diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/xmit_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/xmit_linux.c index d5bb1c7932fc..4260ed5f4e97 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/xmit_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/xmit_linux.c @@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ void _rtw_open_pktfile(struct sk_buff *pktptr, struct pkt_file *pfile) int _rtw_pktfile_read(struct pkt_file *pfile, u8 *rmem, unsigned int rlen) { int ret; + unsigned int remain = rtw_remainder_len(pfile); - if (rtw_remainder_len(pfile) < rlen) - return -EINVAL; + /* clamp to bytes remaining; the coalesce loop relies on short reads */ + if (rlen > remain) + rlen = remain; if (rmem) { ret = skb_copy_bits(pfile->pkt, pfile->buf_len - pfile->pkt_len, rmem, rlen); -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 9f32f38265014fac7f5dc9490fb01a638ce6e121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Tautschnig Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:47:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 Fixes: f00a86d98a1e ("Staging: vme: add VME userspace driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Michael Tautschnig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618114709.72499-1-tautschn@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c index 11e25c2f6b0a..a472a38ef613 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c @@ -156,6 +156,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, { void *image_ptr; + /* + * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf + * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf. + * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the + * subtraction below cannot wrap. + */ + if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf) + return 0; + if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos) + count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos; + image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos; if (copy_to_user(buf, image_ptr, (unsigned long)count)) return -EFAULT; @@ -168,6 +179,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf, { void *image_ptr; + /* + * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf + * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf. + * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the + * subtraction below cannot wrap. + */ + if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf) + return 0; + if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos) + count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos; + image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos; if (copy_from_user(image_ptr, buf, (unsigned long)count)) return -EFAULT; -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From e8422d89e8af41d87f0e9db564be8e2634f4c602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao-Qun Huang Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 14:58:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in fake bridge fake_init() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into fake_bridge->lm_resources. The init error path frees this list, but fake_exit() only frees the slave and master resource lists. Loading and unloading the module therefore triggers a kmemleak warning: unreferenced object 0xffff8b8b82aebe40 (size 64): comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294894572 backtrace (crc c1e013ef): kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0x90 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x338/0x430 0xffffffffc0602246 do_one_initcall+0x4f/0x320 do_init_module+0x68/0x270 load_module+0x2a3b/0x2d90 Free the lm_resources list in fake_exit() as well, before fake_bridge is freed. Fixes: 658bcdae9c67 ("vme: Adding Fake VME driver") Cc: stable Cc: Martyn Welch Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-1-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c index 8abaa3165fbb..434cf760ade6 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c @@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ static void __exit fake_exit(void) { struct list_head *pos = NULL; struct list_head *tmplist; + struct vme_lm_resource *lm; struct vme_master_resource *master_image; struct vme_slave_resource *slave_image; int i; @@ -1268,6 +1269,13 @@ static void __exit fake_exit(void) vme_unregister_bridge(fake_bridge); fake_crcsr_exit(fake_bridge); + /* resources are stored in link list */ + list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &fake_bridge->lm_resources) { + lm = list_entry(pos, struct vme_lm_resource, list); + list_del(pos); + kfree(lm); + } + /* resources are stored in link list */ list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &fake_bridge->slave_resources) { slave_image = list_entry(pos, struct vme_slave_resource, list); -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 151edde741f8bc7f2931c5f44ab376d32b0c8beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao-Qun Huang Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 14:58:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in tsi148 bridge tsi148_probe() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into tsi148_bridge->lm_resources. The probe error path frees this list, but tsi148_remove() only frees the dma, slave and master resource lists, so the location monitor resource is leaked on device unbind or module unload. Free the lm_resources list in tsi148_remove() as well, before tsi148_bridge is freed. Fixes: d22b8ed9a3b0 ("Staging: vme: add Tundra TSI148 VME-PCI Bridge driver") Cc: stable Cc: Martyn Welch Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-2-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c index 4cf3486646ce..c695ad9b4ca2 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c @@ -2534,6 +2534,7 @@ static void tsi148_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct list_head *pos = NULL; struct list_head *tmplist; + struct vme_lm_resource *lm; struct vme_master_resource *master_image; struct vme_slave_resource *slave_image; struct vme_dma_resource *dma_ctrlr; @@ -2590,6 +2591,13 @@ static void tsi148_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) tsi148_crcsr_exit(tsi148_bridge, pdev); + /* resources are stored in link list */ + list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &tsi148_bridge->lm_resources) { + lm = list_entry(pos, struct vme_lm_resource, list); + list_del(pos); + kfree(lm); + } + /* resources are stored in link list */ list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &tsi148_bridge->dma_resources) { dma_ctrlr = list_entry(pos, struct vme_dma_resource, list); -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:46:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index a86d6f97cf02..7198be795000 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) if ((pmlmeinfo->state&0x03) != WIFI_FW_AP_STATE) return _FAIL; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN) + return _FAIL; + sa = GetAddr2Ptr(pframe); auth_mode = psecuritypriv->dot11AuthAlgrthm; @@ -688,6 +691,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) prxattrib->hdrlen = WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN; prxattrib->encrypt = _WEP40_; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 8) + return _FAIL; + iv = pframe+prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = ((iv[3]>>6)&0x3); @@ -787,7 +793,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len, len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4); - if (!p || ie_len <= 0) { + if (!p || ie_len != 128) { status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL; goto auth_fail; } -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index 1d37c2d5b10d..b355d8a3ceab 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -1262,7 +1262,11 @@ void update_beacon_info(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pframe, uint pkt_len, stru len = pkt_len - (_BEACON_IE_OFFSET_ + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN); for (i = 0; i < len;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > len) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pframe + (_BEACON_IE_OFFSET_ + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN) + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > len) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: @@ -1287,7 +1291,7 @@ void update_beacon_info(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pframe, uint pkt_len, stru break; } - i += (pIE->length + 2); + i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length; } } -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From ef61d628dfad38fead1fd2e08979ae9126d011d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-3-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index 7198be795000..70e864cd530d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -2861,7 +2861,11 @@ void issue_assocreq(struct adapter *padapter) /* vendor specific IE, such as WPA, WMM, WPS */ for (i = sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie); i < pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pmlmeinfo->network.ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: @@ -5189,7 +5193,11 @@ u8 join_cmd_hdl(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pbuf) /* sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie) */ for (i = _FIXED_IE_LENGTH_; i < pnetwork->ie_length;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pnetwork->ie_length) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pnetwork->ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pnetwork->ie_length) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:/* Get WMM IE. */ -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 5a752a616e756844388a1a45404db9fc29fec655 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-4-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c index 1484336d7551..6a97afd89dc7 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c @@ -1446,6 +1446,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pie, size_t iel pwpa = rtw_get_wpa_ie(buf, &wpa_ielen, ielen); if (pwpa && wpa_ielen > 0) { + if (wpa_ielen + 2 > sizeof(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } if (rtw_parse_wpa_ie(pwpa, wpa_ielen + 2, &group_cipher, &pairwise_cipher, NULL) == _SUCCESS) { padapter->securitypriv.dot11AuthAlgrthm = dot11AuthAlgrthm_8021X; padapter->securitypriv.ndisauthtype = Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK; @@ -1455,6 +1459,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pie, size_t iel pwpa2 = rtw_get_wpa2_ie(buf, &wpa2_ielen, ielen); if (pwpa2 && wpa2_ielen > 0) { + if (wpa2_ielen + 2 > sizeof(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } if (rtw_parse_wpa2_ie(pwpa2, wpa2_ielen + 2, &group_cipher, &pairwise_cipher, NULL) == _SUCCESS) { padapter->securitypriv.dot11AuthAlgrthm = dot11AuthAlgrthm_8021X; padapter->securitypriv.ndisauthtype = Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK; -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-5-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index b355d8a3ceab..4c0eb93f412e 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -909,7 +909,8 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE) pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1; - for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < umin(pIE->length, + sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap)); i++) { if (i != 2) { /* Commented by Albert 2010/07/12 */ /* Got the endian issue here. */ -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From f9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index 70e864cd530d..a443b3530fb9 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -1371,7 +1371,11 @@ unsigned int OnAssocRsp(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) /* to handle HT, WMM, rate adaptive, update MAC reg */ /* for not to handle the synchronous IO in the tasklet */ for (i = (6 + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN); i < pkt_len;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pkt_len) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pframe + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pkt_len) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 3bf39f711ff27c64be8680a8938bcc5001982e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload: - pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the buffer causes an OOB read. - For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12, which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement is checked. Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the pattern established in update_beacon_info(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-7-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index 4c0eb93f412e..a4de538722b5 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -1308,15 +1308,23 @@ unsigned int is_ap_in_tkip(struct adapter *padapter) for (i = sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie); i < pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length;) { pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pmlmeinfo->network.ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; + switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: - if ((!memcmp(pIE->data, RTW_WPA_OUI, 4)) && (!memcmp((pIE->data + 12), WPA_TKIP_CIPHER, 4))) + if (pIE->length >= 16 && + !memcmp(pIE->data, RTW_WPA_OUI, 4) && + !memcmp((pIE->data + 12), WPA_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) return true; break; case WLAN_EID_RSN: - if (!memcmp((pIE->data + 8), RSN_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) + if (pIE->length >= 12 && + !memcmp((pIE->data + 8), RSN_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) return true; break; @@ -1324,7 +1332,7 @@ unsigned int is_ap_in_tkip(struct adapter *padapter) break; } - i += (pIE->length + 2); + i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length; } return false; -- knotmirror 0.0.1 From 1463ca3ec6601cbb097d8d87dbf5dcf1cb86a344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr() Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks. rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie() compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least 6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain. rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer. Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-8-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c index d0bbe1bb979c..54f805a6b5ce 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c @@ -583,9 +583,14 @@ int rtw_get_wapi_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *wapi_ie, u16 *wapi_len) cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); while (cnt < in_len) { + if (cnt + 2 > in_len) + break; + if (cnt + 2 + in_ie[cnt + 1] > in_len) + break; authmode = in_ie[cnt]; if (authmode == WLAN_EID_BSS_AC_ACCESS_DELAY && + in_ie[cnt + 1] >= 8 && (!memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 6], wapi_oui1, 4) || !memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 6], wapi_oui2, 4))) { if (wapi_ie) @@ -615,9 +620,14 @@ void rtw_get_sec_ie(u8 *in_ie, uint in_len, u8 *rsn_ie, u16 *rsn_len, u8 *wpa_ie cnt = (_TIMESTAMP_ + _BEACON_ITERVAL_ + _CAPABILITY_); while (cnt < in_len) { + if (cnt + 2 > in_len) + break; + if (cnt + 2 + in_ie[cnt + 1] > in_len) + break; authmode = in_ie[cnt]; if ((authmode == WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) && + in_ie[cnt + 1] >= 4 && (!memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], &wpa_oui[0], 4))) { if (wpa_ie) memcpy(wpa_ie, &in_ie[cnt], in_ie[cnt + 1] + 2); @@ -698,6 +708,9 @@ u8 *rtw_get_wps_attr(u8 *wps_ie, uint wps_ielen, u16 target_attr_id, u8 *buf_att if (len_attr) *len_attr = 0; + if (wps_ielen < 6) + return attr_ptr; + if ((wps_ie[0] != WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) || (memcmp(wps_ie + 2, wps_oui, 4))) { return attr_ptr; @@ -708,6 +721,8 @@ u8 *rtw_get_wps_attr(u8 *wps_ie, uint wps_ielen, u16 target_attr_id, u8 *buf_att while (attr_ptr - wps_ie < wps_ielen) { /* 4 = 2(Attribute ID) + 2(Length) */ + if (attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen) + break; u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr); u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2); u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;