feat: Implement production-ready OAuth authentication system with security hardening
This commit implements a complete, secure OAuth 2.0 + atProto authentication system
for Coves, including comprehensive security fixes based on code review.
## ๐ Core Features
### OAuth 2.0 + atProto Authentication
- **DPoP Token Binding (RFC 9449)**: Each session has unique cryptographic key
- **PKCE (RFC 7636)**: S256 challenge method prevents code interception
- **PAR (RFC 9126)**: Pre-registration of authorization requests
- **Complete OAuth Flow**: Login โ Authorize โ Callback โ Session Management
### Implementation Architecture
- **Handlers**: [internal/api/handlers/oauth/](internal/api/handlers/oauth/)
- `login.go` - Initiates OAuth flow with handle resolution
- `callback.go` - Processes authorization code and creates session
- `logout.go` - Session termination
- `metadata.go` - RFC 7591 client metadata endpoint
- `jwks.go` - Public key exposure (JWK Set)
- **OAuth Client**: [internal/atproto/oauth/](internal/atproto/oauth/)
- `client.go` - OAuth HTTP client with PAR, token exchange, refresh
- `dpop.go` - DPoP proof generation (ES256 signatures)
- `pkce.go` - PKCE challenge generation
- **Session Management**: [internal/core/oauth/](internal/core/oauth/)
- `session.go` - OAuth data models (OAuthRequest, OAuthSession)
- `repository.go` - PostgreSQL storage with atomic operations
- `auth_service.go` - Authentication business logic
- **Middleware**: [internal/api/middleware/auth.go](internal/api/middleware/auth.go)
- `RequireAuth` - Enforces authentication
- `OptionalAuth` - Loads user context if available
- Automatic token refresh (< 5 min to expiry)
### Database Schema
- **oauth_requests**: Temporary state during authorization flow (10-min TTL)
- **oauth_sessions**: Long-lived authenticated sessions
- **Indexes**: Performance optimizations for session queries
- **Auto-cleanup**: Trigger-based expiration handling
### DPoP Transport
- **HTTP RoundTripper**: [internal/atproto/xrpc/dpop_transport.go](internal/atproto/xrpc/dpop_transport.go)
- Automatic DPoP proof injection on all requests
- Nonce rotation handling (automatic retry on 401)
- PDS and auth server nonce tracking
## ๐ Security Features (PR Review Hardening)
### Critical Security Fixes
โ
**CSRF/Replay Protection**: Atomic `GetAndDeleteRequest()` prevents state reuse
โ
**Cookie Secret Validation**: Enforced minimum 32 bytes for session security
โ
**Error Sanitization**: No internal error details exposed to users
โ
**HTTPS Enforcement**: Production-only HTTPS cookies with explicit localhost checks
โ
**Clean Architecture**: Business logic extracted to `AuthService` layer
### Additional Security Measures
โ
**No Token Leakage**: Never log response bodies containing credentials
โ
**Race-Free**: Fixed concurrent access to DPoP nonces with proper mutex handling
โ
**Input Validation**: Handle format checking, state parameter verification
โ
**Session Isolation**: One active session per DID (upgradeable to multiple)
โ
**Automatic Cleanup**: Hourly background job removes expired sessions/requests
### Token Binding & Proof-of-Possession
- Each session generates unique ES256 key pair
- Access tokens cryptographically bound to client
- DPoP proofs include:
- JWK header (public key)
- HTTP method and URL (prevents token replay)
- Access token hash (`ath` claim)
- JTI (unique token ID)
- Server nonce (when required)
## ๐ฏ Configuration & Setup
### Environment Variables
```bash
# OAuth Configuration (.env.dev)
OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK=base64:... # Client private key (ES256)
OAUTH_COOKIE_SECRET=... # Session cookie secret (min 32 bytes)
APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8081
```
### Base64 Encoding Support
- Helper: `GetEnvBase64OrPlain()` supports both plain and base64-encoded values
- Prevents shell escaping issues with JSON in environment variables
- Format: `OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK=base64:eyJhbGci...` or plain JSON
### Cookie Store Singleton
- Global singleton initialized at startup: `oauth.InitCookieStore(secret)`
- Shared across all handlers for consistent session management
- Validates secret length on initialization
### Database Migration
```sql
-- Migration 003: OAuth tables
-- Migration 004: Performance indexes
```
## ๐ Code Quality & Testing
### Test Coverage
- `env_test.go` - Base64 environment variable handling (8 test cases)
- `dpop_test.go` - DPoP proof structure validation
- `oauth_test.go` - Integration tests for OAuth endpoints
### Linter Compliance
- Fixed errcheck violations (defer close, error handling)
- Formatted with gofmt
- Added nolint directives where appropriate
### Constants & Configuration
- [constants.go](internal/api/handlers/oauth/constants.go) - Named configuration values
- `SessionMaxAge = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60`
- `TokenRefreshThreshold = 5 * time.Minute`
- `MinCookieSecretLength = 32`
## ๐ Implementation Decisions
### Custom OAuth vs Indigo Library
- **Decision**: Implement custom OAuth client
- **Rationale**: Indigo OAuth library explicitly unstable; custom implementation gives full control over edge cases and nonce retry logic
- **Future**: Migrate when indigo reaches stable v1.0
### Session Storage
- **Decision**: PostgreSQL with one session per DID
- **Rationale**: Simple for initial implementation, easy to upgrade to multiple sessions later, transaction support
### DPoP Key Management
- **Decision**: Unique key per session, stored in database
- **Rationale**: RFC 9449 compliance, token binding security, survives server restarts
## ๐ Performance Optimizations
- `idx_oauth_sessions_did_expires` - Fast session expiry queries
- Partial index for active sessions (`WHERE expires_at > NOW()`)
- Hourly cleanup prevents table bloat
- Cookie store singleton reduces memory allocations
## โ
Production Readiness
### Real-World Validation
โ
Successfully tested with live PDS: `https://pds.bretton.dev`
โ
Handle resolution: `bretton.dev` โ DID โ PDS discovery
โ
Complete authorization flow with DPoP nonce retry
โ
Session storage and retrieval validated
โ
Token refresh logic confirmed working
### Security Checklist
โ
DPoP token binding prevents theft/replay
โ
PKCE prevents authorization code interception
โ
PAR reduces attack surface
โ
Atomic state operations prevent CSRF
โ
HTTP-only, secure, SameSite cookies
โ
Private keys never exposed in public endpoints
โ
Automatic token expiration (60 min access, ~90 day refresh)
## ๐ฆ Files Changed
- **27 files**: 3,130 additions, 1 deletion
- **New packages**: oauth handlers, OAuth client, auth middleware
- **New migrations**: OAuth tables + indexes
- **Updated**: main.go (OAuth initialization), .env.dev (configuration docs)
๐ค Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>