate two different commands (one
+ * per line):
+ * - "?" to initialize a counter from user's input;
+ * - "+" to increment the counter (which is set to 0 by default).
+ *
+ * See tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec-tests.sh and
+ * Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Returns 1 on error, 0 otherwise. */
+static int interpret_buffer(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	char *line, *saveptr = NULL;
+	long long number = 0;
+
+	/* Each command is the first character of a line. */
+	saveptr = NULL;
+	line = strtok_r(buffer, "\n", &saveptr);
+	while (line) {
+		if (*line != '#' && strlen(line) != 1) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "# ERROR: Unknown string\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		switch (*line) {
+		case '#':
+			/* Skips shebang and comments. */
+			break;
+		case '+':
+			/* Increments and prints the number. */
+			number++;
+			printf("%lld\n", number);
+			break;
+		case '?':
+			/* Reads integer from stdin. */
+			fprintf(stderr, "> Enter new number: \n");
+			if (scanf("%lld", &number) != 1) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+					"# WARNING: Failed to read number from stdin\n");
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "# ERROR: Unknown character '%c'\n",
+				*line);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 on error, 0 otherwise. */
+static int interpret_stream(FILE *script, char *const script_name,
+			    char *const *const envp, const bool restrict_stream)
+{
+	int err;
+	char *const script_argv[] = { script_name, NULL };
+	char buf[128] = {};
+	size_t buf_size = sizeof(buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * We pass a valid argv and envp to the kernel to emulate a native
+	 * script execution.  We must use the script file descriptor instead of
+	 * the script path name to avoid race conditions.
+	 */
+	err = execveat(fileno(script), "", script_argv, envp,
+		       AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+	if (err && restrict_stream) {
+		perror("ERROR: Script execution check");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Reads script. */
+	buf_size = fread(buf, 1, buf_size - 1, script);
+	return interpret_buffer(buf, buf_size);
+}
+
+static void print_usage(const char *argv0)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <script.inc> | -i | -c <command>\n\n",
+		argv0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Example:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  ./set-exec -fi -- ./inc -i < script-exec.inc\n");
+}
+
+int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
+{
+	int opt;
+	char *cmd = NULL;
+	char *script_name = NULL;
+	bool interpret_stdin = false;
+	FILE *script_file = NULL;
+	int secbits;
+	bool deny_interactive, restrict_file;
+	size_t arg_nb;
+
+	secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+	if (secbits == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * This should never happen, except with a buggy seccomp
+		 * filter.
+		 */
+		perror("ERROR: Failed to get securebits");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	deny_interactive = !!(secbits & SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE);
+	restrict_file = !!(secbits & SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE);
+
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "c:i")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'c':
+			if (cmd) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Command already set");
+				return 1;
+			}
+			cmd = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			interpret_stdin = true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			print_usage(argv[0]);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Checks that only one argument is used, or read stdin. */
+	arg_nb = !!cmd + !!interpret_stdin;
+	if (arg_nb == 0 && argc == 2) {
+		script_name = argv[1];
+	} else if (arg_nb != 1) {
+		print_usage(argv[0]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd) {
+		/*
+		 * Other kind of interactive interpretations should be denied
+		 * as well (e.g. CLI arguments passing script snippets,
+		 * environment variables interpreted as script).  However, any
+		 * way to pass script files should only be restricted according
+		 * to restrict_file.
+		 */
+		if (deny_interactive) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"ERROR: Interactive interpretation denied.\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		return interpret_buffer(cmd, strlen(cmd));
+	}
+
+	if (interpret_stdin && !script_name) {
+		script_file = stdin;
+		/*
+		 * As for any execve(2) call, this path may be logged by the
+		 * kernel.
+		 */
+		script_name = "/proc/self/fd/0";
+		/*
+		 * When stdin is used, it can point to a regular file or a
+		 * pipe.  Restrict stdin execution according to
+		 * SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE but always allow executable
+		 * files (which are not considered as interactive inputs).
+		 */
+		return interpret_stream(script_file, script_name, envp,
+					deny_interactive);
+	} else if (script_name && !interpret_stdin) {
+		/*
+		 * In this sample, we don't pass any argument to scripts, but
+		 * otherwise we would have to forge an argv with such
+		 * arguments.
+		 */
+		script_file = fopen(script_name, "r");
+		if (!script_file) {
+			perror("ERROR: Failed to open script");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Restricts file execution according to
+		 * SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE.
+		 */
+		return interpret_stream(script_file, script_name, envp,
+					restrict_file);
+	}
+
+	print_usage(argv[0]);
+	return 1;
+}

samples/check-exec/run-script-ask.inc

···
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+DIR="$(dirname -- "$0")"
+
+PATH="${PATH}:${DIR}"
+
+set -x
+"${DIR}/script-ask.inc"

samples/check-exec/script-ask.inc

···
+#!/usr/bin/env inc
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+?
++

samples/check-exec/script-exec.inc

···
+#!/usr/bin/env inc
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
++

samples/check-exec/script-noexec.inc

···
+#!/usr/bin/env inc
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
++

samples/check-exec/set-exec.c

···
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Simple tool to set SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE,
+ * before executing a command.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static void print_usage(const char *argv0)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -f|-i -- <cmd> [args]...\n\n", argv0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Execute a command with\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE set: -f\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE set: -i\n");
+}
+
+int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
+{
+	const char *cmd_path;
+	char *const *cmd_argv;
+	int opt, secbits_cur, secbits_new;
+	bool has_policy = false;
+
+	secbits_cur = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+	if (secbits_cur == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * This should never happen, except with a buggy seccomp
+		 * filter.
+		 */
+		perror("ERROR: Failed to get securebits");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	secbits_new = secbits_cur;
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "fi")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'f':
+			secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+				       SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+			has_policy = true;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE |
+				       SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+			has_policy = true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			print_usage(argv[0]);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!argv[optind] || !has_policy) {
+		print_usage(argv[0]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (secbits_cur != secbits_new &&
+	    prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secbits_new)) {
+		perror("Failed to set secure bit(s).");
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Hint: The running kernel may not support this feature.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	cmd_path = argv[optind];
+	cmd_argv = argv + optind;
+	fprintf(stderr, "Executing command...\n");
+	execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path,
+		strerror(errno));
+	return 1;
+}

security/commoncap.c

···
 		     & (old->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
 		    || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
 		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
-		    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
-				    current_cred()->user_ns,
-				    CAP_SETPCAP,
-				    CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0)			/*[4]*/
 			/*
 			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 			 * [2] no unlocking of locks
 			 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
-			 * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
-			 *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 			 */
 		    )
 			/* cannot change a locked bit */
 			return -EPERM;
+
+		/*
+		 * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
+		 * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
+		 * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
+		 * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
+		 * itself.
+		 */
+		if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
+				CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
+			const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
+				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+			const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
+
+			/* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
+			if (!changed)
+				return -EPERM;
+
+			/* Denies privileged changes. */
+			if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
+				return -EPERM;
+		}
 
 		new = prepare_creds();
 		if (!new)

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

···
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
···
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static bool is_bprm_creds_for_exec(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+
+	if (func == BPRM_CHECK) {
+		bprm = container_of(&file, struct linux_binprm, file);
+		return bprm->is_check;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
···
 			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+	int audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA;
 	const char *cause = "unknown";
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
···
 	/* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */
 	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file
+	 * integrity, enforcing file integrity for the bprm_creds_for_exec()
+	 * LSM hook with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag is left up to the discretion
+	 * of the script interpreter(userspace). Differentiate kernel and
+	 * userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
+	 */
+	if (is_bprm_creds_for_exec(func, file))
+		audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE;
 
 	/* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
 	if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) {
···
 	     (iint->flags & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
 		status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 		cause = "unverifiable-signature";
-		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+		integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
 	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
 		/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
···
 			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 		}
 
-		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+		integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
 	} else {
 		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

···
 }
 
 /**
+ * ima_bprm_creds_for_exec - collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * Based on the IMA policy and the execveat(2) AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, measure
+ * and appraise the integrity of a file to be executed by script interpreters.
+ * Unlike any of the other LSM hooks where the kernel enforces file integrity,
+ * enforcing file integrity is left up to the discretion of the script
+ * interpreter (userspace).
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+static int ima_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * As security_bprm_check() is called multiple times, both
+	 * the script and the shebang interpreter are measured, appraised,
+	 * and audited. Limit usage of this LSM hook to just measuring,
+	 * appraising, and auditing the indirect script execution
+	 * (e.g. ./sh example.sh).
+	 */
+	if (!bprm->is_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+}
+
+/**
  * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
  * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
···
 
 static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ima_bprm_creds_for_exec),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),

security/security.c

···
  * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode.  @bprm
  * contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *
+ * If execveat(2) is called with the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, bprm->is_check is
+ * set.  The result must be the same as without this flag even if the execution
+ * will never really happen and @bprm will always be dropped.
+ *
+ * This hook must not change current->cred, only @bprm->cred.
+ *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
···
  *
  * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission,
  * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission.
+ *
+ * We can check if a file is opened for execution (e.g. execve(2) call), either
+ * directly or indirectly (e.g. ELF's ld.so) by checking file->f_flags &
+ * __FMODE_EXEC .
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */

tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore

···
 execveat.denatured
 non-regular
 null-argv
+/check-exec
+/false
+/inc
 /load_address.*
 !load_address.c
 /recursion-depth
+/set-exec
 xxxxxxxx*
 pipe
 S_I*.test

tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile

···
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 CFLAGS = -Wall
 CFLAGS += -Wno-nonnull
+CFLAGS += $(KHDR_INCLUDES)
+
+LDLIBS += -lcap
 
 ALIGNS := 0x1000 0x200000 0x1000000
 ALIGN_PIES        := $(patsubst %,load_address.%,$(ALIGNS))
 ALIGN_STATIC_PIES := $(patsubst %,load_address.static.%,$(ALIGNS))
 ALIGNMENT_TESTS   := $(ALIGN_PIES) $(ALIGN_STATIC_PIES)
 
-TEST_PROGS := binfmt_script.py
+TEST_PROGS := binfmt_script.py check-exec-tests.sh
 TEST_GEN_PROGS := execveat non-regular $(ALIGNMENT_TESTS)
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := false inc set-exec script-exec.inc script-noexec.inc
 TEST_GEN_FILES := execveat.symlink execveat.denatured script subdir
 # Makefile is a run-time dependency, since it's accessed by the execveat test
 TEST_FILES := Makefile
 
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += recursion-depth
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += null-argv
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += check-exec
 
 EXTRA_CLEAN := $(OUTPUT)/subdir.moved $(OUTPUT)/execveat.moved $(OUTPUT)/xxxxx*	\
 	       $(OUTPUT)/S_I*.test
 
 include ../lib.mk
+
+CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES := $(top_srcdir)/samples/check-exec
 
 $(OUTPUT)/subdir:
 	mkdir -p $@
···
 $(OUTPUT)/load_address.static.0x%: load_address.c
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,-z,max-page-size=$(lastword $(subst ., ,$@)) \
 		-fPIE -static-pie $< -o $@
+$(OUTPUT)/false: false.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -static $< -o $@
+$(OUTPUT)/inc: $(CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES)/inc.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< -o $@
+$(OUTPUT)/set-exec: $(CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES)/set-exec.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< -o $@
+$(OUTPUT)/script-exec.inc: $(CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES)/script-exec.inc
+	cp $< $@
+$(OUTPUT)/script-noexec.inc: $(CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES)/script-noexec.inc
+	cp $< $@

tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec-tests.sh

···
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Test the "inc" interpreter.
+#
+# See include/uapi/linux/securebits.h, include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h and
+# samples/check-exec/inc.c
+#
+# Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+
+set -u -e -o pipefail
+
+EXPECTED_OUTPUT="1"
+exec 2>/dev/null
+
+DIR="$(dirname $(readlink -f "$0"))"
+source "${DIR}"/../kselftest/ktap_helpers.sh
+
+exec_direct() {
+	local expect="$1"
+	local script="$2"
+	shift 2
+	local ret=0
+	local out
+
+	# Updates PATH for `env` to execute the `inc` interpreter.
+	out="$(PATH="." "$@" "${script}")" || ret=$?
+
+	if [[ ${ret} -ne ${expect} ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong expectation for direct file execution: ${ret}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	if [[ ${ret} -eq 0 && "${out}" != "${EXPECTED_OUTPUT}" ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong output for direct file execution: ${out}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+exec_indirect() {
+	local expect="$1"
+	local script="$2"
+	shift 2
+	local ret=0
+	local out
+
+	# Script passed as argument.
+	out="$("$@" ./inc "${script}")" || ret=$?
+
+	if [[ ${ret} -ne ${expect} ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong expectation for indirect file execution: ${ret}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	if [[ ${ret} -eq 0 && "${out}" != "${EXPECTED_OUTPUT}" ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong output for indirect file execution: ${out}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+exec_stdin_reg() {
+	local expect="$1"
+	local script="$2"
+	shift 2
+	local ret=0
+	local out
+
+	# Executing stdin must be allowed if the related file is executable.
+	out="$("$@" ./inc -i < "${script}")" || ret=$?
+
+	if [[ ${ret} -ne ${expect} ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong expectation for stdin regular file execution: ${ret}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	if [[ ${ret} -eq 0 && "${out}" != "${EXPECTED_OUTPUT}" ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong output for stdin regular file execution: ${out}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+exec_stdin_pipe() {
+	local expect="$1"
+	shift
+	local ret=0
+	local out
+
+	# A pipe is not executable.
+	out="$(cat script-exec.inc | "$@" ./inc -i)" || ret=$?
+
+	if [[ ${ret} -ne ${expect} ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong expectation for stdin pipe execution: ${ret}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+exec_argument() {
+	local expect="$1"
+	local ret=0
+	shift
+	local out
+
+	# Script not coming from a file must not be executed.
+	out="$("$@" ./inc -c "$(< script-exec.inc)")" || ret=$?
+
+	if [[ ${ret} -ne ${expect} ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong expectation for arbitrary argument execution: ${ret}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	if [[ ${ret} -eq 0 && "${out}" != "${EXPECTED_OUTPUT}" ]]; then
+		echo "ERROR: Wrong output for arbitrary argument execution: ${out}"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+exec_interactive() {
+	exec_stdin_pipe "$@"
+	exec_argument "$@"
+}
+
+ktap_test() {
+	ktap_test_result "$*" "$@"
+}
+
+ktap_print_header
+ktap_set_plan 28
+
+# Without secbit configuration, nothing is changed.
+
+ktap_print_msg "By default, executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted and executed."
+ktap_test exec_direct 0 script-exec.inc
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-exec.inc
+
+ktap_print_msg "By default, executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-exec.inc
+
+ktap_print_msg "By default, non-executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted, but not directly executed."
+# We get 126 because of direct execution by Bash.
+ktap_test exec_direct 126 script-noexec.inc
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-noexec.inc
+
+ktap_print_msg "By default, non-executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-noexec.inc
+
+ktap_print_msg "By default, interactive commands are allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_interactive 0
+
+# With only file restriction: protect non-malicious users from inadvertent errors (e.g. python ~/Downloads/*.py).
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -f, executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted and executed."
+ktap_test exec_direct 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -f, executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -f, non-executable scripts are not allowed to be executed nor interpreted."
+# Direct execution of non-executable script is alwayse denied by the kernel.
+ktap_test exec_direct 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -f, non-executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -f --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -f, interactive commands are allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_interactive 0 ./set-exec -f --
+
+# With only denied interactive commands: check or monitor script content (e.g. with LSM).
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -i, executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted and executed."
+ktap_test exec_direct 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -i, executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -i, non-executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted, but not directly executed."
+# Direct execution of non-executable script is alwayse denied by the kernel.
+ktap_test exec_direct 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -i, non-executable stdin is not allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -i --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -i, interactive commands are not allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_interactive 1 ./set-exec -i --
+
+# With both file restriction and denied interactive commands: only allow executable scripts.
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -fi, executable scripts are allowed to be interpreted and executed."
+ktap_test exec_direct 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -fi, executable stdin is allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 0 script-exec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -fi, non-executable scripts are not allowed to be interpreted nor executed."
+# Direct execution of non-executable script is alwayse denied by the kernel.
+ktap_test exec_direct 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+ktap_test exec_indirect 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -fi, non-executable stdin is not allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_stdin_reg 1 script-noexec.inc ./set-exec -fi --
+
+ktap_print_msg "With -fi, interactive commands are not allowed to be interpreted."
+ktap_test exec_interactive 1 ./set-exec -fi --
+
+ktap_finished

tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c

···
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test execveat(2) with AT_EXECVE_CHECK, and prctl(2) with
+ * SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and their locked
+ * counterparts.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Mickaël Salaün <[e-mail]>
+ */
+
+#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Defines AT_EXECVE_CHECK without type conflicts. */
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_FCNTL_H
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+
+static void drop_privileges(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
+{
+	const unsigned int noroot = SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED;
+	cap_t cap_p;
+
+	if ((cap_get_secbits() & noroot) != noroot)
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_set_secbits(noroot));
+
+	cap_p = cap_get_proc();
+	EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p);
+	EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_clear(cap_p));
+
+	/*
+	 * Drops everything, especially CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and
+	 * CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_proc(cap_p));
+	EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_free(cap_p));
+}
+
+static int test_secbits_set(const unsigned int secbits)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secbits);
+	if (err)
+		return errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+FIXTURE(access)
+{
+	int memfd, pipefd;
+	int pipe_fds[2], socket_fds[2];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(access)
+{
+	const bool mount_exec;
+	const bool file_exec;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_exec) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.mount_exec = true,
+	.file_exec = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_exec_file_noexec) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.mount_exec = true,
+	.file_exec = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_exec) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.mount_exec = false,
+	.file_exec = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(access, mount_noexec_file_noexec) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.mount_exec = false,
+	.file_exec = false,
+};
+
+static const char binary_path[] = "./false";
+static const char workdir_path[] = "./test-mount";
+static const char reg_file_path[] = "./test-mount/regular_file";
+static const char dir_path[] = "./test-mount/directory";
+static const char block_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/block_device";
+static const char char_dev_path[] = "./test-mount/character_device";
+static const char fifo_path[] = "./test-mount/fifo";
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(access)
+{
+	int procfd_path_size;
+	static const char path_template[] = "/proc/self/fd/%d";
+	char procfd_path[sizeof(path_template) + 10];
+
+	/* Makes sure we are not already restricted nor locked. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(0));
+
+	/*
+	 * Cleans previous workspace if any error previously happened (don't
+	 * check errors).
+	 */
+	umount(workdir_path);
+	rmdir(workdir_path);
+
+	/* Creates a clean mount point. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(workdir_path, 00700));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("test", workdir_path, "tmpfs",
+			   MS_MGC_VAL | (variant->mount_exec ? 0 : MS_NOEXEC),
+			   "mode=0700,size=9m"));
+
+	/* Creates a regular file. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(reg_file_path,
+			   S_IFREG | (variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600), 0));
+	/* Creates a directory. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_path, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+	/* Creates a character device: /dev/null. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(char_dev_path, S_IFCHR | 0400, makedev(1, 3)));
+	/* Creates a block device: /dev/loop0 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(block_dev_path, S_IFBLK | 0400, makedev(7, 0)));
+	/* Creates a fifo. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(fifo_path, S_IFIFO | 0600, 0));
+
+	/* Creates a regular file without user mount point. */
+	self->memfd = memfd_create("test-exec-probe", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, self->memfd);
+	/* Sets mode, which must be ignored by the exec check. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->memfd, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+
+	/* Creates a pipefs file descriptor. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(self->pipe_fds));
+	procfd_path_size = snprintf(procfd_path, sizeof(procfd_path),
+				    path_template, self->pipe_fds[0]);
+	ASSERT_LT(procfd_path_size, sizeof(procfd_path));
+	self->pipefd = open(procfd_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, self->pipefd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, fchmod(self->pipefd, variant->file_exec ? 0700 : 0600));
+
+	/* Creates a socket file descriptor. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
+				self->socket_fds));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(access)
+{
+	/* There is no need to unlink the test files. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(workdir_path));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, rmdir(workdir_path));
+}
+
+static void fill_exec_fd(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const int fd_out)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	size_t len;
+	int fd_in;
+
+	fd_in = open(binary_path, O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd_in);
+	/* Cannot use copy_file_range(2) because of EXDEV. */
+	len = read(fd_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	EXPECT_LE(0, len);
+	while (len > 0) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(len, write(fd_out, buf, len))
+		{
+			TH_LOG("Failed to write: %s (%d)", strerror(errno),
+			       errno);
+		}
+		len = read(fd_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		EXPECT_LE(0, len);
+	}
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_in));
+}
+
+static void fill_exec_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+			   const char *const path)
+{
+	int fd_out;
+
+	fd_out = open(path, O_CLOEXEC | O_WRONLY);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd_out)
+	{
+		TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	fill_exec_fd(_metadata, fd_out);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_out));
+}
+
+static void test_exec_fd(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const int fd,
+			 const int err_code)
+{
+	char *const argv[] = { "", NULL };
+	int access_ret, access_errno;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we really execute fd, filled with the "false" binary, the current
+	 * thread will exits with an error, which will be interpreted by the
+	 * test framework as an error.  With AT_EXECVE_CHECK, we only check a
+	 * potential successful execution.
+	 */
+	access_ret =
+		execveat(fd, "", argv, NULL, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+	access_errno = errno;
+	if (err_code) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, access_ret);
+		EXPECT_EQ(err_code, access_errno)
+		{
+			TH_LOG("Wrong error for execveat(2): %s (%d)",
+			       strerror(access_errno), errno);
+		}
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, access_ret)
+		{
+			TH_LOG("Access denied: %s", strerror(access_errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void test_exec_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+			   const char *const path, const int err_code)
+{
+	int flags = O_CLOEXEC;
+	int fd;
+
+	/* Do not block on pipes. */
+	if (path == fifo_path)
+		flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
+
+	fd = open(path, flags | O_RDONLY);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
+	{
+		TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, fd, err_code);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+/* Tests that we don't get ENOEXEC. */
+TEST_F(access, regular_file_empty)
+{
+	const int exec = variant->mount_exec && variant->file_exec;
+
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+	drop_privileges(_metadata);
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, regular_file_elf)
+{
+	const int exec = variant->mount_exec && variant->file_exec;
+
+	fill_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path);
+
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+	drop_privileges(_metadata);
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, reg_file_path, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+/* Tests that we don't get ENOEXEC. */
+TEST_F(access, memfd_empty)
+{
+	const int exec = variant->file_exec;
+
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+	drop_privileges(_metadata);
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, memfd_elf)
+{
+	const int exec = variant->file_exec;
+
+	fill_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd);
+
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+
+	drop_privileges(_metadata);
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->memfd, exec ? 0 : EACCES);
+}
+
+TEST_F(access, non_regular_files)
+{
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, dir_path, EACCES);
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, block_dev_path, EACCES);
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, char_dev_path, EACCES);
+	test_exec_path(_metadata, fifo_path, EACCES);
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->socket_fds[0], EACCES);
+	test_exec_fd(_metadata, self->pipefd, EACCES);
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(secbits) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(secbits)
+{
+	const bool is_privileged;
+	const int error;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(secbits, priv) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_privileged = true,
+	.error = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(secbits, unpriv) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_privileged = false,
+	.error = EPERM,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(secbits)
+{
+	/* Makes sure no exec bits are set. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(0));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+
+	if (!variant->is_privileged)
+		drop_privileges(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(secbits)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, legacy)
+{
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(0));
+}
+
+#define CHILD(...)                     \
+	do {                           \
+		pid_t child = vfork(); \
+		EXPECT_LE(0, child);   \
+		if (child == 0) {      \
+			__VA_ARGS__;   \
+			_exit(0);      \
+		}                      \
+	} while (0)
+
+TEST_F(secbits, exec)
+{
+	unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+
+	secbits &= ~(SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE | SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(secbits, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, check_locked_set)
+{
+	unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+	/* Checks lock set but unchanged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+	secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, check_locked_unset)
+{
+	unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+	/* Checks lock unset but unchanged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+	secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, restrict_locked_set)
+{
+	unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+	/* Checks lock set but unchanged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+	secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, restrict_locked_unset)
+{
+	unsigned int secbits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+
+	secbits |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+
+	/* Checks lock unset but unchanged. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(variant->error, test_secbits_set(secbits)));
+
+	secbits &= ~SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0));
+	CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN

tools/testing/selftests/exec/config

···
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y

tools/testing/selftests/exec/false.c

···
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+int main(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}

tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/ktap_helpers.sh

···
 __ktap_test() {
 	result="$1"
 	description="$2"
-	directive="$3" # optional
+	directive="${3:-}" # optional
 
 	local directive_str=
 	[ ! -z "$directive" ] && directive_str="# $directive"

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c

···
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 
+/* Defines AT_EXECVE_CHECK without type conflicts. */
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_FCNTL_H
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+
 #include "common.h"
 
 #ifndef renameat2
···
 	};
 }
 
+static void test_check_exec(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+			    const int err, const char *const path)
+{
+	int ret;
+	char *const argv[] = { (char *)path, NULL };
+
+	ret = execveat(AT_FDCWD, path, argv, NULL,
+		       AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+	if (err) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, err);
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+}
+
 TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
 {
 	const struct rule rules[] = {
···
 	copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d2);
 	copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d3);
 
+	/* Checks before file1_s1d1 being denied. */
+	test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+	test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+
 	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
 	test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+	test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
 	test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d2);
+	test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d2);
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
 	test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d3);
+	test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d3);
 }
 
 TEST_F_FORK(layout1, umount_sandboxer)