pam_ssh_agent_auth: 0.9.5 -> 0.10.3

pkgs/os-specific/linux/pam_ssh_agent_auth/default.nix

···
 { stdenv, fetchurl, pam, openssl, perl }:
 
 stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
-  name = "pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.5";
+  name = "pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3";
 
   src = fetchurl {
     url = "mirror://sourceforge/pamsshagentauth/${name}.tar.bz2";
-    sha256 = "1aihfyj17nvqhf0d5i0dg2lsly3r24xjyx0sfqpf60s0libkp4y0";
+    sha256 = "0qx78x7nvqdscyp04hfijl4rgyf64xy03prr28hipvgasrcd6lrw";
   };
-
-  patches =
-    [ # Allow multiple colon-separated authorized keys files to be
-      # specified in the file= option.
-      ./multiple-key-files.patch
-    ];
 
   buildInputs = [ pam openssl perl ];
 

pkgs/os-specific/linux/pam_ssh_agent_auth/multiple-key-files.patch

···
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-12-17 19:29:16.014226336 +0000
-@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@
-     return cookie;
- }
- 
--int
-+const char *
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- {
-     Identity *id;
-     Key *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-     char *comment;
--    uint8_t retval = 0;
-+    const char *key_file = 0;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     session_id2 = pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen();
-@@ -90,13 +90,11 @@
-                 id->key = key;
-                 id->filename = comment;
-                 id->ac = ac;
--                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
--                    retval = 1;
--                }
-+                key_file = userauth_pubkey_from_id(id);
-                 pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
-                 pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
-                 pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
--                if(retval == 1)
-+                if(key_file)
-                     break;
-             }
-         }
-@@ -107,5 +105,5 @@
-     }
-     pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2);
-     EVP_cleanup();
--    return retval;
-+    return key_file;
- }
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h	2012-12-17 19:28:57.454334806 +0000
-@@ -31,6 +31,6 @@
- #ifndef _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
- #define _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
- 
--int pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
-+const char * pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
- 
- #endif
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-12-17 19:30:24.013830673 +0000
-@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
- 
- #define strncasecmp_literal(A,B) strncasecmp( A, B, sizeof(B) - 1)
- 
--char           *authorized_keys_file = NULL;
- uint8_t         allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file = 0;
- 
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
-@@ -161,15 +160,13 @@
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
- 
--    if(authorized_keys_file_input && user) {
--        /*
--         * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
--         */
--        parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
--    } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
--        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
--    }
-+    if (!authorized_keys_file_input || !user)
-+        authorized_keys_file_input = "/etc/security/authorized_keys";
-+
-+    /*
-+     * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
-+     */
-+    parse_authorized_key_files(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
- 
-     /* 
-      * PAM_USER and PAM_RUSER do not necessarily have to get set by the calling application, and we may be unable to divine the latter.
-@@ -177,16 +174,17 @@
-      */
- 
-     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
- 
-         /* 
-          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
-          */
--        if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        const char *key_file;
-+        if((key_file = pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid))) {
-+            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, key_file);
-             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-         } else {
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-         }
-     } else {
-         pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@
-     free(__progname);
- #endif
- 
--    free(authorized_keys_file);
-+    free_authorized_key_files();
- 
-     return retval;
- }
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod	2012-12-17 19:52:35.968965448 +0000
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
- 
- =item file=<path to authorized_keys>
- 
--Specify the path to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below) 
-+Specify the path(s) to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below). Paths are separated using colons.
- 
- =item allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file
- 
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2012-12-17 19:32:20.830157313 +0000
-@@ -79,66 +79,96 @@
- 
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
-+#include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
- 
--extern char    *authorized_keys_file;
-+#define MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES 16
-+
-+char           *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES];
-+unsigned int    nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
- extern uint8_t  allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file;
- uid_t           authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid;
- 
- void
--parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
-+parse_authorized_key_files(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
- {
--    char            fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
-+    const char      *pos = authorized_keys_file_input;
-     char            hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
--    char            auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
--    char           *slash_ptr = NULL;
--    char            owner_uname[128] = "";
--    size_t          owner_uname_len = 0;
--
--    /*
--     * temporary copy, so that both tilde expansion and percent expansion both get to apply to the path
--     */
--    strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_input, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
-+    char            fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
-+
-+#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
-+    *hostname = '\0';
-+    gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
-+    strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
-+#endif
- 
--    if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
--        authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
-+    while (pos) {
-+        const char     *colon = strchr(pos, ':');
-+        char            auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
-+        char           *slash_ptr = NULL;
-+        char            owner_uname[128] = "";
-+        size_t          owner_uname_len = 0;
-+
-+        strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, pos, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
-+        if (colon) {
-+            auth_keys_file_buf[colon - pos] = 0;
-+            pos = colon + 1;
-+        } else {
-+            pos = 0;
-+        }
- 
--    if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
--        if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
-+        if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
-             authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
-+
-+        if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
-+            if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
-+                authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
-+            }
-+            else {
-+                slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
-+                if(!slash_ptr)
-+                    pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
-+
-+                owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-+                if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) ) 
-+                    pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-+
-+                strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-+                if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-+                    authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-+            }
-+            char *tmp = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-+            strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, tmp, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
-+            pamsshagentauth_xfree(tmp);
-         }
--        else {
--            slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
--            if(!slash_ptr)
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
--
--            owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
--            if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) ) 
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
--
--            strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
--            if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
--                authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-+
-+        if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
-+            authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
-         }
--        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
--        strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
--    }
- 
--    if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
--        authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
-+        if (nr_authorized_keys_files >= MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES)
-+            pamsshagentauth_fatal("Too many authorized key files");
-+        authorized_keys_files[nr_authorized_keys_files++] =
-+            pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
-     }
-+}
- 
--#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
--    *hostname = '\0';
--    gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
--    strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
--#endif
--    authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
-+void
-+free_authorized_key_files()
-+{
-+    unsigned int n;
-+    for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++)
-+        free(authorized_keys_files[n]);
-+    nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
- }
- 
--int
-+const char *
- pam_user_key_allowed(Key * key)
- {
--    return pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_file)
--        || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file);
-+    unsigned int n;
-+    for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++) {
-+        if (pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_files[n])
-+            || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_files[n]))
-+            return authorized_keys_files[n];
-+    }
-+    return 0;
- }
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2012-12-17 19:24:34.477894517 +0000
-@@ -28,11 +28,12 @@
-  */
- 
- 
--#ifndef _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
--#define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
-+#ifndef _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
-+#define _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
--void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
-+const char * pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
-+void parse_authorized_key_files(const char *, const char *);
-+void free_authorized_key_files();
- 
- #endif
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2012-12-17 19:27:30.813843933 +0000
-@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
- extern u_char  *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
- 
--int
-+const char *
- userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
- {
-     Buffer          b = { 0 };
-@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@
-     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
-     u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
-     int             authenticated = 0;
-+    const char     *key_file;
- 
-     pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
- 
-     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
--    if(! pam_user_key_allowed(id->key))
-+    if(!(key_file = pam_user_key_allowed(id->key)))
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
-@@ -96,5 +97,5 @@
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
-         pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
--    return authenticated;
-+    return authenticated ? key_file : 0;
- }
-diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2012-12-17 19:25:54.893412987 +0000
-@@ -32,6 +32,6 @@
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- 
- #include <identity.h>
--int userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
-+const char * userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
- 
- #endif