Linux kernel mirror (for testing)
git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel
os
linux
1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2#ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
3#define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
4
5#include <linux/const.h>
6
7#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable
8#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
9
10void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
11void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
12void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");
13void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
14void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
15void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
16
17#define __compiletime_strlen(p) \
18({ \
19 unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p); \
20 size_t __ret = (size_t)-1; \
21 size_t __p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); \
22 if (__p_size != (size_t)-1) { \
23 size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1; \
24 if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) && \
25 __p[__p_len] == '\0') \
26 __ret = __builtin_strlen(__p); \
27 } \
28 __ret; \
29})
30
31#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
32extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
33extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
34extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
35extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
36extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
37extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
38extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
39extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
40extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
41extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
42#else
43#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr
44#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp
45#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy
46#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove
47#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
48#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat
49#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy
50#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen
51#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat
52#define __underlying_strncpy __builtin_strncpy
53#endif
54
55/*
56 * Clang's use of __builtin_object_size() within inlines needs hinting via
57 * __pass_object_size(). The preference is to only ever use type 1 (member
58 * size, rather than struct size), but there remain some stragglers using
59 * type 0 that will be converted in the future.
60 */
61#define POS __pass_object_size(1)
62#define POS0 __pass_object_size(0)
63
64__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncpy, 1, 2, 3)
65char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
66{
67 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
68
69 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
70 __write_overflow();
71 if (p_size < size)
72 fortify_panic(__func__);
73 return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
74}
75
76__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
77char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
78{
79 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
80
81 if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
82 return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
83 if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
84 fortify_panic(__func__);
85 return p;
86}
87
88extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
89__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
90{
91 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
92 size_t p_len = __compiletime_strlen(p);
93 size_t ret;
94
95 /* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */
96 if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != (size_t)-1) {
97 /* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */
98 if (maxlen >= p_size)
99 return p_len;
100 }
101
102 /* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
103 ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
104 if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
105 fortify_panic(__func__);
106 return ret;
107}
108
109/*
110 * Defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it. However, it must still be
111 * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in
112 * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression).
113 */
114#define strlen(p) \
115 __builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)), \
116 __builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))
117__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strlen, 1)
118__kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
119{
120 __kernel_size_t ret;
121 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
122
123 /* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */
124 if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
125 return __underlying_strlen(p);
126 ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
127 if (p_size <= ret)
128 fortify_panic(__func__);
129 return ret;
130}
131
132/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
133extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
134__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
135{
136 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
137 size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
138 size_t q_len; /* Full count of source string length. */
139 size_t len; /* Count of characters going into destination. */
140
141 if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
142 return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
143 q_len = strlen(q);
144 len = (q_len >= size) ? size - 1 : q_len;
145 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && __builtin_constant_p(q_len) && size) {
146 /* Write size is always larger than destination. */
147 if (len >= p_size)
148 __write_overflow();
149 }
150 if (size) {
151 if (len >= p_size)
152 fortify_panic(__func__);
153 __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
154 p[len] = '\0';
155 }
156 return q_len;
157}
158
159/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
160extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
161__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
162{
163 size_t len;
164 /* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */
165 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
166 size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
167
168 /* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
169 if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1)
170 return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
171
172 /*
173 * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than
174 * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error.
175 */
176 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && size > p_size)
177 __write_overflow();
178
179 /*
180 * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
181 * length if it smaller than size.
182 */
183 len = strnlen(q, size);
184 /*
185 * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to
186 * -E2BIG being returned.
187 * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'.
188 */
189 len = len == size ? size : len + 1;
190
191 /*
192 * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
193 * p_size.
194 */
195 if (len > p_size)
196 fortify_panic(__func__);
197
198 /*
199 * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
200 * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen().
201 * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs.
202 */
203 return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
204}
205
206/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
207__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)
208char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count)
209{
210 size_t p_len, copy_len;
211 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
212 size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
213
214 if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
215 return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
216 p_len = strlen(p);
217 copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
218 if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
219 fortify_panic(__func__);
220 __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
221 p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
222 return p;
223}
224
225__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
226 const size_t p_size,
227 const size_t p_size_field)
228{
229 if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
230 /*
231 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
232 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
233 * buffer sizes are known.
234 */
235
236 /* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
237 if (p_size > p_size_field && p_size < size)
238 __write_overflow();
239
240 /* Warn when write size is larger than dest field. */
241 if (p_size_field < size)
242 __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
243 }
244 /*
245 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
246 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
247 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
248 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
249 * overflows.)
250 */
251
252 /*
253 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
254 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
255 * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
256 * lengths are unknown.)
257 */
258 if (p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size)
259 fortify_panic("memset");
260}
261
262#define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({ \
263 size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size); \
264 fortify_memset_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, p_size_field), \
265 __underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size); \
266})
267
268/*
269 * __builtin_object_size() must be captured here to avoid evaluating argument
270 * side-effects further into the macro layers.
271 */
272#define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s, \
273 __builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(p, 1))
274
275/*
276 * To make sure the compiler can enforce protection against buffer overflows,
277 * memcpy(), memmove(), and memset() must not be used beyond individual
278 * struct members. If you need to copy across multiple members, please use
279 * struct_group() to create a named mirror of an anonymous struct union.
280 * (e.g. see struct sk_buff.) Read overflow checking is currently only
281 * done when a write overflow is also present, or when building with W=1.
282 *
283 * Mitigation coverage matrix
284 * Bounds checking at:
285 * +-------+-------+-------+-------+
286 * | Compile time | Run time |
287 * memcpy() argument sizes: | write | read | write | read |
288 * dest source length +-------+-------+-------+-------+
289 * memcpy(known, known, constant) | y | y | n/a | n/a |
290 * memcpy(known, unknown, constant) | y | n | n/a | V |
291 * memcpy(known, known, dynamic) | n | n | B | B |
292 * memcpy(known, unknown, dynamic) | n | n | B | V |
293 * memcpy(unknown, known, constant) | n | y | V | n/a |
294 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, constant) | n | n | V | V |
295 * memcpy(unknown, known, dynamic) | n | n | V | B |
296 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, dynamic) | n | n | V | V |
297 * +-------+-------+-------+-------+
298 *
299 * y = perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
300 * n = cannot perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
301 * n/a = no run-time bounds checking needed since compile-time deterministic
302 * B = can perform run-time bounds checking (currently unimplemented)
303 * V = vulnerable to run-time overflow (will need refactoring to solve)
304 *
305 */
306__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
307 const size_t p_size,
308 const size_t q_size,
309 const size_t p_size_field,
310 const size_t q_size_field,
311 const char *func)
312{
313 if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
314 /*
315 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
316 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
317 * buffer sizes are known.
318 */
319
320 /* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
321 if (p_size > p_size_field && p_size < size)
322 __write_overflow();
323 if (q_size > q_size_field && q_size < size)
324 __read_overflow2();
325
326 /* Warn when write size argument larger than dest field. */
327 if (p_size_field < size)
328 __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
329 /*
330 * Warn for source field over-read when building with W=1
331 * or when an over-write happened, so both can be fixed at
332 * the same time.
333 */
334 if ((IS_ENABLED(KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1) || p_size_field < size) &&
335 q_size_field < size)
336 __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
337 }
338 /*
339 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
340 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
341 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
342 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
343 * overflows.)
344 */
345
346 /*
347 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
348 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
349 * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
350 * lengths are unknown.)
351 */
352 if ((p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size) ||
353 (q_size != (size_t)(-1) && q_size < size))
354 fortify_panic(func);
355}
356
357#define __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, size, p_size, q_size, \
358 p_size_field, q_size_field, op) ({ \
359 size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size); \
360 fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, q_size, \
361 p_size_field, q_size_field, #op); \
362 __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \
363})
364
365/*
366 * __builtin_object_size() must be captured here to avoid evaluating argument
367 * side-effects further into the macro layers.
368 */
369#define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \
370 __builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(q, 0), \
371 __builtin_object_size(p, 1), __builtin_object_size(q, 1), \
372 memcpy)
373#define memmove(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \
374 __builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(q, 0), \
375 __builtin_object_size(p, 1), __builtin_object_size(q, 1), \
376 memmove)
377
378extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
379__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
380{
381 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
382
383 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
384 __read_overflow();
385 if (p_size < size)
386 fortify_panic(__func__);
387 return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
388}
389
390__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memcmp, 1, 2, 3)
391int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t size)
392{
393 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
394 size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
395
396 if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
397 if (p_size < size)
398 __read_overflow();
399 if (q_size < size)
400 __read_overflow2();
401 }
402 if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
403 fortify_panic(__func__);
404 return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
405}
406
407__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memchr, 1, 2, 3)
408void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
409{
410 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
411
412 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
413 __read_overflow();
414 if (p_size < size)
415 fortify_panic(__func__);
416 return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
417}
418
419void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
420__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
421{
422 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
423
424 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
425 __read_overflow();
426 if (p_size < size)
427 fortify_panic(__func__);
428 return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
429}
430
431extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
432__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
433{
434 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
435
436 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
437 __read_overflow();
438 if (p_size < size)
439 fortify_panic(__func__);
440 return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
441}
442
443/* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */
444__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)
445char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
446{
447 size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
448 size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
449 size_t size;
450
451 /* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */
452 if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
453 return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
454 size = strlen(q) + 1;
455 /* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */
456 if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
457 __write_overflow();
458 /* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
459 if (p_size < size)
460 fortify_panic(__func__);
461 __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
462 return p;
463}
464
465/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
466#undef __underlying_memchr
467#undef __underlying_memcmp
468#undef __underlying_strcat
469#undef __underlying_strcpy
470#undef __underlying_strlen
471#undef __underlying_strncat
472#undef __underlying_strncpy
473
474#undef POS
475#undef POS0
476
477#endif /* _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ */