linux-copperhead: LTS based on regular 4.14

pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch

···
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+index 0380a45ecf4b..39956a3ef645 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -490,16 +490,6 @@
+			nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting.
+			nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting.
+
+-	checkreqprot	[SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value.
+-			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+-			See security/selinux/Kconfig help text.
+-			0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes
+-				any implied execute protection).
+-			1 -- check protection requested by application.
+-			Default value is set via a kernel config option.
+-			Value can be changed at runtime via
+-				/selinux/checkreqprot.
+-
+	cio_ignore=	[S390]
+			See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
+	clk_ignore_unused
+@@ -2899,6 +2889,11 @@
+			the specified number of seconds.  This is to be used if
+			your oopses keep scrolling off the screen.
+
++	extra_latent_entropy
++			Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction
++			from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator
++			passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator.
++
+	pcbit=		[HW,ISDN]
+
+	pcd.		[PARIDE]
+diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+index 694968c7523c..002d86416ef8 100644
+--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
+ - sysctl_writes_strict
+ - tainted
+ - threads-max
++- tiocsti_restrict
+ - unknown_nmi_panic
+ - watchdog
+ - watchdog_thresh
+@@ -999,6 +1000,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
+
+ ==============================================================
+
++tiocsti_restrict:
++
++This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
++from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into other processes
++which share a tty session.
++
++When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept
++the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into
++one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must
++have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl.
++
++When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability
++CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally
++opened the tty.
++
++The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the
++default value of tiocsti_restrict.
++
++==============================================================
++
+ unknown_nmi_panic:
+
+ The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index 787cf6605209..e4fda5330730 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ endif
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
+
+ ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
++ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT
++KBUILD_CFLAGS   += -fsanitize=local-init
++endif
+ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unused-variable)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier)
+diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
+index 400b9e1b2f27..4637096f7902 100644
+--- a/arch/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/Kconfig
+@@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+	  is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
+	  irq processing.
+
++	  When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line,
++	  entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the
++	  runtime memory allocator is being initialized.  This costs even more
++	  slowdown of the boot process.
++
+	  Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
+	  secure!
+
+@@ -533,7 +538,7 @@ config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+ choice
+	prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
+	depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+-	default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
++	default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
+	help
+	  This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
+	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+@@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
+	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
+-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
++	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	help
+	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+@@ -769,7 +774,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
+	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
+-	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
++	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+	help
+	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+@@ -952,6 +957,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
+
+ config REFCOUNT_FULL
+	bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
++	default y
+	help
+	  Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
+	  unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+index 2d5f7aca156d..aa4839a74c6a 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+@@ -918,6 +918,7 @@ endif
+
+ config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+	bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
++	default y
+	help
+	  Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
+	  user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
+@@ -1044,6 +1045,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
+	select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
+	select RELOCATABLE
++	default y
+	help
+	  Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
+	  loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+index cc6bd559af85..01d5442d4722 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
+ config DEBUG_WX
+	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
+	select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
++	default y
+	---help---
+	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
+index 34480e9af2e7..26304242250c 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
++++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
+@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
+-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+ CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+ CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+index 33be513ef24c..6f0c0e3ef0dd 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@
+
+ /*
+  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+  */
+-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x100000000UL
+
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ /* 1GB of VA */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ #define STACK_RND_MASK			(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
+-						0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+-						0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
++						((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
++						((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+ #else
+-#define STACK_RND_MASK			(0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
++#define STACK_RND_MASK			(((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef __AARCH64EB__
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+index 9e773732520c..91359f45b5fc 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+@@ -419,9 +419,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
+ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+	if (is_compat_task())
+-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
+	else
+-		return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+index 7483cd514c32..835a86c45fb0 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+@@ -1153,8 +1153,7 @@ config VM86
+        default X86_LEGACY_VM86
+
+ config X86_16BIT
+-	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	---help---
+	  This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit
+@@ -2228,7 +2227,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
+ choice
+	prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
+	depends on X86_64
+-	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
++	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
+	help
+	  Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
+	  to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
+@@ -2318,8 +2317,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
+	  be set to 'N' under normal conditions.
+
+ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+-	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)"
+	---help---
+	  Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
+	  Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
+diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+index 6293a8768a91..add82e0f1df3 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP
+ config DEBUG_WX
+	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
+	select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
++	default y
+	---help---
+	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
+index e32fc1f274d8..d08acc76502a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
+@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
+ # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set
+-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+ CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+ CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y
+ CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+index 1911310959f8..bba8dbbc07a8 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+@@ -203,55 +203,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+-/*
+- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized
+- * offset.  This way there is no hole in the middle of address space.
+- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack
+- * top.  This doesn't give that many random bits.
+- *
+- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso
+- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end.
+- *
+- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos.
+- */
+-static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len)
+-{
+-	unsigned long addr, end;
+-	unsigned offset;
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Round up the start address.  It can start out unaligned as a result
+-	 * of stack start randomization.
+-	 */
+-	start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+-
+-	/* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */
+-	end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK;
+-	if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+-		end = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+-	end -= len;
+-
+-	if (end > start) {
+-		offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
+-		addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT);
+-	} else {
+-		addr = start;
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware
+-	 * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons.
+-	 */
+-	addr = align_vdso_addr(addr);
+-
+-	return addr;
+-}
+-
+ static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image)
+ {
+-	unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start);
+-
+-	return map_vdso(image, addr);
++	return map_vdso(image, 0);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+index 3a091cea36c5..0931c05a3348 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ extern int force_personality32;
+
+ /*
+  * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
++ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+  * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+  */
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+-						  (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2))
++						  0x100000000UL)
+
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ extern unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy);
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+
+-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff)
+-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff)
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO		ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
+
+@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ extern unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy);
+ #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+
+ /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */
+-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff)
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#else
++#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
++#endif
+ #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32())
+
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO							\
+@@ -380,5 +384,4 @@ struct va_alignment {
+ } ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+ extern struct va_alignment va_align;
+-extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+index 704f31315dde..bb82b6344a7b 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits(unsigned long mask)
+	unsigned long cr4;
+
+	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+	if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4) {
+		cr4 |= mask;
+		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+@@ -266,6 +267,7 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask)
+	unsigned long cr4;
+
+	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+	if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4) {
+		cr4 &= ~mask;
+		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+@@ -278,6 +280,7 @@ static inline void cr4_toggle_bits(unsigned long mask)
+	unsigned long cr4;
+
+	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+	cr4 ^= mask;
+	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+	__write_cr4(cr4);
+@@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void)
+	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
++	BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
+	/* toggle PGE */
+	native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
+	/* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+index 48e98964ecad..a94dc690612f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+@@ -1637,7 +1637,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
+	barrier();
+
+-	x86_configure_nx();
+	x2apic_setup();
+
+	/*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+index 988a98f34c66..dc36d2d9078a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
+ #include <asm/desc.h>
+ #include <asm/prctl.h>
+ #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
++#include <asm/elf.h>
++#include <linux/sizes.h>
+
+ /*
+  * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
+@@ -719,7 +721,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
+
+ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+-	return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
++	if (mmap_is_ia32())
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
++	else
++		return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+index a63fe77b3217..e1085e76043e 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void)
+	return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
+ }
+
+-unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
+-{
+-	unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
+-	addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
+-	return addr | get_align_bits();
+-}
+-
+ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
+ {
+	/* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
+@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
+	}
+
+	*begin	= get_mmap_base(1);
+-	if (in_compat_syscall())
+-		*end = task_size_32bit();
+-	else
+-		*end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
++	*end	= get_mmap_base(0);
+ }
+
+ unsigned long
+@@ -206,7 +196,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
+
+	info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
+	info.length = len;
+-	info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
++	info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
+	info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
+
+	/*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+index 3141e67ec24c..e93173193f60 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)
+	permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base);
+ }
+
+-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+
+ /* user-defined highmem size */
+@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size)
+ #endif
+ #endif
+
+-int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly;
++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
+
+ void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+ {
+@@ -917,12 +917,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
+	unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start;
+
++	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
+	set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n",
+		size >> 10);
+
+-	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n",
+		start, start+size);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+index 642357aff216..8bbf93ce3cd2 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+  * around without checking the pgd every time.
+  */
+
+-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+
+ int force_personality32;
+@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
+	mem_init_print_info(NULL);
+ }
+
+-int kernel_set_to_readonly;
++int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init;
+
+ void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+ {
+@@ -1234,9 +1234,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n",
+	       (end - start) >> 10);
+-	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+-
+	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
++	set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	/*
+	 * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!)
+diff --git a/block/blk-softirq.c b/block/blk-softirq.c
+index 01e2b353a2b9..9aeddca4a29f 100644
+--- a/block/blk-softirq.c
++++ b/block/blk-softirq.c
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blk_cpu_done);
+  * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them
+  * while passing them to the queue registered handler.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void)
+ {
+	struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list;
+
+diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+index 473f150d6b22..65a65f9824ed 100644
+--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
++++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+@@ -5141,7 +5141,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+	struct ata_port *ap;
+	unsigned int tag;
+
+-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
++	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+	ap = qc->ap;
+
+	qc->flags = 0;
+@@ -5158,7 +5158,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+	struct ata_port *ap;
+	struct ata_link *link;
+
+-	WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
++	BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE));
+	ap = qc->ap;
+	link = qc->dev->link;
+diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+index c28dca0c613d..d4813f0d25ca 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ source "drivers/tty/Kconfig"
+
+ config DEVMEM
+	bool "/dev/mem virtual device support"
+-	default y
+	help
+	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device.
+	  The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
+@@ -568,7 +567,6 @@ config TELCLOCK
+ config DEVPORT
+	bool "/dev/port character device"
+	depends on ISA || PCI
+-	default y
+	help
+	  Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
+	  device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c
+index e105532bfba8..e07d52bb9b62 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c
+@@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ static int cx24116_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune,
+	return cx24116_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+
+-static int cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c
+index d37cb7762bd6..97e0feff0ede 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c
+@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ static int cx24117_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune,
+	return cx24117_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+
+-static int cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c
+index 7f11dcc94d85..01da670760ba 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c
+@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static int cx24120_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune,
+	return cx24120_read_status(fe, status);
+ }
+
+-static int cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c
+index 1d59d1d3bd82..41cd0e9ea199 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c
+@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static int cx24123_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
+	return retval;
+ }
+
+-static int cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c
+index f6ebbb47b9b2..3e0d8cbd76da 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static enum dvbfe_search cxd2820r_search(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_SEARCH_ERROR;
+ }
+
+-static int cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_CUSTOM;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c
+index e8ac8c3e2ec0..e0f4ba8302d1 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c
+@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static void mb86a20s_release(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+	kfree(state);
+ }
+
+-static int mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+         return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c
+index 274544a3ae0e..9ef9b9bc1bd2 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c
++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c
+@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int s921_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
+	return rc;
+ }
+
+-static int s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c b/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c
+index 7166d2279465..fa682f9fdc4b 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c
++++ b/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ static int dst_tune_frontend(struct dvb_frontend* fe,
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return dst_algo ? DVBFE_ALGO_HW : DVBFE_ALGO_SW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c
+index f75f69556be7..d913a6050e8c 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c
++++ b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int va1j5jf8007s_read_snr(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr)
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c
+index 63fda79a75c0..4115c3ccd4a8 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c
++++ b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int va1j5jf8007t_read_snr(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr)
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
++static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
+ {
+	return DVBFE_ALGO_HW;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+index 981b3ef71e47..9883da1da383 100644
+--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
++++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static irqreturn_t jp_handle_irq_event(unsigned int irq,
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static void jp_tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
++static void jp_tasklet_action(void)
+ {
+	lkdtm_handler();
+	jprobe_return();
+diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
+index b811442c5ce6..4f62a63cbcb1 100644
+--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
+@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS
+
+ config LEGACY_PTYS
+	bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support"
+-	default y
+	---help---
+	  A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two
+	  halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to
+diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+index 562d31073f9a..2184b9b5485f 100644
+--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
+	put_device(tty->dev);
+	kfree(tty->write_buf);
+	tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
++	put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
+	kfree(tty);
+ }
+
+@@ -2154,11 +2155,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
+  *	FIXME: may race normal receive processing
+  */
+
++int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
++
+ static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
+ {
+	char ch, mbz = 0;
+	struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+
++	if (tiocsti_restrict &&
++		!ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
++		dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev,
++			"Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n");
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
+	if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (get_user(ch, p))
+@@ -2841,6 +2850,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
+	tty->index = idx;
+	tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
+	tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
++	tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
+
+	return tty;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+index 442be7f312f6..788557d5c454 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+ #define USB_VENDOR_GENESYS_LOGIC		0x05e3
+ #define HUB_QUIRK_CHECK_PORT_AUTOSUSPEND	0x01
+
++extern int deny_new_usb;
++
+ /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members
+  * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can
+  * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */
+@@ -4806,6 +4808,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
+			goto done;
+		return;
+	}
++
++	if (deny_new_usb) {
++		dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1);
++		goto done;
++	}
++
+	if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
+		unit_load = 150;
+	else
+diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
+index 0da4d748b4e6..69fcee853363 100644
+--- a/fs/exec.c
++++ b/fs/exec.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <linux/oom.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+	arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma);
+	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
++	if (randomize_va_space)
++		bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK;
+	return 0;
+ err:
+	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
+index 0b46b858cd42..3ae8e72341da 100644
+--- a/fs/namei.c
++++ b/fs/namei.c
+@@ -902,8 +902,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
+		path_put(&last->link);
+ }
+
+-int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0;
+-int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
++int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1;
++int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+
+ /**
+  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
+diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644
+--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
++++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG
+	bool
+	depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG
+	select CRC32
+-	default y
+diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
+index 8ef7d7bef775..b82f305ec13d 100644
+--- a/fs/pipe.c
++++ b/fs/pipe.c
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;
+ /*
+  * Minimum pipe size, as required by POSIX
+  */
+-unsigned int pipe_min_size = PAGE_SIZE;
++unsigned int pipe_min_size __read_only = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /* Maximum allocatable pages per user. Hard limit is unset by default, soft
+  * matches default values.
+diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig
+index 1ade1206bb89..60b0f76dec47 100644
+--- a/fs/proc/Kconfig
++++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig
+@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE
+ config PROC_VMCORE
+	bool "/proc/vmcore support"
+	depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP
+-	default y
+         help
+         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
+
+diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
+index 873785dae022..d3c2ada8b9c7 100644
+--- a/fs/stat.c
++++ b/fs/stat.c
+@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat)
+	stat->gid = inode->i_gid;
+	stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+	stat->size = i_size_read(inode);
+-	stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
+-	stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
++		stat->atime = inode->i_ctime;
++		stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime;
++	} else {
++		stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
++		stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
++	}
+	stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
+	stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+	stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks;
+@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
+	stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS;
+	request_mask &= STATX_ALL;
+	query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS;
+-	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
+-		return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask,
+-					    query_flags);
++	if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
++		int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
++		if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
++			stat->atime = stat->ctime;
++			stat->mtime = stat->ctime;
++		}
++		return retval;
++	}
+
+	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
+	return 0;
+diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
+index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cache.h
++++ b/include/linux/cache.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
+ #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
+ #endif
+
++#define __read_only __ro_after_init
++
+ #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
+ #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
+index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644
+--- a/include/linux/capability.h
++++ b/include/linux/capability.h
+@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ extern bool capable(int cap);
++extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
+ extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+ #else
+@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
+ {
+	return true;
+ }
++static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
++{
++	return true;
++}
+ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+ {
+	return true;
+diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
+index cc613f20e5a6..7606596d6c2e 100644
+--- a/include/linux/fs.h
++++ b/include/linux/fs.h
+@@ -3392,4 +3392,15 @@ static inline bool dir_relax_shared(struct inode *inode)
+ extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path);
+ extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode);
+
++extern int device_sidechannel_restrict;
++
++static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++	umode_t mode;
++	if (!device_sidechannel_restrict)
++		return false;
++	mode = inode->i_mode;
++	return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH)));
++}
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+index bdaf22582f6e..326ff15d4637 100644
+--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
++++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file)
+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	__u32 mask = FS_ACCESS;
+
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
++		return;
++
+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
+
+@@ -199,6 +202,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_modify(struct file *file)
+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	__u32 mask = FS_MODIFY;
+
++	if (is_sidechannel_device(inode))
++		return;
++
+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+		mask |= FS_ISDIR;
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
+index b041f94678de..a5e0175c79e0 100644
+--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
++++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
+@@ -518,9 +518,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order,
+ extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
+ extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+-void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
++void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size);
+-void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
++void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+
+ #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \
+		__get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0)
+diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h
+index 776f90f3a1cd..3f5c47000059 100644
+--- a/include/linux/highmem.h
++++ b/include/linux/highmem.h
+@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page)
+	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+ }
+
++static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page)
++{
++	void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
++	BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE));
++	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
++}
++
+ static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page,
+	unsigned start1, unsigned end1,
+	unsigned start2, unsigned end2)
+diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h
+index 69c238210325..ee487ea4f48f 100644
+--- a/include/linux/interrupt.h
++++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h
+@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS];
+
+ struct softirq_action
+ {
+-	void	(*action)(struct softirq_action *);
++	void	(*action)(void);
+ };
+
+ asmlinkage void do_softirq(void);
+@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static inline void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+-extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *));
++extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void));
+ extern void softirq_init(void);
+ extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr);
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+index df32d2508290..c992d130b94d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
++++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
+	void (*drop_ns)(void *);
+ };
+
+-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
+ int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
+ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
+ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
+diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
+index f23215854c80..98df98c44cc0 100644
+--- a/include/linux/mm.h
++++ b/include/linux/mm.h
+@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+-extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node);
++extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+ {
+	return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
+index 296bbe49d5d1..b26652c9a98d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/percpu.h
++++ b/include/linux/percpu.h
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size,
+				pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn);
+ #endif
+
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr);
+ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
+
+@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
+ extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void);
+ #endif
+
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp);
+-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata);
+ extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr);
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
+index 8e22f24ded6a..b7fecdfa6de5 100644
+--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
++++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
+@@ -1165,6 +1165,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+
++static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
++{
++	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
++}
++
+ static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
+ {
+	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
+diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
+index ae5ed6492d54..fd0786124504 100644
+--- a/include/linux/slab.h
++++ b/include/linux/slab.h
+@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ void memcg_destroy_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *);
+ /*
+  * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators
+  */
+-void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
+-void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
++void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
++void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2)));
+ void kfree(const void *);
+ void kzfree(const void *);
+ size_t ksize(const void *);
+@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_index(size_t size)
+ }
+ #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
+
+-void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
++void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
+ void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *);
+
+@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+-void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
++void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
+ #else
+ static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+  * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of
+  * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h.
+  */
+-static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+ {
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+		if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
+@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_size(int n)
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
++static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+ {
+ #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
+diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
+index 39fa09bcde23..0b7a48cd883b 100644
+--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
++++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
+@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ struct kmem_cache {
+	unsigned long random;
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++	unsigned long random_active;
++	unsigned long random_inactive;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+	/*
+	 * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node.
+diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
+index cfd83eb2f926..b9ecb42c762d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/string.h
++++ b/include/linux/string.h
+@@ -234,10 +234,16 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
+ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter");
+ void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1)
++#else
++#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0)
++#endif
++
+ #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
+		__write_overflow();
+	if (p_size < size)
+@@ -247,7 +253,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
+
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
+	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
+@@ -258,7 +264,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
+ {
+	__kernel_size_t ret;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+
+	/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
+@@ -273,7 +279,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
+ extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
+	__kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
+	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+@@ -285,8 +291,8 @@ extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+ {
+	size_t ret;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
+	ret = strlen(q);
+@@ -306,8 +312,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
+ {
+	size_t p_len, copy_len;
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
+	p_len = strlen(p);
+@@ -420,8 +426,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+ /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
+ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
+ {
+-	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
+-	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
++	size_t p_size = __string_size(p);
++	size_t q_size = __string_size(q);
+	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
+	memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
+diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
+index 1dd587ba6d88..9a9a04fb641d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/tty.h
++++ b/include/linux/tty.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/llist.h>
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+
+ /*
+@@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
+	/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
+	struct work_struct SAK_work;
+	struct tty_port *port;
++	struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
+ } __randomize_layout;
+
+ /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
+@@ -344,6 +346,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
+	struct list_head list;
+ };
+
++extern int tiocsti_restrict;
++
+ /* tty magic number */
+ #define TTY_MAGIC		0x5401
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
+index 1e5d8c392f15..66d0e49c9987 100644
+--- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
++++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
+@@ -68,19 +68,19 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+-extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
+-extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
+-extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
+-extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot);
++extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
++extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
+			unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
+			pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
+-			const void *caller);
++			const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+ #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
+ static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
+diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
+index 46075327c165..0c78750bc76d 100644
+--- a/init/Kconfig
++++ b/init/Kconfig
+@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config USELIB
+ config AUDIT
+	bool "Auditing support"
+	depends on NET
++	default y
+	help
+	  Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
+	  kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
+@@ -1052,6 +1053,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE
+
+ endchoice
+
++config LOCAL_INIT
++	bool "Zero uninitialized locals"
++	help
++	  Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length
++	  arrays. Requires compiler support.
++
+ config SYSCTL
+	bool
+
+@@ -1361,8 +1368,7 @@ config SHMEM
+	  which may be appropriate on small systems without swap.
+
+ config AIO
+-	bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT
+-	default y
++	bool "Enable AIO support"
+	help
+	  This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used
+	  by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling
+@@ -1491,7 +1497,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS
+
+ config SLUB_DEBUG
+	default y
+-	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT
++	bool "Enable SLUB debugging support"
+	depends on SLUB && SYSFS
+	help
+	  SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can
+@@ -1515,7 +1521,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON
+
+ config COMPAT_BRK
+	bool "Disable heap randomization"
+-	default y
+	help
+	  Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
+	  also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
+@@ -1562,7 +1567,6 @@ endchoice
+
+ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+	bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
+-	default y
+	help
+	  For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
+	  merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
+@@ -1575,9 +1579,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+	  command line.
+
+ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
+-	default n
+	depends on SLAB || SLUB
+	bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
++	default y
+	help
+	  Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
+	  security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
+@@ -1586,12 +1590,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
+ config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+	bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
+	depends on SLUB
++	default y
+	help
+	  Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
+	  other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
+	  sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
+	  freelist exploit methods.
+
++config SLAB_HARDENED
++	default y
++	depends on SLUB
++	bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure"
++	help
++          Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab
++          allocator.
++
++config SLAB_CANARY
++	depends on SLUB
++	depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
++	bool "SLAB canaries"
++	default y
++	help
++	  Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing
++	  some performance and memory usage for security.
++
++	  Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations
++	  are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides
++	  basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY.
++
++	  Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate
++	  non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero
++	  byte and provide basic double-free detection.
++
++config SLAB_SANITIZE
++	bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations"
++	depends on SLUB
++	default y
++	help
++	  Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
++	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
++
++	  For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact.
++
++config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY
++	depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE
++	default y
++	bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations"
++	help
++	  Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect
++	  write-after-free bugs.
++
+ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
+	default y
+	depends on SLUB && SMP
+diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
+index 5b34d3114af4..e57930192ce1 100644
+--- a/kernel/audit.c
++++ b/kernel/audit.c
+@@ -1573,6 +1573,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
+	audit_default = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	if (!audit_default)
+		audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
++        else
++		audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED;
++
+	audit_enabled = audit_default;
+	audit_ever_enabled = !!audit_enabled;
+
+diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
+index d203a5d6b726..2a6c3e2c57a6 100644
+--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
+@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ void __weak bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
+	bpf_prog_unlock_free(fp);
+ }
+
+-int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly;
++int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2;
+
+ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
+			      const struct bpf_insn *aux,
+diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+index 4e933219fec6..0f37db32a2b1 100644
+--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock);
+ static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr);
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock);
+
+-int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly;
++int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1;
+
+ static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = {
+ #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops)
+diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
+index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644
+--- a/kernel/capability.c
++++ b/kernel/capability.c
+@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap)
+	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
++
++bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
++{
++	return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
+index cb8274d7824f..c1b3d232b0a4 100644
+--- a/kernel/events/core.c
++++ b/kernel/events/core.c
+@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
+  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
+  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
+  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
++ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
++#else
+ int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
++#endif
+
+ /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
+ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
+@@ -9941,6 +9946,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
+	if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
++	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
+index 98c91bd341b4..dbb9540ee61c 100644
+--- a/kernel/fork.c
++++ b/kernel/fork.c
+@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@
+
+ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+ #include <trace/events/task.h>
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#else
++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
++#endif
+
+ /*
+  * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
+@@ -1554,6 +1559,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
++	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++
+	/*
+	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
+	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
+@@ -2347,6 +2356,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
+	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
+		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
+
++	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			goto bad_unshare_out;
++	}
++
+	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
+	if (err)
+		goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+index 0972a8e09d08..00dde7aad47a 100644
+--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
++++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void)
+
+ void clear_free_pages(void)
+ {
+-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)
+	struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map;
+	unsigned long pfn;
+
+@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void)
+	}
+	memory_bm_position_reset(bm);
+	pr_info("PM: free pages cleared after restore\n");
+-#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */
++#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */
+ }
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
+index a64eee0db39e..4d7de378fe4c 100644
+--- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
++++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_ctrlblk *rcp)
+	}
+ }
+
+-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
+ {
+	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk);
+	__rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk);
+diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
+index 3e3650e94ae6..7ecd7a5d04b3 100644
+--- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c
++++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
+@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_state *rsp)
+ /*
+  * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
++static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
+ {
+	struct rcu_state *rsp;
+
+diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
+index 5c09ddf8c832..f5db6ece105a 100644
+--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
++++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
+@@ -8986,7 +8986,7 @@ static void nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle) { }
+  * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick.
+  * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set).
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void)
+ {
+	struct rq *this_rq = this_rq();
+	enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ?
+diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
+index e89c3b0cff6d..0d3ebd520931 100644
+--- a/kernel/softirq.c
++++ b/kernel/softirq.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ irq_cpustat_t irq_stat[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_stat);
+ #endif
+
+-static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
++static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd);
+
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void)
+		kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr);
+
+		trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr);
+-		h->action(h);
++		h->action();
+		trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr);
+		if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
+			pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n",
+@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr)
+	or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr);
+ }
+
+-void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
++void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void))
+ {
+	softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
+ }
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule);
+
+-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void)
+ {
+	struct tasklet_struct *list;
+
+@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
+	}
+ }
+
+-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a)
++static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void)
+ {
+	struct tasklet_struct *list;
+
+diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+index 069550540a39..822783a174aa 100644
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <linux/kexec.h>
+ #include <linux/bpf.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -98,12 +99,19 @@
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
+
+ /* External variables not in a header file. */
++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
++int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
++#endif
+ extern int suid_dumpable;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
+ extern int core_uses_pid;
+ extern char core_pattern[];
+ extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#endif
+ extern int pid_max;
+ extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
+ extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
+@@ -115,40 +123,43 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
+
+ /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
+-static int sixty = 60;
++static int sixty __read_only = 60;
+ #endif
+
+-static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
++static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1;
+
+ static int zero;
+-static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
+-static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
+-static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
+-static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
+-static int one_hundred = 100;
+-static int one_thousand = 1000;
++static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1;
++static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2;
++static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4;
++static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1;
++static int one_hundred __read_only = 100;
++static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
+-static int ten_thousand = 10000;
++static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+-static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
++static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024;
+ #endif
+
+ /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */
+-static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
++static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
+-static int maxolduid = 65535;
+-static int minolduid;
++static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535;
++static int minolduid __read_only;
+
+-static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
++static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX;
+ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
+
+ /*this is needed for proc_doulongvec_minmax of sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
+-static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
++static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
+ #endif
+
++int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
+ #include <linux/inotify.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -286,19 +297,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
+ };
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
+-static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
+-static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+-static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns;			/* 0 usecs */
+-static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
++static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000;		/* 100 usecs */
++static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
++static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only;			/* 0 usecs */
++static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC;	/* 1 second */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+-static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
+-static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
++static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
++static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION
+-static int min_extfrag_threshold;
+-static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000;
++static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only;
++static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000;
+ #endif
+
+ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+@@ -512,6 +523,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+	},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++	{
++		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
++		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
+	{
+		.procname	= "tainted",
+@@ -853,6 +873,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &two,
+	},
++#endif
++#if defined CONFIG_TTY
++	{
++		.procname	= "tiocsti_restrict",
++		.data		= &tiocsti_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
++#endif
++	{
++		.procname	= "device_sidechannel_restrict",
++		.data		= &device_sidechannel_restrict,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB)
++	{
++		.procname	= "deny_new_usb",
++		.data		= &deny_new_usb,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
++		.extra1		= &zero,
++		.extra2		= &one,
++	},
+ #endif
+	{
+		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
+diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
+index 9fe525f410bf..6a85b0e1292e 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
++++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
+@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
+ /*
+  * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context.
+  */
+-static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void)
+ {
+	struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]);
+
+diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+index c490f1e4313b..dd03bd39d7bf 100644
+--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
+ #include <linux/projid.h>
+ #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+
++/* sysctl */
++int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++
+ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
+
+diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+index 62d0e25c054c..3953072277eb 100644
+--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
++++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs"
+
+ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
+	bool "Panic on Oops"
++	default y
+	help
+	  Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
+	  has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
+@@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
+	  anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data
+	  corruption or other issues.
+
+-	  Say N if unsure.
++	  Say Y if unsure.
+
+ config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE
+	int
+@@ -1319,6 +1320,7 @@ config DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
+ config DEBUG_LIST
+	bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++	default y
+	help
+	  Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
+	  walking routines.
+@@ -1932,6 +1934,7 @@ config MEMTEST
+ config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+	bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
+	select DEBUG_LIST
++	default y
+	help
+	  Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
+	  data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
+@@ -1952,7 +1955,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
+	bool "Filter access to /dev/mem"
+	depends on MMU && DEVMEM
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
+-	default y if TILE || PPC
++	default y
+	---help---
+	  If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
+	  of memory, including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental
+@@ -1971,6 +1974,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
+ config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM
+	bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem"
+	depends on STRICT_DEVMEM
++	default y
+	---help---
+	  If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
+	  io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
+diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c
+index 86a709954f5a..6f15787fcb1b 100644
+--- a/lib/irq_poll.c
++++ b/lib/irq_poll.c
+@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete);
+
+-static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
++static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void)
+ {
+	struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll);
+	int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget;
+diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
+index 34f847252c02..4fda329de614 100644
+--- a/lib/kobject.c
++++ b/lib/kobject.c
+@@ -956,9 +956,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add);
+
+
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock);
+-static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES];
++static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init;
+
+-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
++int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
+ {
+	enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type;
+	int error;
+diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
+index 3d8295c85505..3fa3b3409d69 100644
+--- a/lib/nlattr.c
++++ b/lib/nlattr.c
+@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count)
+ {
+	int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src));
+
++	BUG_ON(minlen < 0);
++
+	memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen);
+	if (count > minlen)
+		memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen);
+diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
+index 86c3385b9eb3..c482070e379b 100644
+--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
++++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
+@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
+	return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
+ }
+
+-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
++int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2;
+
+ /*
+  * Show a '%p' thing.  A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
+diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
+index 59efbd3337e0..c070e14ec83d 100644
+--- a/mm/Kconfig
++++ b/mm/Kconfig
+@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ config KSM
+ config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+         int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+	depends on MMU
+-        default 4096
++	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
++	default 65536
+         help
+	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
+index 11f96fad5271..632e7f9a710e 100644
+--- a/mm/mmap.c
++++ b/mm/mmap.c
+@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk)
+
+	newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk);
+	oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk);
++	/* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */
++	if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) {
++		if (brk == min_brk)
++			newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
++		if (mm->brk == min_brk)
++			oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
++	}
+	if (oldbrk == newbrk)
+		goto set_brk;
+
+diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
+index 1d7693c35424..8963a3b4d37c 100644
+--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
++++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+ #include <linux/lockdep.h>
+ #include <linux/nmi.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+@@ -98,6 +99,15 @@ int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES];
+ DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex);
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain);
+
++bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy;
++
++static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str)
++{
++	extra_latent_entropy = true;
++	return 0;
++}
++early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+ volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
+@@ -1063,6 +1073,13 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
+		debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page),
+					   PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	}
++
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) {
++		int i;
++		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
++			clear_highpage(page + i);
++	}
++
+	arch_free_page(page, order);
+	kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
+	kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
+@@ -1278,6 +1295,21 @@ static void __init __free_pages_boot_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+	__ClearPageReserved(p);
+	set_page_count(p, 0);
+
++	if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) {
++		unsigned long hash = 0;
++		size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash;
++		const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page);
++
++		for (index = 0; index < end; index++)
++			hash ^= hash + data[index];
++#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
++		latent_entropy ^= hash;
++		add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
++#else
++		add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash));
++#endif
++	}
++
+	page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages;
+	set_page_refcounted(page);
+	__free_pages(page, order);
+@@ -1718,8 +1750,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page)
+
+ static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void)
+ {
+-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) &&
+-		page_poisoning_enabled();
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) ||
++		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled());
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
+@@ -1776,6 +1808,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags
+
+	post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags);
+
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) {
++		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
++			verify_zero_highpage(page + i);
++	}
++
+	if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO))
+		for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+			clear_highpage(page + i);
+diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
+index 485d9fbb8802..436461588804 100644
+--- a/mm/slab.h
++++ b/mm/slab.h
+@@ -311,7 +311,11 @@ static inline bool is_root_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+ static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s,
+				      struct kmem_cache *p)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
++	return p == s;
++#else
+	return true;
++#endif
+ }
+
+ static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s)
+@@ -363,18 +367,26 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
+	 * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root
+	 * will also be a constant.
+	 */
+-	if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
++	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) &&
++	    !memcg_kmem_enabled() &&
+	    !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS))
+		return s;
+
+	page = virt_to_head_page(x);
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED
++	BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page));
++#endif
+	cachep = page->slab_cache;
+	if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s))
+		return cachep;
+
+	pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
+	       __func__, s->name, cachep->name);
++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++	BUG_ON(1);
++#else
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
++#endif
+	return s;
+ }
+
+@@ -399,7 +411,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s)
+	 * back there or track user information then we can
+	 * only use the space before that information.
+	 */
+-	if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER))
++	if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+		return s->inuse;
+	/*
+	 * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation
+diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
+index 65212caa1f2a..d8bf8a75f445 100644
+--- a/mm/slab_common.c
++++ b/mm/slab_common.c
+@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@
+
+ #include "slab.h"
+
+-enum slab_state slab_state;
++enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init;
+ LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
+ DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
+-struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
++struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+ static LIST_HEAD(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
+ static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work);
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
+ /*
+  * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
+  */
+-static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
++static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
+
+ static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
+ {
+@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_dma_caches);
+  * of two cache sizes there. The size of larger slabs can be determined using
+  * fls.
+  */
+-static s8 size_index[24] = {
++static s8 size_index[24] __ro_after_init = {
+	3,	/* 8 */
+	4,	/* 16 */
+	5,	/* 24 */
+diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
+index 41c01690d116..591dd60d37f3 100644
+--- a/mm/slub.c
++++ b/mm/slub.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
+ #endif
+ }
+
++static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s)
++{
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON));
++}
++
++static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s)
++{
++	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s);
++}
++
+ void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
+ {
+	if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
+@@ -297,6 +307,35 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp)
+	*(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
++{
++	if (s->offset)
++		return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
++	return object + s->inuse;
++}
++
++static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value)
++{
++	return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK;
++}
++
++static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
++{
++	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
++	*canary = get_canary_value(canary, value);
++}
++
++static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
++{
++	unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
++	BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value));
++}
++#else
++#define set_canary(s, object, value)
++#define check_canary(s, object, value)
++#endif
++
+ /* Loop over all objects in a slab */
+ #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \
+	for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \
+@@ -484,13 +523,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
+  * Debug settings:
+  */
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON)
+-static int slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
++static int slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+ #else
+-static int slub_debug;
++static int slub_debug __ro_after_init;
+ #endif
+
+-static char *slub_debug_slabs;
+-static int disable_higher_order_debug;
++static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init;
++static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init;
+
+ /*
+  * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata.  This memory lies
+@@ -550,6 +589,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+	else
+		p = object + s->inuse;
+
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *);
++
+	return p + alloc;
+ }
+
+@@ -688,6 +730,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
+	else
+		off = s->inuse;
+
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		off += sizeof(void *);
++
+	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
+
+@@ -817,6 +862,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
+		/* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
+		off += sizeof(void *);
+
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		off += sizeof(void *);
++
+	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+		/* We also have user information there */
+		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
+@@ -1416,8 +1464,9 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
+				void *object)
+ {
+	setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
++	set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
+	kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object);
+-	if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
++	if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
+		kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
+		s->ctor(object);
+		kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
+@@ -2717,9 +2766,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
+		stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
+	}
+
+-	if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
++	if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) {
++		size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++		BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
++		if (s->ctor)
++			s->ctor(object);
++		if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++			memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *));
++	} else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
+		memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
+
++	if (object) {
++		check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
++		set_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
++	}
++
+	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object);
+
+	return object;
+@@ -2926,6 +2987,27 @@ static __always_inline void do_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s,
+	void *tail_obj = tail ? : head;
+	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
+	unsigned long tid;
++	bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s);
++
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) {
++		__maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++		void *x = head;
++
++		while (1) {
++			check_canary(s, x, s->random_active);
++			set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive);
++
++			if (sanitize) {
++				memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset);
++				if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor)
++					s->ctor(x);
++			}
++			if (x == tail_obj)
++				break;
++			x = get_freepointer(s, x);
++		}
++	}
++
+ redo:
+	/*
+	 * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab.
+@@ -3104,7 +3186,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+			  void **p)
+ {
+	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
+-	int i;
++	int i, k;
+
+	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
+	s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
+@@ -3141,13 +3223,29 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
+	local_irq_enable();
+
+	/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
+-	if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
++	if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
++		int j;
++
++		for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++			size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *);
++			BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset));
++			if (s->ctor)
++				s->ctor(p[j]);
++			if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset)
++				memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *));
++		}
++	} else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
+		int j;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+			memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size);
+	}
+
++	for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
++		check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive);
++		set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active);
++	}
++
+	/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
+	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p);
+	return i;
+@@ -3179,9 +3277,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
+  * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
+  * take the list_lock.
+  */
+-static int slub_min_order;
+-static int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
+-static int slub_min_objects;
++static int slub_min_order __ro_after_init;
++static int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
++static int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init;
+
+ /*
+  * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
+@@ -3351,6 +3449,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
+	init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
+	init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
+ #endif
++	set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active);
+	kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	init_kmem_cache_node(n);
+@@ -3507,6 +3606,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
+		size += sizeof(void *);
+	}
+
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
++		size += sizeof(void *);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
+	if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
+		/*
+@@ -3577,6 +3679,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+	s->random = get_random_long();
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
++	s->random_active = get_random_long();
++	s->random_inactive = get_random_long();
++#endif
+
+	if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+		s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+@@ -3841,6 +3947,8 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+		offset -= s->red_left_pad;
+	}
+
++	check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active);
++
+	/* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
+	if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset)
+		return NULL;
+@@ -3859,7 +3967,11 @@ static size_t __ksize(const void *object)
+	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+
+	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
++		BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
++#else
+		WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page));
++#endif
+		return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page);
+	}
+
+@@ -4724,7 +4836,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type {
+ #define SO_TOTAL	(1 << SL_TOTAL)
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
+-static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
++static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON);
+
+ static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str)
+ {
+diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
+index a77d68f2c1b6..d1f1d75f4d1f 100644
+--- a/mm/swap.c
++++ b/mm/swap.c
+@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
+	if (!PageHuge(page))
+		__page_cache_release(page);
+	dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
++	if (!PageHuge(page))
++		BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page
++#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
++			&& dtor != free_transhuge_page
++#endif
++		);
++
+	(*dtor)(page);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
+index 6ca771f2f25b..6da2c9c3e6a5 100644
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -4095,7 +4095,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni);
+
+-static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void)
+ {
+	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
+
+@@ -5609,7 +5609,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll)
+	return work;
+ }
+
+-static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
++static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void)
+ {
+	struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
+	unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+index f48fe6fc7e8c..d78c52835c08 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
++++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2
+
+ config SYN_COOKIES
+	bool "IP: TCP syncookie support"
++	default y
+	---help---
+	  Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
+	  flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
+diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+index 54deaa1066cf..211f97bd5ee3 100644
+--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
++++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1;
+ static int warn_unresolved = 0;
+ /* How a symbol is exported */
+ static int sec_mismatch_count = 0;
++static int writable_fptr_count = 0;
+ static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1;
+ static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0;
+ /* ignore missing files */
+@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ enum mismatch {
+	ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT,
+	EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT,
+	EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
++	DATA_TO_TEXT
+ };
+
+ /**
+@@ -1091,6 +1093,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = {
+	.good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL},
+	.mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
+	.handler = extable_mismatch_handler,
++},
++/* Do not reference code from writable data */
++{
++	.fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL },
++	.bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL },
++	.mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT
+ }
+ };
+
+@@ -1240,10 +1248,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr,
+			continue;
+		if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION)
+			continue;
+-		if (sym->st_value == addr)
+-			return sym;
+		/* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */
+		d = sym->st_value - addr;
++		if (d == 0)
++			return sym;
+		if (d < 0)
+			d = addr - sym->st_value;
+		if (d < distance) {
+@@ -1402,7 +1410,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
+	char *prl_from;
+	char *prl_to;
+
+-	sec_mismatch_count++;
++	if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT)
++		writable_fptr_count++;
++	else
++		sec_mismatch_count++;
++
+	if (!sec_mismatch_verbose)
+		return;
+
+@@ -1526,6 +1538,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
+		fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, "
+		      "we should never get here.");
+		break;
++	case DATA_TO_TEXT:
++#if 0
++		fprintf(stderr,
++		"The %s %s:%s references\n"
++		"the %s %s:%s%s\n",
++		from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p);
++#endif
++		break;
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+@@ -2539,6 +2559,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+		}
+	}
+	free(buf.p);
++	if (writable_fptr_count) {
++		if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) {
++			warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n"
++			     "To see full details build your kernel with:\n"
++			     "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n",
++			     writable_fptr_count);
++		}
++	}
+
+	return err;
+ }
+diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
+index 87f2a6f842fd..7bdbb7edf5bf 100644
+--- a/security/Kconfig
++++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig
+
+ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+-	default n
++	default y
+	help
+	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+	  syslog via dmesg(8).
+@@ -18,10 +18,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
++config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
++	depends on PERF_EVENTS
++	default y
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
++	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
++	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
++	  changed.
++
++config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
++	default y
++	help
++	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
++	  into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
++	  ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
++
++	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
++	  unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
++
++	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
++
+ config SECURITY
+	bool "Enable different security models"
+	depends on SYSFS
+	depends on MULTIUSER
++	default y
+	help
+	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
+	  configured into your kernel.
+@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS
+ config SECURITY_NETWORK
+	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
+	depends on SECURITY
++	default y
+	help
+	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+@@ -155,6 +180,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+	select BUG
+	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
++	default y
+	help
+	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+@@ -178,10 +204,36 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
+ config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
++	default y
+	help
+	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
++config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING
++	bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows"
++	depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE
++	depends on EXPERT
++	help
++	  Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects
++	  for common C string functions rather than only between objects.
++
++	  This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding.
++
++config PAGE_SANITIZE
++	bool "Sanitize pages"
++	default y
++	help
++	  Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of
++	  sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs.
++
++config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY
++	bool "Verify sanitized pages"
++	depends on PAGE_SANITIZE
++	default y
++	help
++	  Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect
++	  write-after-free bugs.
++
+ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
+	help
+diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
+index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
++++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
+	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+	select NETWORK_SECMARK
+-	default n
++	default y
+	help
+	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+	  /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+	  tools such as avcstat.
+-
+-config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
+-	int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
+-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+-	range 0 1
+-	default 0
+-	help
+-	  This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
+-	  that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
+-	  by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
+-	  kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
+-	  mmap and mprotect calls.  If this option is set to 0 (zero),
+-	  SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
+-	  by the kernel.  If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
+-	  default to checking the protection requested by the application.
+-	  The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
+-	  'checkreqprot=' boot parameter.  It may also be changed at runtime
+-	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
+-
+-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
+diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+index 1649cd18eb0b..067f35559aa7 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
++++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+@@ -150,6 +150,6 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
+	u32	sid;	/* SID of pkey */
+ };
+
+-extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
++extern const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
+
+ #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
+diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+index 00eed842c491..8f7b8d7e6f91 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
++++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+@@ -41,16 +41,7 @@
+ #include "objsec.h"
+ #include "conditional.h"
+
+-unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+-
+-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+-{
+-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+-		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+-	return 1;
+-}
+-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
++const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
+
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
+
+@@ -610,10 +601,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+-	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
++	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value)
+		goto out;
+
+-	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	length = count;
+ out:
+	kfree(page);
+diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
+index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644
+--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
++++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ config SECURITY_YAMA
+	bool "Yama support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+-	default n
++	default y
+	help
+	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
+	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary

pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-4.14.nix

···
-{ stdenv, buildPackages, hostPlatform, fetchurl, perl, buildLinux, ... } @ args:
+{ stdenv, buildPackages, hostPlatform, fetchurl, perl, buildLinux, modDirVersionArg ? null, ... } @ args:
 
 with stdenv.lib;
 
 buildLinux (args // rec {
   version = "4.14.48";
+
+  # modDirVersion needs to be x.y.z, will automatically add .0 if needed
+  modDirVersion = if (modDirVersionArg == null) then concatStrings (intersperse "." (take 3 (splitString "." "${version}.0"))) else modDirVersionArg;
 
   # branchVersion needs to be x.y
   extraMeta.branch = concatStrings (intersperse "." (take 2 (splitString "." version)));

pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix

···
     patch = ./tag-hardened.patch;
   };
 
+  copperhead_4_14 = rec {
+    name = "copperhead-4.14";
+    patch = ./copperhead-4-14.patch;
+  };
+
   copperhead_4_16 = rec {
     name = "copperhead-4.16";
     patch = ./copperhead-4-16.patch;

pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix

···
       ];
   };
 
-  linux_copperhead_lts = callPackage ../os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix {
-    kernelPatches = with kernelPatches; [
-      bridge_stp_helper
-      modinst_arg_list_too_long
-      tag_hardened
-    ];
-  };
+  linux_copperhead_lts = (linux_4_14.override {
+    kernelPatches = linux_4_14.kernelPatches ++ [
+      kernelPatches.copperhead_4_14
+      kernelPatches.tag_hardened
+     ];
+    modDirVersionArg = linux_4_14.modDirVersion + "-hardened";
+  });
 
   linux_copperhead_stable = (linux_4_16.override {
     kernelPatches = linux_4_16.kernelPatches ++ [