--- id: web-launch title: Checkers run by somebody else pass against the live deployment status: open crates: [didbot-serve] dependsOn: [deploy] exitCriterion: > Every checker named here has been run against the live deployment by its public name, and each probe either passes or is recorded in docs/conformance.md with the reason its result is accepted. --- # web-launch Some conformance checks only work once the server is on the public internet. The checker runs on somebody else's machine, or in a browser tab on somebody else's origin, and reaches this server the way a stranger would. On `*.localhost` there is nothing for it to reach. [docs/conformance.md](../docs/conformance.md) records what runs in-process and what `goat` checks against a local server. This epic is the other half: public tools, pointed at `pds.did.bot`, with a record of what each one said. ## What makes a check launch-only - **Public DNS.** The checker asks resolvers this project does not run. pdscheck asks Cloudflare over DNS-over-HTTPS. bsky-debug checks that public resolvers agree with the authoritative answer. - **A publicly trusted certificate.** `infra/pds/`'s `acme_environment` defaults to `production`. A staging certificate fails every checker here the same way no certificate does, and did.bot's HSTS header, which covers the PDS hosts once `infra/site/`'s `pds_serves_a_production_certificate` is true, makes a browser refuse to click through it. - **Cross-origin requests.** A checker that runs in the browser fetches from its own origin. Each probe passes only if the response carries `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`. - **Third parties that crawl.** A relay reports a host as active only after it has crawled it. ## pdscheck.dev A static page that runs its probes in the viewer's browser. Its source is at `tangled.org/chaosgreml.in/pdscheck`, and its probe list is one array in that source. It takes a PDS URL, a handle or a DID. A URL input skips every probe that needs an account, so a full run is three runs. The two PLC history probes report `skip` for a `did:web`. That is their pass. ## bsky-debug.app/handle Bluesky's handle debugger. It takes a handle and checks two methods. By DNS: the `_atproto.` TXT record exists, is authoritative, holds a valid DID, and public resolvers agree. By HTTP: `https:///.well-known/atproto-did` returns 200 and a DID. A handle passes if either method passes. - [ ] **Run it against a soft-deleted account's handle**, and record whether the handle still resolves. [tombstone-serving](tombstone-serving.md) keeps a soft-deleted account's identity resolvable. The 2026-10-14 run found no soft-deleted account to try. ## The rest of the family Each of these reaches the server from outside, and each needs its own run and its own record. - **debug.hose.cam.** The tool pdscheck's probe design came from. It adds a label lookup and live monitoring of a repository against relays. - **pdsls.dev.** A repository browser. It reads `listRecords` and `getRecord` from the browser, so it checks both CORS and whether this server's records render in somebody else's interface. - **internect.info.** Handle and DID lookup, from a third implementation. - **Qualys SSL Labs.** The server terminates its own TLS, with no load balancer in front (see `terraform-aws-didbot-pds/ec2.tf`). The grade is a grade of this server's TLS configuration. Test the zone hostname and one agent hostname, since agents are served under the wildcard certificate. - **Mozilla HTTP Observatory**, against the dashboard. It is the surface a person's browser session lives on. - **DNSViz**, against the zone. It checks that the parent's NS records match the zone's own, which is the delegation step [aws-deploy](aws-deploy.md) says an operator must not miss. ## Keeping it true - [ ] **Rerun after every release.** pdscheck prints a `curl` command for each probe, so most of its checks can run from a script after a deploy. The browser run still matters, because only a browser enforces CORS. ## Done - [x] **Run every checker against a production certificate.** On 2026-10-14 both zones served Let's Encrypt production certificates. [docs/conformance.md](../docs/conformance.md) records each run: the checker, its source commit or version, the server process it reached, and each non-pass with its reason. - [x] **Run pdscheck with the server's URL, an agent's handle and an agent's DID.** The non-passes are `/xrpc/_health`, the handle's DNS method and two relays. The first two are the decisions below. - [x] **Decide what pdscheck's health probe should see.** The reference PDS's answer. `GET /xrpc/_health` returns `{"version": ...}`, the `revision` `/health` already reports, or a 503 adding `"error": "Service Unavailable"` while the server serves no reads. It answers cross-origin, so pdscheck's browser probe passes, and debug.hose.cam reads its version from it. - [x] **Decide whether an agent gets an `_atproto` TXT record.** No, and pdscheck's warning is accepted. An agent handle resolves over HTTPS from `/.well-known/atproto-did`. The [handle spec](https://atproto.com/specs/handle#handle-resolution) prefers DNS for a handle configured by hand, and says services should fully support both methods, so either one resolves a handle on its own. A TXT record per agent would add a DNS write to the provisioning path and a second record to remove when the account goes. Both cost reliability, and resolution gains nothing. - [x] **Pass the relay probes.** Five of the seven relays pdscheck lists report the host active and the repository at the server's `rev`. `relay.upcloud.world` does not resolve, and `atproto.africa` does not serve either method. - [x] **Run bsky-debug against an agent's handle.** It passes by HTTP. - [x] **Run debug.hose.cam, pdsls.dev, internect.info, SSL Labs, HTTP Observatory and DNSViz.** SSL Labs grades both names A and Observatory grades the dashboard C+. Both lose the same points to the `Strict-Transport-Security` header, which a Tangled issue tracks. - [x] **Answer cross-origin requests on the public XRPC and `/.well-known/` routes.** `didbot_serve::routes::cross_origin_layer` is layered on the `/xrpc/*` routes, the four `/.well-known/` documents, `/oauth/par` and `/oauth/token`: any origin, no credentials, `GET`/`POST`/`OPTIONS`, the whatever request headers the preflight names, and `DPoP-Nonce` and `WWW-Authenticate` exposed. Preflight is answered by the layer before the route's own 405. `/health`, `/oauth/authorize` and the dashboard answer no origin but their own; widening that set is the human decision the item named. - [x] **Serve `com.atproto.sync.getRepoStatus`.** `active` and `status` are read through `HostedAccount::sync_status`, the mapping `subscribeRepos`'s `#account` is announced from, with `rev` when the repository is fetchable and `RepoNotFound` where the stream is silent. The conformance harness checks the body against the vendored document and that the route and the stream agree at every state-and-lock position. - [x] **Serve `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`** (RFC 9728). Served from `routes::oauth_protected_resource_metadata`, naming this server as its one authorization server and checked against the authorization server document in `crates/didbot-serve/src/tests/mod.rs`.