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1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ 2/* 3 * Based on arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. 6 */ 7#ifndef __ASM_UACCESS_H 8#define __ASM_UACCESS_H 9 10#include <asm/alternative.h> 11#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h> 12#include <asm/sysreg.h> 13 14/* 15 * User space memory access functions 16 */ 17#include <linux/bitops.h> 18#include <linux/kasan-checks.h> 19#include <linux/string.h> 20 21#include <asm/cpufeature.h> 22#include <asm/mmu.h> 23#include <asm/mte.h> 24#include <asm/ptrace.h> 25#include <asm/memory.h> 26#include <asm/extable.h> 27 28#define HAVE_GET_KERNEL_NOFAULT 29 30/* 31 * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address. 32 * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise. 33 * 34 * This is equivalent to the following test: 35 * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX 36 */ 37static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size) 38{ 39 unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1; 40 41 /* 42 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the 43 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag 44 * the user address before checking. 45 */ 46 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI) && 47 (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR))) 48 addr = untagged_addr(addr); 49 50 __chk_user_ptr(addr); 51 asm volatile( 52 // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps: 53 // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64 54 " adds %0, %3, %2\n" 55 // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4 56 " csel %1, xzr, %1, hi\n" 57 // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X' 58 // to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For 59 // X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does. 60 " csinv %0, %0, xzr, cc\n" 61 // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1 62 // comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are 63 // testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments. 64 " sbcs xzr, %0, %1\n" 65 " cset %0, ls\n" 66 : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc"); 67 68 return ret; 69} 70 71#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) 72 73#define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ 74 " .pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \ 75 " .align 3\n" \ 76 " .long (" #from " - .), (" #to " - .)\n" \ 77 " .popsection\n" 78 79/* 80 * User access enabling/disabling. 81 */ 82#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN 83static inline void __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void) 84{ 85 unsigned long flags, ttbr; 86 87 local_irq_save(flags); 88 ttbr = read_sysreg(ttbr1_el1); 89 ttbr &= ~TTBR_ASID_MASK; 90 /* reserved_pg_dir placed before swapper_pg_dir */ 91 write_sysreg(ttbr - RESERVED_SWAPPER_OFFSET, ttbr0_el1); 92 isb(); 93 /* Set reserved ASID */ 94 write_sysreg(ttbr, ttbr1_el1); 95 isb(); 96 local_irq_restore(flags); 97} 98 99static inline void __uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void) 100{ 101 unsigned long flags, ttbr0, ttbr1; 102 103 /* 104 * Disable interrupts to avoid preemption between reading the 'ttbr0' 105 * variable and the MSR. A context switch could trigger an ASID 106 * roll-over and an update of 'ttbr0'. 107 */ 108 local_irq_save(flags); 109 ttbr0 = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->ttbr0); 110 111 /* Restore active ASID */ 112 ttbr1 = read_sysreg(ttbr1_el1); 113 ttbr1 &= ~TTBR_ASID_MASK; /* safety measure */ 114 ttbr1 |= ttbr0 & TTBR_ASID_MASK; 115 write_sysreg(ttbr1, ttbr1_el1); 116 isb(); 117 118 /* Restore user page table */ 119 write_sysreg(ttbr0, ttbr0_el1); 120 isb(); 121 local_irq_restore(flags); 122} 123 124static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void) 125{ 126 if (!system_uses_ttbr0_pan()) 127 return false; 128 __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); 129 return true; 130} 131 132static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void) 133{ 134 if (!system_uses_ttbr0_pan()) 135 return false; 136 __uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); 137 return true; 138} 139#else 140static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void) 141{ 142 return false; 143} 144 145static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void) 146{ 147 return false; 148} 149#endif 150 151static inline void __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(void) 152{ 153 asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), ARM64_HAS_PAN, 154 CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); 155} 156 157static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) 158{ 159 asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), ARM64_HAS_PAN, 160 CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); 161} 162 163/* 164 * The Tag Check Flag (TCF) mode for MTE is per EL, hence TCF0 165 * affects EL0 and TCF affects EL1 irrespective of which TTBR is 166 * used. 167 * The kernel accesses TTBR0 usually with LDTR/STTR instructions 168 * when UAO is available, so these would act as EL0 accesses using 169 * TCF0. 170 * However futex.h code uses exclusives which would be executed as 171 * EL1, this can potentially cause a tag check fault even if the 172 * user disables TCF0. 173 * 174 * To address the problem we set the PSTATE.TCO bit in uaccess_enable() 175 * and reset it in uaccess_disable(). 176 * 177 * The Tag check override (TCO) bit disables temporarily the tag checking 178 * preventing the issue. 179 */ 180static inline void __uaccess_disable_tco(void) 181{ 182 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(0), 183 ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); 184} 185 186static inline void __uaccess_enable_tco(void) 187{ 188 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1), 189 ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); 190} 191 192/* 193 * These functions disable tag checking only if in MTE async mode 194 * since the sync mode generates exceptions synchronously and the 195 * nofault or load_unaligned_zeropad can handle them. 196 */ 197static inline void __uaccess_disable_tco_async(void) 198{ 199 if (system_uses_mte_async_mode()) 200 __uaccess_disable_tco(); 201} 202 203static inline void __uaccess_enable_tco_async(void) 204{ 205 if (system_uses_mte_async_mode()) 206 __uaccess_enable_tco(); 207} 208 209static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) 210{ 211 __uaccess_disable_tco(); 212 213 if (uaccess_ttbr0_disable()) 214 return; 215 216 __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); 217} 218 219static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) 220{ 221 __uaccess_enable_tco(); 222 223 if (uaccess_ttbr0_enable()) 224 return; 225 226 __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); 227} 228 229/* 230 * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the maximum 231 * user address. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), untag 232 * the pointer before checking. 233 */ 234#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) 235static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) 236{ 237 void __user *safe_ptr; 238 239 asm volatile( 240 " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" 241 " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" 242 : "=&r" (safe_ptr) 243 : "r" (ptr), "r" (TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1), 244 "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) 245 : "cc"); 246 247 csdb(); 248 return safe_ptr; 249} 250 251/* 252 * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address 253 * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()" 254 * call. 255 * 256 * The "__xxx_error" versions set the third argument to -EFAULT if an error 257 * occurs, and leave it unchanged on success. 258 */ 259#define __get_mem_asm(load, reg, x, addr, err) \ 260 asm volatile( \ 261 "1: " load " " reg "1, [%2]\n" \ 262 "2:\n" \ 263 " .section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" \ 264 " .align 2\n" \ 265 "3: mov %w0, %3\n" \ 266 " mov %1, #0\n" \ 267 " b 2b\n" \ 268 " .previous\n" \ 269 _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \ 270 : "+r" (err), "=&r" (x) \ 271 : "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT)) 272 273#define __raw_get_mem(ldr, x, ptr, err) \ 274do { \ 275 unsigned long __gu_val; \ 276 switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \ 277 case 1: \ 278 __get_mem_asm(ldr "b", "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 279 break; \ 280 case 2: \ 281 __get_mem_asm(ldr "h", "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 282 break; \ 283 case 4: \ 284 __get_mem_asm(ldr, "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 285 break; \ 286 case 8: \ 287 __get_mem_asm(ldr, "%x", __gu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 288 break; \ 289 default: \ 290 BUILD_BUG(); \ 291 } \ 292 (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ 293} while (0) 294 295#define __raw_get_user(x, ptr, err) \ 296do { \ 297 __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \ 298 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ 299 __raw_get_mem("ldtr", x, ptr, err); \ 300 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ 301} while (0) 302 303#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ 304do { \ 305 __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ 306 might_fault(); \ 307 if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ 308 __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ 309 __raw_get_user((x), __p, (err)); \ 310 } else { \ 311 (x) = (__force __typeof__(x))0; (err) = -EFAULT; \ 312 } \ 313} while (0) 314 315#define __get_user(x, ptr) \ 316({ \ 317 int __gu_err = 0; \ 318 __get_user_error((x), (ptr), __gu_err); \ 319 __gu_err; \ 320}) 321 322#define get_user __get_user 323 324#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ 325do { \ 326 int __gkn_err = 0; \ 327 \ 328 __uaccess_enable_tco_async(); \ 329 __raw_get_mem("ldr", *((type *)(dst)), \ 330 (__force type *)(src), __gkn_err); \ 331 __uaccess_disable_tco_async(); \ 332 if (unlikely(__gkn_err)) \ 333 goto err_label; \ 334} while (0) 335 336#define __put_mem_asm(store, reg, x, addr, err) \ 337 asm volatile( \ 338 "1: " store " " reg "1, [%2]\n" \ 339 "2:\n" \ 340 " .section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ 341 " .align 2\n" \ 342 "3: mov %w0, %3\n" \ 343 " b 2b\n" \ 344 " .previous\n" \ 345 _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \ 346 : "+r" (err) \ 347 : "r" (x), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT)) 348 349#define __raw_put_mem(str, x, ptr, err) \ 350do { \ 351 __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x); \ 352 switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \ 353 case 1: \ 354 __put_mem_asm(str "b", "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 355 break; \ 356 case 2: \ 357 __put_mem_asm(str "h", "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 358 break; \ 359 case 4: \ 360 __put_mem_asm(str, "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 361 break; \ 362 case 8: \ 363 __put_mem_asm(str, "%x", __pu_val, (ptr), (err)); \ 364 break; \ 365 default: \ 366 BUILD_BUG(); \ 367 } \ 368} while (0) 369 370#define __raw_put_user(x, ptr, err) \ 371do { \ 372 __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \ 373 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ 374 __raw_put_mem("sttr", x, ptr, err); \ 375 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ 376} while (0) 377 378#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ 379do { \ 380 __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ 381 might_fault(); \ 382 if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ 383 __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ 384 __raw_put_user((x), __p, (err)); \ 385 } else { \ 386 (err) = -EFAULT; \ 387 } \ 388} while (0) 389 390#define __put_user(x, ptr) \ 391({ \ 392 int __pu_err = 0; \ 393 __put_user_error((x), (ptr), __pu_err); \ 394 __pu_err; \ 395}) 396 397#define put_user __put_user 398 399#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ 400do { \ 401 int __pkn_err = 0; \ 402 \ 403 __uaccess_enable_tco_async(); \ 404 __raw_put_mem("str", *((type *)(src)), \ 405 (__force type *)(dst), __pkn_err); \ 406 __uaccess_disable_tco_async(); \ 407 if (unlikely(__pkn_err)) \ 408 goto err_label; \ 409} while(0) 410 411extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); 412#define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ 413({ \ 414 unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ 415 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ 416 __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), \ 417 __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \ 418 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ 419 __acfu_ret; \ 420}) 421 422extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); 423#define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ 424({ \ 425 unsigned long __actu_ret; \ 426 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ 427 __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \ 428 (from), (n)); \ 429 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ 430 __actu_ret; \ 431}) 432 433extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); 434#define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \ 435({ \ 436 unsigned long __aciu_ret; \ 437 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ 438 __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \ 439 __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \ 440 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ 441 __aciu_ret; \ 442}) 443 444#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER 445#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER 446 447extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n); 448static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) 449{ 450 if (access_ok(to, n)) { 451 uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); 452 n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n); 453 uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); 454 } 455 return n; 456} 457#define clear_user __clear_user 458 459extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count); 460 461extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n); 462 463#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE 464struct page; 465void memcpy_page_flushcache(char *to, struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t len); 466extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user_flushcache(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); 467 468static inline int __copy_from_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) 469{ 470 kasan_check_write(dst, size); 471 return __copy_user_flushcache(dst, __uaccess_mask_ptr(src), size); 472} 473#endif 474 475#endif /* __ASM_UACCESS_H */