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Linux kernel mirror (for testing) git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
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#include <linux/array_size.h>#include <linux/minmax.h>#include <vdso/datapage.h>#include <vdso/getrandom.h>#include <vdso/limits.h>#include <vdso/unaligned.h>#include <asm/barrier.h>#include <asm/vdso/getrandom.h>#include <uapi/linux/errno.h>#include <uapi/linux/mman.h>#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
/* Bring in default accessors */#include <vdso/vsyscall.h>
#undef PAGE_SIZE#undef PAGE_MASK#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << CONFIG_PAGE_SHIFT)#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1))
#define MEMCPY_AND_ZERO_SRC(type, dst, src, len) do { \ while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \ __put_unaligned_t(type, __get_unaligned_t(type, src), dst); \ __put_unaligned_t(type, 0, src); \ dst += sizeof(type); \ src += sizeof(type); \ len -= sizeof(type); \ } \} while (0)
static void memcpy_and_zero_src(void *dst, void *src, size_t len){ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT)) MEMCPY_AND_ZERO_SRC(u64, dst, src, len); MEMCPY_AND_ZERO_SRC(u32, dst, src, len); MEMCPY_AND_ZERO_SRC(u16, dst, src, len); } MEMCPY_AND_ZERO_SRC(u8, dst, src, len);}
/** * __cvdso_getrandom_data - Generic vDSO implementation of getrandom() syscall. * @rng_info: Describes state of kernel RNG, memory shared with kernel. * @buffer: Destination buffer to fill with random bytes. * @len: Size of @buffer in bytes. * @flags: Zero or more GRND_* flags. * @opaque_state: Pointer to an opaque state area. * @opaque_len: Length of opaque state area. * * This implements a "fast key erasure" RNG using ChaCha20, in the same way that the kernel's * getrandom() syscall does. It periodically reseeds its key from the kernel's RNG, at the same * schedule that the kernel's RNG is reseeded. If the kernel's RNG is not ready, then this always * calls into the syscall. * * If @buffer, @len, and @flags are 0, and @opaque_len is ~0UL, then @opaque_state is populated * with a struct vgetrandom_opaque_params and the function returns 0; if it does not return 0, * this function should not be used. * * @opaque_state *must* be allocated by calling mmap(2) using the mmap_prot and mmap_flags fields * from the struct vgetrandom_opaque_params, and states must not straddle pages. Unless external * locking is used, one state must be allocated per thread, as it is not safe to call this function * concurrently with the same @opaque_state. However, it is safe to call this using the same * @opaque_state that is shared between main code and signal handling code, within the same thread. * * Returns: The number of random bytes written to @buffer, or a negative value indicating an error. */static __always_inline ssize_t__cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state, size_t opaque_len){ ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, INT_MAX & PAGE_MASK /* = MAX_RW_COUNT */, len); struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state; size_t batch_len, nblocks, orig_len = len; bool in_use, have_retried = false; void *orig_buffer = buffer; u64 current_generation; u32 counter[2] = { 0 };
if (unlikely(opaque_len == ~0UL && !buffer && !len && !flags)) { struct vgetrandom_opaque_params *params = opaque_state; params->size_of_opaque_state = sizeof(*state); params->mmap_prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; params->mmap_flags = MAP_DROPPABLE | MAP_ANONYMOUS; for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(params->reserved); ++i) params->reserved[i] = 0; return 0; }
/* The state must not straddle a page, since pages can be zeroed at any time. */ if (unlikely(((unsigned long)opaque_state & ~PAGE_MASK) + sizeof(*state) > PAGE_SIZE)) return -EFAULT;
/* Handle unexpected flags by falling back to the kernel. */ if (unlikely(flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))) goto fallback_syscall;
/* If the caller passes the wrong size, which might happen due to CRIU, fallback. */ if (unlikely(opaque_len != sizeof(*state))) goto fallback_syscall;
/* * If the kernel's RNG is not yet ready, then it's not possible to provide random bytes from * userspace, because A) the various @flags require this to block, or not, depending on * various factors unavailable to userspace, and B) the kernel's behavior before the RNG is * ready is to reseed from the entropy pool at every invocation. */ if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(rng_info->is_ready))) goto fallback_syscall;
/* * This condition is checked after @rng_info->is_ready, because before the kernel's RNG is * initialized, the @flags parameter may require this to block or return an error, even when * len is zero. */ if (unlikely(!len)) return 0;
/* * @state->in_use is basic reentrancy protection against this running in a signal handler * with the same @opaque_state, but obviously not atomic wrt multiple CPUs or more than one * level of reentrancy. If a signal interrupts this after reading @state->in_use, but before * writing @state->in_use, there is still no race, because the signal handler will run to * its completion before returning execution. */ in_use = READ_ONCE(state->in_use); if (unlikely(in_use)) /* The syscall simply fills the buffer and does not touch @state, so fallback. */ goto fallback_syscall; WRITE_ONCE(state->in_use, true);
retry_generation: /* * @rng_info->generation must always be read here, as it serializes @state->key with the * kernel's RNG reseeding schedule. */ current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);
/* * If @state->generation doesn't match the kernel RNG's generation, then it means the * kernel's RNG has reseeded, and so @state->key is reseeded as well. */ if (unlikely(state->generation != current_generation)) { /* * Write the generation before filling the key, in case of fork. If there is a fork * just after this line, the parent and child will get different random bytes from * the syscall, which is good. However, were this line to occur after the getrandom * syscall, then both child and parent could have the same bytes and the same * generation counter, so the fork would not be detected. Therefore, write * @state->generation before the call to the getrandom syscall. */ WRITE_ONCE(state->generation, current_generation);
/* * Prevent the syscall from being reordered wrt current_generation. Pairs with the * smp_store_release(&vdso_k_rng_data->generation) in random.c. */ smp_rmb();
/* Reseed @state->key using fresh bytes from the kernel. */ if (getrandom_syscall(state->key, sizeof(state->key), 0) != sizeof(state->key)) { /* * If the syscall failed to refresh the key, then @state->key is now * invalid, so invalidate the generation so that it is not used again, and * fallback to using the syscall entirely. */ WRITE_ONCE(state->generation, 0);
/* * Set @state->in_use to false only after the last write to @state in the * line above. */ WRITE_ONCE(state->in_use, false);
goto fallback_syscall; }
/* * Set @state->pos to beyond the end of the batch, so that the batch is refilled * using the new key. */ state->pos = sizeof(state->batch); }
/* Set len to the total amount of bytes that this function is allowed to read, ret. */ len = ret;more_batch: /* * First use bytes out of @state->batch, which may have been filled by the last call to this * function. */ batch_len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(state->batch) - state->pos, len); if (batch_len) { /* Zeroing at the same time as memcpying helps preserve forward secrecy. */ memcpy_and_zero_src(buffer, state->batch + state->pos, batch_len); state->pos += batch_len; buffer += batch_len; len -= batch_len; }
if (!len) { /* Prevent the loop from being reordered wrt ->generation. */ barrier();
/* * Since @rng_info->generation will never be 0, re-read @state->generation, rather * than using the local current_generation variable, to learn whether a fork * occurred or if @state was zeroed due to memory pressure. Primarily, though, this * indicates whether the kernel's RNG has reseeded, in which case generate a new key * and start over. */ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation))) { /* * Prevent this from looping forever in case of low memory or racing with a * user force-reseeding the kernel's RNG using the ioctl. */ if (have_retried) { WRITE_ONCE(state->in_use, false); goto fallback_syscall; }
have_retried = true; buffer = orig_buffer; goto retry_generation; }
/* * Set @state->in_use to false only when there will be no more reads or writes of * @state. */ WRITE_ONCE(state->in_use, false); return ret; }
/* Generate blocks of RNG output directly into @buffer while there's enough room left. */ nblocks = len / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; if (nblocks) { __arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack(buffer, state->key, counter, nblocks); buffer += nblocks * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= nblocks * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; }
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(state->batch_key) % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
/* Refill the batch and overwrite the key, in order to preserve forward secrecy. */ __arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack(state->batch_key, state->key, counter, sizeof(state->batch_key) / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Since the batch was just refilled, set the position back to 0 to indicate a full batch. */ state->pos = 0; goto more_batch;
fallback_syscall: return getrandom_syscall(orig_buffer, orig_len, flags);}
static __always_inline ssize_t__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state, size_t opaque_len){ return __cvdso_getrandom_data(__arch_get_vdso_u_rng_data(), buffer, len, flags, opaque_state, opaque_len);}