diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c index 6569048a8c1c..a787409f5a62 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c @@ -754,13 +754,11 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) x86_pmu_enable_event(event); } -static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +static void __amd_pmu_enable_all(void) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); int idx; - amd_brs_enable_all(); - for_each_set_bit(idx, x86_pmu.cntr_mask, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) { /* only activate events which are marked as active */ if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) @@ -775,6 +773,12 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) } } +static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +{ + amd_brs_enable_all(); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); +} + static void amd_pmu_v2_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) { struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; @@ -1561,7 +1565,7 @@ static inline void amd_pmu_reload_virt(void) * set global enable bits once again */ amd_pmu_v2_disable_all(); - amd_pmu_enable_all(0); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); amd_pmu_v2_enable_all(0); return; } -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 5948aaf64f81f217a25dcc2bf6c0779bca19566c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lee Jia Jie Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 21:56:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range() map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event. Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 ===== ===== rb_alloc_aux() map_range() [1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0] [2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++ [3]: perf_mmap_to_page() returns rb->aux_pages[0] [4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP [5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1 munmap the page [6]: free rb->aux_pages[0] Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a mapping to a freed physical frame. Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range(). Fixes: b709eb872e19 ("perf: map pages in advance") Signed-off-by: Lee Jia Jie Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Namhyung Kim --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index d7f3e2c2ecb1..ba5bd6a78fe7 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -7150,6 +7150,8 @@ static int map_range(struct perf_buffer *rb, struct vm_area_struct *vma) int err = 0; unsigned long pagenum; + guard(mutex)(&rb->aux_mutex); + /* * We map this as a VM_PFNMAP VMA. * -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 2a892294b83f541115c94b0bb637f39bef187657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sandipan Das Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 16:15:27 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g. $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \ perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' ... 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH ... The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. Fixes: f4f925dae741 ("perf/x86/amd/lbr: Add LbrExtV2 hardware branch filter support") Reported-by: Ian Rogers Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://patch.msgid.link/a898a29725f6b2f30518354cdc2e432db66c43cf.1783680119.git.sandipan.das@amd.com --- arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c index 5b437dc8e4ce..9d9c961989d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c @@ -127,7 +127,8 @@ static void amd_pmu_lbr_filter(void) } /* If type does not correspond, then discard */ - if (type == X86_BR_NONE || (br_sel & type) != type) { + if (type == X86_BR_NONE || (br_sel & type) != type || + (!(br_sel & X86_BR_KERNEL) && kernel_ip(cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from))) { cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from = 0; /* mark invalid */ compress = true; } -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 47915e855fb38b42133e31ba917d99565f862154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sandipan Das Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 22:04:49 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g. $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \ perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' ... 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//- ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. Fixes: 8910075d61a3 ("perf/x86/amd: Enable branch sampling priv level filtering") Reported-by: Sashiko Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f05931c4f89a146c364bd5dc6b8170b1ac611c65.1783701239.git.sandipan.das@amd.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260710110235.F3FD81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ --- arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c index 06f35a6b58a5..dc564688f3d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c @@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ void amd_brs_disable_all(void) amd_brs_disable(); } -static bool amd_brs_match_plm(struct perf_event *event, u64 to) +static bool amd_brs_match_plm(struct perf_event *event, u64 from, u64 to) { int type = event->attr.branch_sample_type; int plm_k = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL | PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HV; int plm_u = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER; - if (!(type & plm_k) && kernel_ip(to)) + if (!(type & plm_k) && (kernel_ip(to) || kernel_ip(from))) return 0; if (!(type & plm_u) && !kernel_ip(to)) @@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ void amd_brs_drain(void) */ to = (u64)(((s64)to << shift) >> shift); - if (!amd_brs_match_plm(event, to)) - continue; - rdmsrq(brs_from(brs_idx), from); + if (!amd_brs_match_plm(event, from, to)) + continue; + perf_clear_branch_entry_bitfields(br+nr); br[nr].from = from;