Something went wrong. Try again.
A free, open-source, self-hosted place to write a novel.
Something went wrong. Try again.
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112import { isIP } from 'node:net';
/** * The scheme decides the app's own origin. SvelteKit compares that origin with * the browser's `Origin` header on every form POST, so a wrong answer rejects * writes and a spoofable answer lets a client choose the origin. * * The client address decides a throttle bucket and a session record. Both are * request headers any client can send, so only a deployment where a proxy * overwrites them may believe them, which is what `TRUST_PROXY=1` states. These * helpers only parse and resolve; the policy lives in `server.js`. */
/** * The scheme of a declared origin, or null when it names none. A value that is * not an absolute http(s) URL returns null, rather than passing another scheme * to the adapter. */export function schemeFromOrigin(origin) { if (typeof origin !== 'string') return null;
const raw = origin.trim();
if (raw.length === 0) return null;
try { const { protocol } = new URL(raw);
return protocol === 'http:' || protocol === 'https:' ? protocol.slice(0, -1) : null; } catch { return null; }}
/** * The scheme the nearest proxy appended to `X-Forwarded-Proto`, or null. * * A proxy appends to the header, so the last entry is the one it wrote. Earlier * entries came from the client and may be forged. Callers must use this only * when every request arrives through that proxy. */export function schemeFromForwarded(value) { const raw = Array.isArray(value) ? value.at(-1) : value;
if (typeof raw !== 'string') return null;
const entries = raw.split(','); const last = entries.at(-1)?.trim().toLowerCase();
return last === 'http' || last === 'https' ? last : null;}
/** * The client address that `depth` proxies agreed on, or null. * * A proxy appends the address it saw, so the trustworthy entry sits `depth` * from the right; every earlier entry came from the client. Callers must use * this only when every request arrives through those proxies. */export function addressFromForwarded(value, depth) { const raw = Array.isArray(value) ? value.at(-1) : value;
if (typeof raw !== 'string') return null;
const entries = raw .split(',') .map((entry) => entry.trim()) .filter(Boolean);
if (!Number.isInteger(depth) || depth < 1 || depth > entries.length) return null;
const selected = entries[entries.length - depth];
return selected && isIP(selected) ? selected : null;}
/** * A proxy depth that is safe to index with. A missing or malformed value means * one proxy, which is what a single `X-Forwarded-For` entry implies. */export function proxyDepth(value) { const depth = Number(value);
return Number.isInteger(depth) && depth > 0 ? depth : 1;}
/** * The one client address this server lets anything else see. * * Adapter-node and better-auth read headers, and better-auth never sees the * socket, so a client-supplied value reaches both unless the entry point * overwrites it. `TRUST_PROXY=0` means no header is trustworthy, so only the * socket can answer. Behind a declared proxy the address comes from the header * the operator named: an appended chain for `X-Forwarded-For`, a single value * for any other header, which is what those proxies send. * * A missing or malformed value falls back to the socket. A throw here would * stop the request, and a wrong address is worse than a shared one. */export function resolveClientAddress({ trustProxy, addressHeader, depth, headers, socket }) { if (!trustProxy) return socket;
if (addressHeader === 'x-forwarded-for') { return addressFromForwarded(headers['x-forwarded-for'], depth) ?? socket; }
const reported = addressHeader ? headers[addressHeader] : undefined; const value = Array.isArray(reported) ? reported.at(-1) : reported;
return typeof value === 'string' && isIP(value.trim()) ? value.trim() : socket;}