x86/entry: Use the correct fence macro after swapgs in kernel CR3

The commit

c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")

removed a CR3 write in the faulting path of load_gs_index().

But the path's FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY has no fence operation if PTI is
enabled, see spectre_v1_select_mitigation().

Rather, it depended on the serializing CR3 write of SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
and since it got removed, add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY call to make
sure speculation is blocked.

[ bp: Massage commit message and comment. ]

Fixes: c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[e-mail]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[e-mail]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[e-mail]

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S

···
 	pushq	%r12
 	ret
 
-.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
-	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
-.Lerror_entry_done:
-	ret
-
 	/*
 	 * There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
 	 * usergs. Handle them here.  B stepping K8s sometimes report a
···
 	 * .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
 	 */
 	SWAPGS
-	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
-	jmp .Lerror_entry_done
+
+	/*
+	 * Issue an LFENCE to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether it is a
+	 * kernel or user gsbase.
+	 */
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+	ret
 
 .Lbstep_iret:
 	/* Fix truncated RIP */